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name in the order in which it appears in those records.   
The titles of trial records include the names of all defendants in a case, 
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unconditionally ABSTRACT 
After the war in the Pacific formally ended in September 1945, the victorious Allies 
occupied Japan and pursued Japanese militarism through democratisation programs and 
war crimes tribunals. Australian officials took part in the multinational effort to bring 
members of Japan’s leadership, the 'Class A' war criminals, to account for the war. 
Between 1945 and 1951 the government and military also ran wholly Australian trials, 
prosecuting about 800 'Class B and C' suspects for mistreating soldiers and civilians 
during the conflict. The government needed to be seen to be addressing public outrage 
over Japanese atrocities, by bringing the perpetrators to justice. In the 1950s, however, 
as the Cold War escalated and US priorities changed, Australian authorities became 
conscious that they needed to promote good relations with the US and with Japan. 
Australia’s harsh polices on war criminals proved to be a significant obstacle, and 
pressure to show clemency to imprisoned war criminals increased. The government 
eventually released all surviving war criminals in Australian custody by mid-1957.  
Writing on the early post-war period in Australia generally acknowledges that Japan 
was a focus of an increasingly independent and energetic foreign policy agenda. 
Nevertheless, the BC trials have received very little scholarly attention. The trials and 
their aftermath, however, constitute a twelve-year foreign policy project that illuminates 
Australia’s relations with Japan and the US during an era when Australia sought to 
establish itself as an independent participant in Asia-Pacific politics. The increasingly 
political dimension of the BC trials, and their propensity to inflame domestic opinion 
and to become entwined with high-level policies, means they offer a unique perspective 
on post-war Australian politics, society and, especially, foreign policy. 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For Australia’s government, military and people, the conflict with Japan that 
lasted from December 1941 to August 1945 was by the far the most significant 
part of the Second World War. During those years Australian forces, alongside 
those of the United States of America and the rest of the British Commonwealth, 
battled the Japanese military on land, at sea and in the air, in a series of ferocious 
and bloody encounters. Japan achieved great military success early in its war 
against the US and its allies; at its peak the Japanese empire encompassed large 
areas of East and South East Asia and the Pacific. As a result of their sweeping 
early victories, Japanese forces captured roughly 320,000 prisoners, of whom 
140,000 were Allied soldiers. The rest were civilians in areas that Japanese forces 
occupied.
1 Of the Allied soldiers, about 22,000 were Australian.
2 In August 1945 
Japan surrendered unconditionally. The Allies occupied Japan from September 
1945 until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952. The 
Occupation was officially a multilateral undertaking by the Allies, whose interests 
were represented on the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, which 
was intended to be the main policy-making body for the Occupation. In practice, 
however, the Occupation was dominated by the United States, and chiefly by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, 
                                                           
1 Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War Two in the 
Pacific, Carlton, Victoria, Scribe Publications, 1994, p. 96. 
2 For details see Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns, Canberra, Australian War 
Memorial, 1963, p. 634. 2 
 
and his vast supporting military and civilian organisation in Japan. Nonetheless, 
the Occupation of Japan formed a dynamic part of several nations’ post-war 
foreign policy, including Australia’s.    
In the early period of the Occupation, the Allied authorities focused on 
removing Japanese militarism and reforming Japan so that it would become a 
democratic nation. A key part of this agenda was bringing alleged war criminals to 
justice. As the Second World War drew to a close, the Allied leadership had made 
special mention of war crimes, in particular signalling in the Potsdam Declaration 
of July 1945 an intention to call to account all war criminals, including those 
Japanese soldiers who were responsible for cruelties against prisoners of war 
(POWs).
3 In areas occupied by the Japanese, treatment of Allied prisoners and of 
the native peoples had been unsympathetic, lacking in compassion and at times 
brutal. Moreover, as the tide of war turned against Japan, supply problems and the 
need to extract hard physical labour from POWs and civilians had led to further 
deterioration in conditions for those subject to Japanese authority. Japan’s 
treatment of foreign civilians and POWs thus became a major focus of a series of 
military trials for ‘ordinary’ war crimes, which were conducted separately from 
the international trials in Tokyo of political, military and diplomatic leaders. 
Australia was one of seven countries to prosecute Japanese soldiers for ‘ordinary’ 
war crimes. The Australian trials of alleged Japanese war criminals, and their 
political and social significance, are the subject of this thesis. 
                                                           
3 Potsdam Declaration, July 1945, in John M. Maki (ed.), Conflict and Tension in 
the Far East: Key Documents, 1894-1960, Seattle, University of Washington 
Press, 1961, p. 122. 3 
 
Overall, the crimes prosecuted at the Allied trials of Japanese war 
criminals were divided into three types, according to a categorization set out in 
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, a 
document signed by the USA, France, Great Britain and the USSR which was 
initially supposed to provide the legal basis of trials of major European war 
criminals. Suspected war criminals were to be divided into ‘Class A’, ‘Class B’ 
and ‘Class C’. ‘Class A’ suspects were considered to be major war criminals and 
were charged with offences relating to the planning, initiating or waging of 
aggressive war. In the Japanese case, twenty-eight ‘Class A’ suspects faced trial in 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo between 
April 1946 and November 1948 and all twenty-five against whom verdicts were 
passed were found guilty of one or more charges.
4 The Class B and C trials of 
Japanese suspects began very soon after the war ended, in late 1945.  ‘Class B’ 
suspects were to be charged with ‘conventional war crimes’, whilst ‘Class C’ 
suspects would be charged with ‘crimes against humanity’. In practice, however, 
there was little difference between Classes B and C in court, and the two 
categories were usually treated together.
5 The accused in BC war crimes trials 
                                                           
4 For details of the Tokyo trials see Timothy Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The 
Japanese War Crimes Trials, Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 
2001; Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials: The Pursuit of Justice in the 
Wake of World War Two, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
2008; Richard  Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971; N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo 
International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
5 S. Wilson, ‘After the Trials: Class B and C Japanese War Criminals and the 
Post-War World, 1946-1958’, Japanese Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 2, September 4 
 
ranged from the lowest-ranking Japanese soldiers to senior officers in command of 
units. The crimes ranged from, at the lower end, slapping, beating or mistreating a 
prisoner, to cases of murder and cannibalism. Some high profile cases involved 
questions of ‘command responsibility’, which assessed the guilt of Japanese 
commanders in failing to prevent war crimes perpetrated by their units. 
Class B and C suspects were not prosecuted in international courts but 
rather by individual Allied governments. In all, 5,677 Japanese soldiers were 
prosecuted for Class B and C war crimes by seven different governments, namely 
those of the USA, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Philippines, France, 
Nationalist China and Australia, in about fifty venues around Asia and the Pacific, 
and in Darwin. The USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also 
conducted trials of Japanese war criminals, but did not recognise the categories of 
‘Class B’ and ‘Class C’, and thus operated outside the system in which Australia 
participated, and on a completely different timetable. As Communist countries, the 
USSR and the PRC did not work together with the other Allies, nor did they keep 
them or the Japanese government informed of the progress of their legal 
proceedings. In fact, the Soviet trials were conducted in secret and consisted of 
summary proceedings only.
6 The Allied trials, by contrast, featured dialogue 
                                                                                                                                                                
2011, p. 142. The categories ‘B’ and ‘C’ do not appear to have been used routinely 
in the trials of German war criminals. In this thesis I refer to prosecutions in the 
two categories collectively as the ‘BC trials’. 
6 For the Soviet trials see John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath 
of World War II, London, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1999, p. 449; Boris G. 
Yudin, ‘Research on Humans at the Khabarovsk War Crimes Trial: An Historical 
and Ethical Examination’, in Jing-Bao Nie et al. (eds), Japan’s Wartime Medical 
Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History and Ethics, London, 5 
 
among the prosecuting countries, similar legal frameworks, and an effort to 
conduct transparent proceedings. For these reasons, the Communist trials are not 
considered in detail in this thesis. Trials by the six Allied governments apart from 
Australia will be referred to when they impinge upon the Australian prosecutions 
and on Australian official thinking about how to deal with Japanese war criminals.  
The Australian trials were conducted according to the Australian War 
Crimes Act 1945, which was completed in October 1945 after the Australian 
government declined an offer to use the legal framework the UK had prepared for 
its trials. The Australian prosecutions began in November 1945 and concluded in 
April 1951. Australia was the last of the seven Allied governments to conclude its 
trials, although for its part the PRC did not even begin proceedings until 1956. 
Continuing trials into the 1950s was not originally part of the Australian 
government’s plan. Government officials initially thought the hearings would take 
twelve months to complete, but delays saw this loose deadline extended to 1947 
and then finally to 1951. In total, 296 Australian trials were held, and 924 accused 
were prosecuted. Because some accused appeared in two or more trials, the actual 
number of defendants was fewer, at 814. Six hundred and forty-four accused were 
convicted, with 148 death sentences handed down, and a total of 137 individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                
Routledge, 2010, pp. 59-78. For the PRC see A. Cathcart and P. Nash, ‘War 
Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the 
Shenyang Trials, 1954-1956’, Twentieth Century China, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2009, pp. 
89-111; A. Cathcart and P. Nash, ‘“To Serve Revenge for the Dead”: Chinese 
Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the PRC Foreign Ministry 
Archive, 1949-1956’, China Quarterly, Vol. 200, 2009, pp. 1053-1069. 6 
 
actually executed.
7 Some of the trials were conducted with a single defendant, 
whilst others were large, with as many as ninety-two defendants in the most 
extreme case.
8 War criminals were prosecuted by the Australian government in 
Rabaul, Wewak and Manus Island in Australian New Guinea; Singapore; Hong 
Kong; Morotai in the Netherlands Indies; and Labuan in Malaya. Early tribunals 
were also convened in Darwin, although after three trials there in March and April 
1946, the Australian government decided that no more prosecutions should be 
conducted on Australian soil, due to the intensely negative press reaction to the 
perceived leniency of the verdicts and sentences.
9  
The Australian government pursued Japanese war criminals with particular 
tenacity. By 1949, most of the wartime Allies were bringing their trials to a close, 
or had actually completed them. Activity in the Australian trials, too, had stalled, 
but this was due to bureaucratic difficulties and a lack of resources rather than a 
desire to end the trials permanently. Many suspects remained in custody, still 
awaiting prosecution by the Australian authorities. There was a change of 
government at the federal level in December 1949, but the pursuit of war criminals 
proved to be a bipartisan policy. The Labor Party had been in power since 1941, 
                                                           
7 D. C. S. Sissons, ‘Sources on Australian Investigations into Japanese War 
Crimes in the Pacific’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Issue 30, April 
1997, unpaginated. For details of the crimes see ‘Japanese War Criminals Charged 
Under the War Crimes Act 1945 by Australian Military Authorities 30 Nov 1945 
to Apr 1951 Against Whom Findings and Sentences Were Confirmed’, National 
Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), Melbourne, 1946-1957, 393718. 
8 Phillip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in 
the Far East 1945-1952, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1979, p. 130. 
9 Caroline Pappas, ‘Law and Politics: Australia’s War Crimes Trials in the Pacific 
1943-1961’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Australian Defence Force Academy, 
UNSW, 2001, p. 52. 7 
 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Ben Chifley after John Curtin’s death in 
office in July 1945. The Party was firmly committed to war crimes trials, though 
its resolve was tempered at times by other considerations: determination to punish 
and resist any revival of Japanese militarism was balanced with a consciousness 
that the war had greatly diminished the financial and human resources available to 
the Australian military. War crimes trials absorbed considerable military 
resources, and the army faced tight financial restrictions in the federal budget 
immediately after the war and thus was restructuring in a period of economic 
austerity.
10 Nevertheless, rather than end the prosecutions in the face of financial 
strain, or in an effort to follow its allies in winding down the trials, the Labor 
government began complicated negotiations in 1948 to restart prosecutions. As it 
happened, Labor was voted out of office in December 1949, before it could 
complete its planning to restart trials. A new government took office, representing 
a coalition of the Liberal and Country Parties and led by Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies. The Coalition built on Labor’s planning and rejuvenated the war crimes 
trial program, beginning a new period of prosecutions on Manus Island in June 
1950.  
The Australian government also retained direct custody of prisoners after 
conviction longer than other countries did. Prior to enactment of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952, convicted war criminals were incarcerated either 
in an overseas prison controlled by the prosecuting government, or in Sugamo 
                                                           
10 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 161-162. 8 
 
Prison in occupied Tokyo, under US military jurisdiction. After the end of the 
Occupation, Sugamo was transferred to Japanese administration. Article 11 of the 
peace treaty, however, stipulated that the convicting nation retained the sole right 
to vary sentences, and thus to release prisoners, whether on parole or 
unconditionally, regardless of where they were held. Prosecuting nations could 
keep control of convicted war criminals in areas under their direct jurisdiction if 
they chose, but by the end of 1952, all BC criminals except those held by the 
Philippines and Australia had been transferred to Sugamo Prison to serve out the 
remainder of their sentences. Although a small number of war criminals convicted 
by Australian courts in Hong Kong and Singapore had been repatriated to Sugamo 
by the end of 1951 along with their British-tried counterparts, the majority were 
by then imprisoned on Manus Island, where they were being used as cheap labour 
by the Australian navy.
11  
In 1952, the Australian government began to consider repatriation from 
Manus Island. Pressure from Japan and a growing understanding that the world 
had changed had produced a softening of the government's stance on war 
criminals, but negotiations over repatriation were nevertheless protracted and 
difficult. The last Japanese prisoners convicted by Australian courts were returned 
to Japan in July 1953, six weeks after the last prisoners from the Philippines, to 
serve out their sentences in Sugamo Prison.
12 In 1954, the Australian government 
                                                           
11 ‘Cabinet Agendum – Appendix’, September 1952, NAA, Canberra, A1838, 
140817.  
12 ‘External Affairs to Australian Embassy in Tokyo Regarding the Repatriation of 
War Criminals’, 7/7/53, NAA, Canberra, A1838, 246874 and Military History 9 
 
created a new set of policies on Japan, reflecting the view that Japan should now 
be regarded as a Western ally against Communism in Asia, rather than a potential 
military threat to the region, as well as a fear that Japan itself was at risk of falling 
prey to Communism. A key part of these new policies was a review of the parole 
system for war criminals convicted by Australian courts and an effort to ensure 
that all remaining Japanese war criminals would be released from Sugamo Prison 
by the end of the decade. The last war criminals convicted by Australia were in 
fact released in June 1957, a year and a half before the last of those convicted by 
US courts. The last Japanese war criminals convicted by any country were 
released from prison in Tokyo unconditionally in December 1958. 
The Australian BC trials have not been widely studied. Existing works 
have mainly been produced by legal scholars, in attempts to assess the trials’ 
fairness or to catalogue them as legal precedent for possible future war crimes 
proceedings.
13 This approach has contributed much to our understanding of the 
                                                                                                                                                                
Section (now Australian Army History Unit), ‘Report on the Directorate of 
Prisoners of War and Internees at Army Headquarters Melbourne 1939-1951’, Part 
V, Ch. 9, NAA, Melbourne, A7711, 1898192. For repatriation from the 
Philippines see Sharon Williams Chamberlain, ‘Justice and Reconciliation: Post-
war Philippine Trials of Japanese War Criminals in History and Memory’, 
unpublished PhD Dissertation, George Washington University, 2010, Ch. 4; 
Beatrice Trefalt, ‘Hostages to International Relations? The Repatriation of 
Japanese War Criminals from the Philippines’, Japanese Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 
September 2011, p. 204.  
13 See Pappas, ‘Law and Politics’ and Michael Carrel, ‘Australia's Prosecution of 
Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
University of Melbourne, 2006. A project funded by the Australian Research 
Council is currently underway to compile a detailed law reports series on the 
Australian BC trials which will constitute an official legal history of the trials, so 
that they can provide judicial precedent for war crimes proceedings around the 
world: Tim McCormack, Gideon Boas, Helen Durham, ‘Australia’s Post World 10 
 
legal and moral dimensions of the trials, but leaves aside broader consideration of 
their political and social significance, which is much greater than such an 
approach would suggest. In this thesis I investigate the broad significance of the 
trials in Australian politics and society between 1945 and 1957, when the last 
surviving Japanese war criminals prosecuted in Australian courts were released 
from prison. I seek to answer the question of how the BC trials were connected to 
Australian foreign policy, politics and social change in the second half of the 
1940s and in the 1950s. Analysis of the Australian BC trials, plus the repatriation 
of prisoners to Japan and their eventual release, increases our understanding of 
Australia’s changing diplomatic and political agenda in the post-war era. The 
government’s treatment of issues relating to Japanese war criminals illuminates 
the shifts and tensions in political and social attitudes to Japan and its region, 
showing the beginnings of Australia's new official relationships with Asian 
countries as well as its altered post-war relationships with major allies.  
Though the government insisted that seeking justice for wartime wrongs 
was the motivation for the trials, the Australian prosecutions were never 
completely separate from politics and international diplomacy. The link between 
legal and political considerations became more pronounced as time went on, 
however, in particular because the continuation of the Australian trials after 1949 
provoked tension with the US, Australia’s major ally. Examination of the trials 
and their aftermath provides valuable insight into the divergence between official 
                                                                                                                                                                
War Two War Crimes Trials: A Systematic and Comprehensive Law Reports 
Series’ (2011-2013).  11 
 
US and Australian assessments of Japan, of the Cold War and of Pacific security 
in the post-war years, showing also that official Australian views of Japan were 
slower to change after the San Francisco Peace Treaty than has been previously 
thought. Further, analysis of the trials and reactions to them contributes to a better 
understanding of retrospective Australian perceptions of the wartime experience. 
Like their counterparts in other countries, Australian politicians, officials and 
members of the public tended to see their wartime experience as unique. For many 
Australians, the apparent uniqueness of the wartime experience was reflected in an 
emphasis on the war crimes trials, and an insistence that they should continue until 
justice had been done. Australian officials were certainly resolute in their pursuit 
of war criminals, continuing to prosecute them longer than any other non-
Communist country. On the other hand, however, a study of the war crimes trials 
that extends to include the later repatriation and release of convicted war criminals 
reveals that the Australian government was only prepared to maintain an emphasis 
on war crimes for as long as it was perceived to be politically valuable, and that 
eventually Australia exchanged its tough stance on war criminals for better 
relations with Japan. In summary, this thesis shows that the BC trials provide their 
own guide to the progression of Australia’s relations with both Japan and the US, 
and to official Australian perceptions of the Cold War. The trials and their 
aftermath reveal the Australian government’s determination to pursue Japanese 
militarism after the end of the war, its steadfast attitude towards war criminals in 
the late 1940s, the relative slowness to accept Japan, even after the peace treaty, as 12 
 
a trusted friend, and then finally the commitment to better relations with Japan 
from the mid-1950s onwards. 
 
The Development of Modern War Crimes Law   
Modern war crimes law has its origins in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907. These conferences attempted, amongst other things, to develop a set of rules 
and customs for the conduct of war and the treatment of POWs.
14 The Treaty of 
Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, also included statements by the victors in the 
First World War that war crimes trials would be convened and details of how the 
courts would function. The Treaty of Versailles is highly significant in the 
development of war crimes law because for the first time, the war effort of one 
nation, namely Germany, was condemned as a criminal action.
15 The First World 
War had been the bloodiest conflict to that point in European history, and there 
was a strong desire to apportion blame for the war and its costs. With the fighting 
over, courtrooms and international politics were the only remaining arenas in 
which Germany could be brought to justice. The application of international 
agreements to war crimes trials, however, was not easy. Prosecutions of accused 
German war criminals were launched by the German government in Leipzig in 
1921, but with very limited results. In the aftermath of a conflict that had killed 
                                                           
14 Frederick W. Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague: And its Bearings on 
International Law and Policy, New York, Macmillan, 1900; A. Roberts and R. 
Guelff (eds), Documents on the Laws of War, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2000.  
15 Gerry J. Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Re-
invention of International Law, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007, p. 59. 13 
 
sixteen million people, including roughly nine million civilians, only twelve 
people were tried and six found guilty. The court imposed only light sentences and 
the Leipzig trial process is regarded now as a deeply flawed undertaking.
16  
  After Leipzig, discussion of the laws of war continued. Although it did not 
specifically deal with the laws of war, or war crimes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
signed in 1928, proved to be significant in the development of war crimes law as 
the fifteen original signatories to the pact, which included Germany and Japan, 
renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy. The Kellogg-Briand Pact later 
formed the basis of the charge of ‘crimes against peace’ in trials after the Second 
World War. Similar to the Hague conventions, the Third Geneva Convention of 
1929, that is, the agreement commonly known as ‘the Geneva Convention’, 
specifically dealt with the treatment of  prisoners of war and constituted another 
step towards international consensus on an acceptable code of conduct for waging 
war.
17  
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in September 1939, however, 
preceded any serious international attempts to formalise war crimes courts, and the 
eventual trials were essentially ad hoc creations. The devastation caused by the 
Second World War and the information that emerged relatively early on about 
atrocities in both Europe and the Pacific meant there was always a strong 
                                                           
16 Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command 
Responsibility, Wilmington, Delaware, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982, pp. 42-43; 
War Department, ‘G-I Roundtable: What Shall Be Done With War Criminals?’, 
EM 11 G-I Roundtable Series, Special Board of the American Historical 
Association, Wisconsin, 1944, pp. 13-18. 
17 Boister and Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, pp. 9-10, 121.  14 
 
likelihood that trials would be held after the conflict ended. Much of the legal 
basis and jurisdiction for war crimes trials was based on the international 
agreements mentioned above and was set more specifically by various decrees and 
declarations originating in wartime conferences among Allied leaders. In October 
1943, the leaders of the three major Allied powers, the UK, the Soviet Union and 
the United States, signed the Moscow Declaration, which indicated that those 
responsible for Nazi atrocities would be pursued and brought to justice.
18 At the 
Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allies reiterated that Nazi war criminals 
would be pursued.
19 On 8 August 1945, three months after the surrender of 
Germany and one week before Japan’s surrender, the London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal was signed by the US, the UK, the Soviet Union 
and France, beginning the process that led to the Nuremberg trials.
20 Twenty-four 
key Nazi leaders were charged as war criminals and twenty-two of them were 
eventually tried at Nuremberg between November 1945 and October 1946.
21  
In the Pacific, the situation was different. Japan had not signed the Third 
Geneva Convention of 1929 and it was difficult to determine the international 
framework under which trials could be held. As noted above, a comprehensive and 
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compelling international legal framework for war crimes trials did not exist. When 
Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, however, it 
accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration with its promise that ‘stern justice 
shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties 
upon our prisoners’.
22 Acceptance of the wording of the Potsdam Declaration 
made war crimes trials in the Pacific legally possible.  
The specific legal framework of the Class A trials in Japan, that is, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, was set forth in a SCAP 
proclamation on 19 January 1946.
23 The IMTFE convened in Tokyo on 29 April 
1946. Eleven judges sat on the tribunal, representing the US, UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands, the Philippines, India, China, Canada, France and the 
USSR. The Australian representative, Sir William Webb, was appointed as 
president of the court. On trial were twenty-eight Japanese civilian and military 
leaders. Seven were sentenced to death, sixteen to life in prison, one to twenty 
years and one to seven years. Two died before they could be sentenced and one 
was declared insane.
24  
‘Lesser’ war criminals, that is, those in Classes B and C, were tried 
separately by the US, UK, Australia, Nationalist China, France, the Netherlands 
and the Philippines, each according to its own war crimes legislation. The 
Australian government was keen to conduct trials on as large a scale as possible. 
In fact, Australian authorities had begun investigating possible war crimes before 
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the Pacific War had ended, as had US authorities. The Queensland judge, Sir 
William Webb, who would later become President of the IMTFE, conducted a 
series of investigations in 1943 and 1944 into alleged war crimes against 
Australian soldiers in New Guinea. The result was a lengthy report, extending to 
over 400 pages, claiming that Japanese war crimes against Australian soldiers 
were widespread.
25 At the end of the war, however, Australia did not have any war 
crimes legislation, reflecting the fact that the idea that war crimes trials should be 
a key element of a surrender was still in its infancy. This situation was quickly 
remedied, as will be explained in Chapter One. 
 The Australian BC trials are now generally regarded, both in Australia and 
by commentators in Japan, as flawed. Some believe the flaws seriously 
undermined the justness of the trials, while others see them as inevitable but not 
fatal. There were many obstacles to the smooth running of the tribunals. The 
Australian trials constituted a diverse and ambitious project that, like the trials 
conducted by the other Allies, faced serious challenges, including the difficulty of 
locating witnesses, time constraints and significant language barriers. Both Webb 
and the Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1941 to 1949, Dr Herbert 
Vere Evatt, stated that the trials were intended to provide an example of justice 
and fairness. Arguably, however, they fell short of this ideal. Legal procedures 
that would normally be accepted as essential safeguards were put aside: for 
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example, the rules of evidence were greatly relaxed.
26 Also, there was 
considerable inconsistency in sentencing throughout the trials. Though avoiding 
vengeance and focusing on justice were stated goals, it is hard to argue that 
individuals connected with the prosecuting side were always free from a desire for 
vengeance. The fact is that Australian soldiers involved in the trials were angry, 
upset and outraged about Japanese wartime conduct, as were many people back in 
Australia. Almost certainly some trial personnel were motivated at least in part by 
a desire for vengeance. With so many legal safeguards removed, this emotional 
backdrop may help to explain the patchy record of the tribunals. Given these 
circumstances, it is difficult to make blanket assessments of the fairness of the 
trials. Detailed examination shows many of them to have been fair and effective 
while some appear unjust, either from a technical standpoint or a moral one. The 
issue of fairness will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Two, where I argue 
that we need to assess the trials in terms of their ability to meet the relevant 
principles of international law, of the degree to which they fulfilled their initial 
goals and of their effectiveness in punishing war criminals and punishing them in 
a fair and effective way.  
 
War Crimes Trials and the Occupation of Japan  
War crimes trials were only one part of the Allied effort to reform Japan after the 
Second World War. They took place in the context of the Occupation of the 
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Japanese home islands, which began in September 1945 and ended on 28 April 
1952. The Occupation started with the goals of demilitarising and democratising 
Japan. Originally, General MacArthur wanted Japan to become a country that 
avoided involvement in military conflicts in the region but was nonetheless firmly 
aligned with US political and economic interests in the region.
27 The Japanese 
economy was to be allowed to function and develop to the extent that it could 
support a peaceful population, but beyond this, the Occupation forces were not to 
take positive steps to aid economic recovery or rehabilitation.
28 Ultranationalist 
influence was to be eliminated from the economy and government, and over 
200,000 individuals were therefore removed from positions of responsibility in the 
‘purges’ instituted by SCAP.
29 War crimes trials sat comfortably with these early 
aims. Occupation policy, however, was neither monolithic nor static. Most 
historians identify a major change in direction towards the second half of the 
Occupation, a change known as the Reverse Course. With the intensification of 
the Cold War, US officials increasingly regarded Japan less as a former enemy 
that might rise again, and more as a key ally against Communism in Asia. Thus 
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Occupation policies began to focus on recovery, rehabilitation and stability, rather 
than democratic reform for its own sake.
30  
The changing geopolitical situation in Asia, chiefly the 1949 Communist 
victory in China and the Korean War that began in June 1950, meant that the 
potential threat posed by Japan to Pacific security came to seem less grave to the 
Allies than the danger posed by a vulnerable Japan. The Occupation authorities 
now began to focus on the ‘red purge’ of Communist influence from Japan.
31 Not 
only did the change in emphasis discourage further pursuit of Japanese militarism, 
it also undermined the success of initiatives implemented in the early Occupation 
to counter militarism and promote democracy. By one count, over 300,000 
Japanese military, government and other officials purged in the initial crackdown 
on militarism were allowed to return to positions of influence in the early 1950s 
and conservative government was encouraged. In fact, the last years of the 
Occupation had been so focused on combating Asian Communism that when the 
first post-Occupation national election was held in Japan in October 1952, 40% of 
the candidates elected to the lower house of parliament were former purgees who 
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had been ‘depurged’ after the Reverse Course.
32 The peace treaty enacted on 28 
April 1952 and a security treaty between Japan and the US, which came into force 
on the same day, ensured that Japan was closely aligned with the US and other 
Western democracies during the Cold War and provided for the stationing of US 
troops in Japan after the Occupation ended.
33 
  In the latter part of the Occupation, war crimes trials were no longer seen 
to be in the best interests of the US, its allies or Japan. US officials as well as 
Japanese leaders believed that all prosecutions should be concluded before a peace 
treaty was signed. As early as 16 November 1948 the majority opinion on the Far 
Eastern Commission in Washington was that all trials should cease by 30 
September 1949. In February 1949 this became the official FEC position and also 
that of SCAP: investigations were to be completed by 31 March 1949 and, if 
possible, all trials concluded by 30 September.
34 Throughout 1948 and 1949, some 
suspects whom the Australian authorities still planned to try were being held in 
Sugamo Prison in Tokyo, where they had been since their arrest in Japan early in 
the Occupation. SCAP now insisted that war crimes suspects could not be held in 
prison forever without trials and should therefore be released.
35 US moves to wind 
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down the trials and release suspects, however, did not succeed in bringing the 
Australian trials to a close. Nor did the Australian government release the suspects 
in Sugamo. 
 Conducting war crimes trials was not the only way in which Australia 
contributed to the remaking of Japan after August 1945.  Australia participated 
directly in the military activities of the Occupation as a member of the British 
Commonwealth. Some 22,000 Australian soldiers in total served in the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), peaking at 12,000 between 1946 and 
1948, along with troops from New Zealand, India and Great Britain. BCOF shared 
the military tasks of the Occupation with over 350,000 American troops. 
Australia’s contribution to BCOF was significant not only because of the large 
number of soldiers who served but also because BCOF was commanded by 
Australians for the entire period of the Occupation.
36 As well as playing a 
considerable role in BCOF, Australians also contributed to the Occupation in other 
areas. The political scientist and public intellectual William Macmahon Ball 
represented the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan, the body 
that supposedly oversaw Occupation policy in Tokyo, on behalf of the Far Eastern 
                                                           
36 George Davies, The Occupation of Japan: The Rhetoric and the Reality of 
Anglo-Australasian Relations in 1939-1952, St Lucia, Queensland, University of 
Queensland Press, 2001, p. 311. On BCOF and its Australian contingent, see also 
James Wood, The Forgotten Force: The Australian Military Contribution to the 
Occupation of Japan 1945-1952, St Leonards, NSW, Allen and Unwin, 1998; 
Robin Gerster, Travels in Atomic Sunshine: Australia and the Occupation of 
Japan, Melbourne, Scribe, 2008; Christine De Matos, Imposing Peace and 
Prosperity: Australia, Social Justice and Labour Reform in Occupied Japan, 
North Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008; Peter Bates, Japan and 
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946-52, London, Macmillan, 1993. 22 
 
Commission, which sat in Washington.
37 From April 1946, as noted above, 
Australian judge Sir William Flood Webb served as the President of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Ball’s and Webb’s were 
prestigious appointments, as was the selection of the Australians to command 
BCOF. 
Australian influence in the Occupation was thus not negligible. While 
Australia participated in the tasks of demilitarisation, however, it played little part 
in the governance of the Occupation. In BCOF, the Allied Council for Japan and 
the IMTFE, Australian officials acted within the framework set by SCAP or under 
heavy US influence.
38 BCOF was directed by the US army. The Allied Council 
was dominated by SCAP and was riven with Cold War tensions, which made it 
less effective than it might otherwise have been. Webb was one of eleven judges 
and although he played the senior role in the IMTFE he was unable successfully to 
pursue top Australian initiatives, as evidenced by the fact that Emperor Hirohito 
was not tried for war crimes even though the Australian government pushed hard 
for this outcome.
39 
  In these circumstances Australia’s BC war crimes trials constituted a rare 
opportunity for the government to create and direct policy on Japan on its own 
terms. While US policy constrained Australian action in BCOF and on the Allied 
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Council, the prosecutions of ‘lesser’ war criminals were governed by Australian 
legislation and investigations, and courts were staffed by Australian personnel. 
Each government’s BC war crimes trials program was its own responsibility and 
although the different countries’ trials shared much in common, there was also 
room for independence and for individual characteristics. Such capacity for 
independent action was reflected in the Australian War Crimes Act, which 
provided a very broad jurisdiction for the pursuit of war criminals.
40 Furthermore, 
the Australian BC trials proved to be more resistant to US influence than were 
other policy areas on which Australia and the US disagreed, such as the pursuit of 
Hirohito, or later, the advisability of Japanese rearmament. The best evidence that 
the Australian government could operate independently in conducting the trials is 
that officials continued to prosecute suspected war criminals well after the US had 
called on them to stop. US officials applied pressure on Australian trial authorities 
but did not determine Australian policy. The FEC and SCAP recommendations to 
end prosecutions only served to provide a greater sense of urgency, rather than 
dramatically to change Australian war crimes trial policy. Australian trials 
continued until the government brought the program to a close in May 1951, 
almost two years after the FEC ‘deadline’ to end them. 
Australia and the US did differ on the question of Japanese rearmament, a 
matter that arose with some force as the Cold War intensified and the peace 
settlement with Japan drew near. The Australian government did not favour 
Japanese rearmament. While the government accepted that the threat of 
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Communism in Asia was increasing, for far longer than the other wartime Allies, 
with the possible exception of New Zealand, it maintained a stronger emphasis on 
the danger of a Japanese military resurgence. Australian officials, including high-
ranking members of the Department of External Affairs, expressed their anxiety 
openly. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, wrote a press article entitled ‘Has 
the Menace of Japan been Removed?’, which was published in the New York 
Times on 3 February 1946. Evatt suggested that the Occupation must remain 
vigilant and always focus on democratising and demilitarising Japan, so that Japan 
would not have the capacity to threaten the Pacific again.
41 Evatt did not 
substantially change his view while he was minister, and in general, any concerns 
about Communism in Asia were secondary to the government until the 1950s. Part 
of the reason was probably that Australia, unlike the Philippines or Vietnam, for 
example, was not directly threatened by Communism, but on the other hand, was 
geographically closer to Japan than were the US and European powers. For most 
of the Occupation, Australian policy on Japan remained more or less consistent. 
There was broad bipartisan agreement, indicating that the official attitude to Japan 
reflected widespread Australian views, not simply tough talk against a former 
enemy for short-term, domestic political gain. The Labor Party, in opposition 
federally from December 1949, supported the Coalition’s opposition to Japanese 
rearmament, on the grounds that this stance conformed with the Labor Party’s own 
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position when it had been in government.
42 When drafts of the peace treaty and the 
process of negotiation revealed that the treaty would not include a statement 
prohibiting or seriously restricting Japanese rearmament, Australian officials 
initially resisted, having always favoured a peace settlement that would reflect the 
security concern for the Pacific at the forefront of Australia’s foreign policy 
agenda: that is, the supposed threat from Japan.
43  
The different assessments of threats to Pacific security by Australia and the 
US became the basis of a significant divergence in policy. Both governments were 
committed to combating Communism in Asia, but the US believed that to achieve 
this goal, a peace treaty allowing Japan to defend itself militarily was needed, 
whereas Australia initially did not. The official Australian stance did not change 
until late in the treaty negotiations, in 1950-1951, when the government began to 
accept that a more lenient peace with Japan was likely. Two factors were 
significant in the Australian government’s eventual acceptance of a comparatively 
lenient treaty. First, the UK government abandoned its earlier opposition to 
Japanese rearmament and insistence on restrictions on Japanese industry, leaving 
Australian officials without a major wartime ally supporting their stance.
44 Second, 
and most important, the US government agreed to another treaty, with Australia: 
the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), which was 
signed on 1 September 1952, four months after the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
came into effect.  
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From Australia’s point of view, ANZUS had its roots in Australian 
concern for the Pacific after the war. Since 1945, the government had pursued a 
commitment from the US to enhancing Australia’s security. Officials had lobbied 
the US for a ‘Pacific Pact’, a security treaty that would rely heavily on US military 
backing for Australia’s defence. For a time, they also attempted to take advantage 
of US interest in retaining an existing naval base on Manus Island, in the 
Admiralty group of islands in New Guinea, which was Australian mandated 
territory after the war. The US base on Manus would effectively have functioned 
as an outpost protecting Australia. In the end, however, the US withdrew from 
Manus.
45 If the US government had not subsequently agreed to ANZUS it is hard 
to imagine that Australia would easily have accepted the terms of the peace treaty, 
with its lack of comprehensive restriction on Japanese rearmament.
46 ANZUS 
substantially allayed Australia’s concerns over the security of the Pacific. 
The attitude of the Australian government to Japanese rearmament, and the 
initial divergence from US policy on this point, have long attracted the attention of 
Australian historians and diplomats.
47 Difference on policy towards the end of the 
war crimes trials, on the other hand, is overlooked. The divergence between 
Australia and the US on war criminals persisted until mid-1953, when the 
Australian government repatriated convicted criminals to Japan. Thus, the 
                                                           
45 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
46 Renouf, The Frightened Country, p. 42.  
47 Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, pp. 236-240; Renouf, The 
Frightened Country, pp. 38-41; T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External 
Relations, 1788-1977, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1977, pp. 
269-270.  27 
 
difference in policy on war criminals remained in place longer than the divergence 
in policy over Japanese rearmament, which ended two or three years earlier. Alan 
Renouf has stated that Australia’s relationship with Japan can be divided into the 
periods before and after the peace treaty, and that the treaty created the 
opportunity for a new Australian policy on Japan.
48 Alan Rix also identifies the 
peace treaty as the beginning of close political ties between the two countries, 
though he believes the groundwork had been laid earlier.
49 The point is valid, but 
the fact that war criminals remained a difficult issue well into 1953 shows that 
signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951 did not fully or quickly 
alter Australian perceptions of Japan, and indicates that the division between 
before and after in the relationship is not so clear as other writers have suggested. 
A study of the negotiations over repatriating war criminals demonstrates that 
whilst the peace treaty created an impetus for a new relationship, long-standing 
official Australian attitudes to Japan were slow to change, as was, according to 
official assessments, the opinion of the Australian public.     
 
Scholarly Context 
Although there were far more BC trials than Class A trials, works on the latter are 
much more numerous. Early work in English on the Class A trials concentrated on 
the question of ‘victor’s justice’: that is, on an examination of the fairness or 
otherwise of the trials and of the accusation that they represented exclusively the 
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interests of the victors in the war, rather than any balanced assessment of wrong-
doing. Most notably, Richard Minear’s Victor’s Justice appeared in 1971 as a 
trenchant criticism of the IMTFE.
50 Minear’s book has served as a departure point, 
for later scholars seeking to consider the question of ‘victor’s justice’ and to 
develop a more complex understanding of the IMTFE.  
There is little consensus among recent scholars on the Tokyo trial, except 
an agreement that ‘victor’s justice’ is an inadequate characterization of the trials, 
and that more work needs to be done to elucidate the place of the tribunals within 
the history of post-war Asia  and in the development of international war crimes 
law. Ushimura Kei, for example, focuses on the comment from the chief 
prosecutor in the Class A trials, the American George Keenan, that the hearings 
represented the ‘judgment of civilization’. Ushimura examines the trial 
proceedings and some of the writings of the accused war criminals in the way one 
might examine literature, constructing a history of the trials around the themes of 
civilization, barbarism and alleged cultural differences between the East and the 
West. He concludes that notions of civilisation are hard to quantify, that claims of 
barbarism could be levelled at both sides in the war and that the trials really 
amount to a clash of cultures revealing the differences between East and West.
51 
Using the Tokyo trials as part of his analysis, Gerry Simpson highlights the 
tension between war crimes law and politics, demonstrating that war crimes trials 
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are not immune from political interference. Rather, they represent a balance 
between the imperatives of getting a result and maintaining impartiality and 
fairness. Simpson also suggests that war crimes trials are as much about informing 
a community or nation about the immorality of the enemy’s campaign in a war, or 
the morality of one’s own campaign, as they are about punishing transgressions.
52 
Yuma Totani’s position is that the ‘binary’ scholarly understanding of the Class A 
trials, as victor’s justice or not, is insufficient. For Totani, understanding of the 
trials has been corrupted by, on the one hand, the knowledge that everything 
turned out well and Japan was restored to the international community after the 
Occupation, and on the other, the potential of the trials to serve right-wing agendas 
presenting Japan as a victim of foreign pressure. In seeking to move towards a 
truer understanding of the trials and their place in history, Totani has begun to 
consider war crimes justice in the Asia-Pacific area as a single undertaking, rather 
than focusing exclusively on the Class A trials and leaving aside the Class B and 
C trials.
53  
Boister and Cryer distinguish between what they see as two approaches: 
one deriving from a ‘political science’ stance and the other, which they adopt, that 
attempts instead to disentangle the legal aspects of the trials from their socio-
political history and to produce what they call the IMTFE’s ‘law story’. Their 
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effort to restore the legal legacy of the trials seeks not to ‘deny their flaws’ but to 
ensure that the legal proceedings, including their limitations, are remembered as 
part of the foundation of modern war crimes law.
54 Timothy Maga also rejects 
some of the criticism of the trials, asserting that they were as fair as they possibly 
could be and that they were based on good intentions. He suggests that the legacy 
of the trials was tarnished by the failure to create a standing international court for 
war crimes, soon after the Tokyo trial.
55 Presumably, Maga means that if the trials 
had led to the establishment of a definitive precedent for the punishment of war 
criminals and had thus acted as a deterrent for future war crimes, their legacy 
would be stronger. A recent edited volume examines the Class A trials and some 
aspects of the Class B and C tribunals from many different perspectives, 
representing the multitude of views on the trials that now characterises scholarship 
in this area.
56 Works associated with the Class A trials also encompass biographies 
and memoirs of convicted war criminals and leading suspects, including former 
prime minister and foreign minister Hirota Koki and the right-wing ideologue and 
businessman, Sasakawa Ryoichi.
57  
This thesis draws on the above literature, especially on works that 
emphasise the tension in the trials between law and politics. Such tension was also 
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very much evident in the Australian tribunals. At the same time, I also show that 
approaches based on the theory of war crimes law are unlikely to reveal fully the 
distinctive elements of the Australian war crimes prosecutions and their 
connection with foreign policy and Australia’s evolving relations with Asian 
nations.  
Studies of the BC trials have been preoccupied with the question of 
whether they were fair. Phillip Piccigallo’s 1975 work remains the most detailed 
English-language source. Piccigallo assesses each government’s trial process, and 
discusses the differences among the various approaches. He uses few archival 
sources, doubtless because not many were available when the book was written, 
relying instead on newspapers and parliamentary records. He provides much 
useful information on the trials themselves, though he does not discuss repatriation 
of convicted criminals to Japan or their eventual release. By contrast I make 
extensive use of archival material, and I cover the entirety of the war crimes trial 
process from Australia’s point of view, from investigation of crimes before the 
war’s end to repatriation and release of convicted prisoners. Piccigallo devotes a 
chapter to the Australian trials. He contends that the Australian trial authorities 
and the government pursued Japanese war criminals with unsurpassed 
determination because they were wary of showing leniency towards Japan during 
the Occupation, and because of enmity towards the Japanese in the Australian 
public. Piccigallo concludes that the trials overall were a fair exercise that upheld 32 
 
the values they set out to defend.
58 I will challenge this argument in the Australian 
context in Chapter Two.  
Other works on the BC trials focus on one particular element of the 
process, or an individual case.
59 One of the most significant is Richard Lael’s The 
Yamashita Precedent, which focuses on the controversial ‘command 
responsibility’ trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of Japanese 
forces in the Philippines in 1944 and the first person to be prosecuted by the 
Americans as a ‘lesser’ war criminal. Yamashita was held responsible for the war 
crimes committed by his troops in the Philippines and was executed in February 
1946.
60 Utsumi Aiko has focused on suspected war criminals of Korean 
ethnicity.
61 As Japanese nationals during the war, and members of the Japanese 
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armed forces, some Koreans as well as Formosans faced Allied war crimes courts 
and many were convicted. Koreans and Formosans lost their status as Japanese 
nationals when Japan was immediately stripped of its overseas territories upon its 
surrender, but still were tried as Japanese. Their nationality became a difficult 
issue in negotiations in 1952-1953 over repatriating convicted war criminals, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. Australia held a considerable number of 
Formosan prisoners, and both the Australian government and the Japanese 
government were uncertain about how best to deal with Korean and Formosan war 
criminals. Uncertainty over the prisoners’ nationality in Japanese law unsettled the 
Australian government, contributing to the cautious Australian approach to the 
repatriation of ‘Japanese’ war criminals.  
Two unpublished PhD theses deal principally with the legal history of the 
Australian BC tribunals. Caroline Pappas provides an overview of the 
prosecutions from a legal and to some extent political perspective, arguing that 
although the trials had limitations, they should be seen as fair and just, as 
vengeance was never part of the official motivation for the trials. Pappas also 
discusses the relationship between the legal proceedings and Australian politics, 
but only in very specific contexts. For example, she notes that the continuation of 
the prosecutions in 1950 was influenced by the change of federal government in 
Australia in December 1949, because the new Coalition was determined to 
complete the trials satisfactorily.
62 Michael Carrel explores similar questions, 
concluding that while the trials should not be seen as an exercise in revenge, there 
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was indeed a strong feeling in Australia that Japan must be brought to a reckoning. 
Carrel argues, like Pappas, that the trials were just, and also that the legal process 
‘strengthened humanitarian law’.
63 These works do acknowledge in a preliminary 
way that political influence affected aspects of the Australian trials and their 
outcome, but they remain primarily concerned with questions of law, not of 
politics or diplomacy. I provide a much broader analysis of the political, 
diplomatic and social factors shaping the trials, showing that such considerations 
were present from the beginning of the official Australian concern with suspected 
war criminals and analyzing their impact at each stage of Australia’s dealings with 
Japanese soldiers.  
There is far more academic and popular discussion of Japanese war crimes 
and ill-treatment of POWs than there is of the subsequent trials. Writing about war 
crimes is often highly emotive and this complicates attempts at scholarly analysis 
of the trials. Works on Japanese war crimes in the Pacific are very numerous and 
are still being produced, although with less frequency than before. In scholarly 
publications, the overall issue of war crimes during the Pacific War was dealt with 
most famously by John Dower in his 1986 prize-winning work War Without 
Mercy.
64 Dower’s major concern is to explore the theme of race in the Pacific 
War; he concludes that the conflict became so fierce that mercy was extinguished 
on both sides. Dower discusses not only Japanese crimes but also offences 
committed by American soldiers. His assertion that war crimes occurred on all 
                                                           
63 Carrel, ‘Australia's Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals’, p. 248.  
64 Dower, War Without Mercy.   35 
 
sides of the war has been criticised by some authors and former soldiers, mostly 
on the grounds that although war crimes were indeed perpetrated by Allied 
soldiers, they were not as widespread and numerous as Japanese offences.
65  
Other notable contributions include Tanaka Toshiyuki’s Hidden Horrors: 
Japanese War Crimes in World War II and Mark Felton’s Slaughter At Sea: The 
Story of Japan’s Naval War Crimes.
66 Tanaka offers academic analysis of the 
breadth of Japanese crimes in the Pacific. Slaughter at Sea, on the other hand, is 
significant not because it is the first work on crimes perpetrated by the Japanese 
navy, but because it stimulated immediate response from readers, with many 
internet forums and blogs registering outrage and disgust, in support of the 
author’s own findings.
 The strong public reaction to this book demonstrates that 
Japanese war crimes, even sixty-five years after the end of the conflict, still 
generate great interest and draw emotive responses. The popularity of works that 
focus solely on illuminating Japanese war crimes suggests that the strong feelings 
of disgust felt in the Australian community at the time of the BC trials linger 
today. Such works otherwise have little scholarly value; they cover ground that 
has been thoroughly exhausted in the decades since the war. 
Literature on the Allied Occupation of Japan also provides essential 
context for this thesis. The Australian prosecutions were influenced by the 
progression of US policy in Japan from the early years of the Occupation when the 
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US government supported Australia’s trials, to the period where the Australian 
government in resuming prosecutions resisted the change in US priorities in Japan. 
Moreover, the shift represented by the Reverse Course and then the urgency with 
which peace treaty negotiations were pursued in the intensifying Cold War 
undermined Australia’s pursuit of Japanese militarism and pressured Australia’s 
BC trials program. The Occupation has been studied from many perspectives and 
the collection of writings is very large. For the above reasons, my own work is 
informed mainly by analysis of policy matters, rather than studies which focus on 
key individuals, for example.
67 Schaller, Takemae, and Ward, in their analyses of 
how and when the Reverse Course came about, are particularly crucial.  
Works specifically on Australia’s contribution to the Occupation are 
critical to an analysis of the war crimes trials because they help to establish the 
context of the trials and their relationship with other Australian policies and 
military operations. Literature on Australia’s role in the Occupation dates back to 
William Macmahon Ball’s Japan: Enemy or Ally?, published in 1948.
68 In this 
book and also in his published diary,
69 Ball reveals the challenges facing him as 
Australia’s and the British Commonwealth’s representative on the Allied Council 
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for Japan. Though he arrived in Japan believing that his role was to contribute to 
the development of Occupation policy, it was soon apparent that wherever 
possible SCAP would prevent the Allied Council from having any meaningful 
influence, and Ball’s frustration is palpable. More recently, several works have 
focused on Australia’s role in Occupation-period labour reform and in BCOF. 
Christine De Matos discusses Australia’s contribution to the improvement of 
conditions for workers and the reformist spirit in which Australian BCOF officials 
generally approached the Occupation.
70 Robin Gerster provides a social history of 
BCOF, suggesting that although many Australian soldiers who went to Japan had 
little prior knowledge of the country and began their service with antagonistic 
feelings towards the Japanese, BCOF as a whole contributed greatly to repairing 
relations between Japan and Australia because the soldiers’ experiences of Japan 
were essentially positive.
71 Other works on BCOF, some of which were written by 
former participants, broadly analyse its role in the Occupation; most writers agree 
that although it had its limitations, BCOF was a success that has largely been 
neglected in Australian military history.
72  
Works on Australia and the Occupation do not focus on war crimes trials 
in detail, though they may deal with Australian views of Japan and the perceived 
need to bring Japan to account after the war. According to De Matos, for instance, 
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the Australian government concluded that Japanese leaders bore far more 
responsibility for the war than did the ordinary Japanese person. De Matos thus 
argues that the ‘retributive aims of Australian policy’ were directed mainly at 
Japan’s leaders.
73 It is my contention that Australia’s war crimes trials indicate 
otherwise. They have been overlooked, however, as a distinct aspect of the 
Australian government’s policy for Japan after the war, and writers on Australia’s 
contribution to post-war Japan fail to realise the full significance of the trials and 
their aftermath.  
The late 1940s and the 1950s were a dynamic period in Australian foreign 
policy. The broad foreign policy context affected Australia’s war crimes trials, and 
the trials in turn had an impact on Australia’s changing stance towards its region 
and its major allies. Literature on post-war Australian foreign policy generally 
emphasises the importance of the Occupation or the peace treaty in Australia-
Japan relations, neglecting the war crimes trials. Richard Rosecrance’s Australian 
Diplomacy and Japan is the only specialist work specifically to chart the 
progression of Australian foreign policy towards Japan between 1945 and 1952. 
Rosecrance describes the Australian government’s focus on security in the Pacific 
from the early negotiations over maintaining a US naval base on Manus Island to 
the Japanese peace treaty and ANZUS, showing the divergence between 
Australian and US policy during the 1940s over Japanese remilitarisation and the 
key negotiations that eventually allowed the Australian government to support the 
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peace treaty.
74 Renouf and Walker also discuss Australia’s approach to Pacific 
security and the post-war anxiety, both in official circles and in the community, 
about a potential threat from Asia.
75 Undoubtedly a crucial aspect of Australia-
Japan relations from 1950 onwards was the resumption of economic ties. Rix 
examines the re-emergence of trade between Japan and Australia, showing that 
firm steps towards better political relations, too, were taken after the end of the 
Occupation.
76 The emerging Cold War also played a major role in aligning Japan 
and Australia as allies in Asia. Literature on Australian relations with the US, its 
role in the Cold War and Australian diplomacy more generally reveals Cold War 
politics in Australia to have been passionate and divisive.
77 Evidently, the process 
of conforming with US goals was neither straightforward nor immediate.  
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Works on Prime Minister John Curtin’s role in the creation of independent 
Australian foreign policy during the war, and on Australia’s participation in 
regional politics and the United Nations immediately after the war, also shed 
significant light on the context in which war crimes trials took place. In particular, 
they help to explain the government’s desire to continue legal proceedings after 
other governments had ceased prosecuting, at a time when establishing an 
independent Australian stance was considered an urgent matter.
78 Studies of Prime 
Minister Chifley and his Labor government after the war are similarly important in 
assessing how the context for the Australian trials changed, and particularly in 
highlighting the emergence of Communism as a major issue in Australian 
domestic politics in the late 1940s.
79  
The development of Japanese public opinion on war criminals is an 
important part of the history of the trials. During the negotiations to repatriate and 
release war criminals, the Australian government had to contend not only with its 
own citizens but also with the Japanese public, which became very active in 
pressuring the Japanese, Australian, and other governments over issues relating to 
war criminals. A small amount of secondary literature in English examines lobby 
groups in civil society in Japan working on war-related issues in the early 1950s. 
Beatrice Trefalt discusses the campaign on behalf of the many Japanese civilians 
and soldiers stranded overseas still awaiting repatriation. Franziska Seraphim 
                                                           
78 For Curtin see James Curran, Curtin’s Empire, Port Melbourne, Victoria, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011; David Day, John Curtin: A Life, Pymble, 
NSW, HarperCollins, 1999.    
79 David Day, Chifley, Pymble, NSW, HarperCollins, 2001. 41 
 
examines the emergence of grassroots political organisations during the 
Occupation, which embraced its democratic principles and often turned into mass 
movements aiming to pressure Japanese politicians to promote a change of policy 
or even to lobby foreign governments on behalf of the Japanese people. These 
groups campaigned on a range of issues, including repatriation of those stranded 
overseas, pensions for demobilized soldiers and allowances for war widows.
80 
Sandra Wilson has examined the campaign by inmates in Sugamo Prison to secure 
the release of BC war criminals.
81 Such analysis provides strong evidence of the 
continued vitality of war issues in Japanese society in the years after the war’s 
end, and helps to explain the pressure on governments that retained control of the 
sentences of convicted war criminals to renegotiate the terms of their 
imprisonment. 
 
Primary Sources 
A great many documents relevant to the war crimes trials are held in the National 
Archives of Australia both in Melbourne, the main repository for military records, 
and Canberra, which holds mainly government records. These expansive though 
not always well organised archives provide the bulk of the primary materials used 
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in this thesis. Parts of certain folders and in some cases entire folders are closed, 
and in some cases open folders have names removed to withhold details of a 
soldier’s death or torture.  
The files contain the complete findings of Sir William Webb’s 
investigation into war crimes in the Pacific that began before the war had ended; 
questionnaires submitted by returned POWs on their treatment by the Japanese; 
correspondence between the military and government departments, mainly 
External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Department, about how the trials were 
to be set up and conducted; details of the trials themselves, including the complete 
trial records; records of the legal review process by the Australian-based Judge 
Advocate General, with extensive notes; and correspondence and other materials 
relating to repatriation of convicted war criminals from prisons in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Rabaul and Manus to Japan. There are also numerous documents 
concerning the release of Japanese war criminals as well as the entire collection of 
parole requests sent to the Australian government from Japanese authorities after 
April 1952. Other documents include telegrams and printed reports relating to 
communication with the other Allies about the trials, which contain many views 
from the British and US governments in particular. Such documents show that the 
Australian government was acutely aware of the progress of other BC war crimes 
trials, and indeed that the seven Allied countries conducting these trials remained 
in close touch and were aware of the progress of each other’s prosecutions, 
repatriation programs and policies on early release of convicted criminals. One of 
the major strengths of the National Archives records on war crimes trials, 43 
 
especially in the folders from External Affairs, is the clarity with which 
government officials presented their views. Senior officials and legal personnel 
were forthright in their assessments of the trials and of relations with Japan. The 
Australian government also noted the views of the press and key lobby groups, as 
major issues relating to war criminals became public. For example, the National 
Archives contain official communications to the government from the Returned 
and Services League, in relation to war criminals amongst other issues.  
  Limited use has also been made of overseas archives. The US National 
Archives and Records Administration has an extensive collection of documents 
relating to the Occupation of Japan, and to war crimes trials, which have been 
used where they shed light on Australian decisions on trials and on the pressures 
on the Australian government in dealing with Japanese war criminals. Similarly, 
the National Archives in the United Kingdom, specifically the collection of 
Foreign Office documents, also contains records relevant to the Australian 
proceedings.  
Parliamentary debates (Hansard) provide some of the most significant 
comments on Australian war crimes trials.
82 Early post-war Australian politics was 
lively, and many issues relating to post-war reconstruction, foreign policy and war 
criminals were debated heatedly in parliament, both under Labor before December 
1949, and under the Coalition thereafter. The tough stance of some Australian 
Members of Parliament on Japan after the surrender is startling. Parliamentary 
                                                           
82 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
1945-1957, Canberra, Commonwealth Govt. Printer, Vols 185-211.  44 
 
debates give a strong sense of which aspects of the trials were considered 
significant to the electorate and what issues were divided along party lines. They 
provide a counterpoint to National Archives records: while the latter primarily 
reflect the position of the government of the day, Hansard grants an insight into 
the views of the parliament as a whole. 
Newspapers followed war crimes and trials closely, providing information 
about what was happening, and editorials and other comment on policy moves or 
when news of crimes and of trials appeared. In this thesis I use newspapers from 
all of the Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory. Press coverage of 
the relevant topics was generally comprehensive and thoughtful. International 
events were given a high priority in the Australian post-war press and newspapers 
both revealed and helped to shape public reactions to the trials, the war itself and 
other international events, including the emerging Cold War. Records in the 
National Archives show that government officials followed the press closely when 
key issues relating to war crimes arose, suggesting that the government believed 
the press was a good indication of public views, and felt the need to respond to or 
at least be aware of public opinion.  
  Two manuscript collections are of particular use in a study of the 
Australian war crimes trials. The papers of the late, distinguished Australian 
scholar of Japanese history D. C. S. Sissons, held in the National Library of 
Australia, detail amongst other things Sissons’ long-term interest in the trials.
83 
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Sissons’ papers are contained in thirty boxes, of which five relate to war crimes 
trials. They contain folders of extremely thorough hand-written notes on the court 
proceedings, personal reflections on the trials, published materials such as a guide 
to archival sources on the trials that Sissons produced for the Australian War 
Memorial and correspondence with experts in the field in Japan. Sissons focuses 
heavily on one case in particular that he investigated near the end of his research 
on the trials, involving the Japanese soldier Katayama Hideo, and I will make 
extensive reference to this case. The papers of John Myles Williams, a prosecutor 
in the Australian trials in Morotai, in the Netherlands Indies, are held in the 
Mitchell Library in Sydney. The 1990 film Blood Oath is based on his experiences 
in the BC trials.
84 Williams’ papers consist of a collection of correspondence with 
other prosecutors and with war veterans, and record his overall thoughts on the 
trials. The papers include a diary. As personal reflections, the Williams papers 
present views of the trials and the conditions under which prosecutors were 
working that are not found elsewhere. They show that at least for some personnel, 
the trials were not free from a desire for vengeance against Japan, but also that the 
Australian and Japanese legal teams had friendly relationships, though both were 
under considerable stress. The Williams papers also highlight some of the 
techniques used by the prosecution to gain convictions. 
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Athol Moffitt was another Australian prosecutor in the trials who produced 
a memoir of his experiences, published as Project Kingfisher. The memoir 
emphasises that for Australian soldiers taking part in the proceedings, the pursuit 
of Japanese militarism in the form of the BC suspects was a very serious matter. 
Project Kingfisher reveals a determination to bring criminals to justice, despite the 
supposedly impartial position of the military legal personnel, with senior 
personnel declaring that they will not let the Japanese get away, that they will see 
they are brought to justice.
85 There was a strong sense that it was necessary to 
honour the sacrifices made by Australians who had suffered under Japanese 
militarism. The strain that this hefty responsibility placed on Australians 
connected with the trials seems to have led to further frustration and anger towards 
the Japanese in some cases.
86 The Pacific War had been a fierce conflict and to 
those now face to face with the former enemy, the war’s end was also confronting 
and stressful. 
Many soldiers have produced memoirs and reflective works on the Pacific 
War and a vivid picture has thus been painted of the Australian war experience, 
including the experience of captivity. Such works help to establish Australian 
views of the crimes that were on trial and also contemporary perceptions of the 
Australian war experience which in turn provided a key part of the impetus behind 
the trials. Australian images of the Second World War are mainly of heroic 
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suffering, pain and exhaustion, and this is especially the case for the Pacific. Even 
the triumphs, like defence of the Kokoda Track from the Japanese in New Guinea, 
are stories of endurance and ingenuity, not of sweeping military victories.
87 Some 
memoirs seem to be designed primarily to heap criticism on the Japanese rather 
than to praise the Australians.
88 Photographs commonly show a malnourished 
prisoner or a wounded soldier or the signs of strain and exhaustion on soldiers’ 
faces. Soldiers always exhibit good humour, however, in a reflection of another 
key element of the stereotypical image of the Australian serviceman.  Although he 
was not a soldier, Rohan Rivett’s book Behind Bamboo is a significant and 
influential portrayal of time spent in Japanese captivity.
89 Rivett was a war 
correspondent for the Melbourne Argus who was captured when Singapore fell, in 
February 1942. The work is a confronting and angry account of an enemy seen as 
fundamentally different from Australians. 
 Memoirs and first-hand accounts were also produced by Australian 
soldiers who served in the Occupation; the views expressed in these works are 
more varied than those in POW narratives. In his diary of 1946, the BCOF soldier 
Basil Archer portrays the Japanese as submissive, rather than aggressive, and even 
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as efficient and courteous towards Australians.
90 Another BCOF soldier, Allan 
Clifton, is at times critical of the behaviour of Australian soldiers during the 
Occupation.
91 What the wartime and Occupation memoirs have in common is a 
focus on the tension or potential tension between Australians and Japanese at 
ground level. In the wartime memoirs this tension appears as anger and disgust at 
Japanese mistreatment of POWs and during the Occupation it manifests itself as 
either antagonism from Australian soldiers or uncertainty over cultural 
differences.  
First-hand accounts of the Occupation from Japanese perspectives offer 
insight into views of the Japanese people or comment on the Occupation at ground 
level. Dear General MacArthur is a collection of letters written to SCAP by 
ordinary Japanese.
92  One section contains letters about the war crimes trials, and 
shows that Japanese people’s views on the trials varied. Though some letter-
writers felt that US bombing of Japanese civilians had also been a crime and 
should have been prosecuted, many supported Allied military justice and advised 
on how to pursue the remnants of Japanese militarism. The book suggests the 
willingness of many Japanese people to comment on and even participate in the 
broad process of assessing war guilt. Such participation became a significant 
factor later in Australia’s war crimes trials program, when thousands of Japanese 
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expressed their views on who was and was not guilty by signing petitions on 
behalf of convicted BC war criminals or otherwise participating in the campaign 
on their behalf. Grassroots pressure in Japan then provided impetus for official 
Japanese discussions with the Australian government over the repatriation of 
convicted war criminals imprisoned overseas, and later their early release. 
 
 
Chapter One of the thesis, ‘Japan and Australia 1945-46: War and War Crimes’, 
examines the initial reporting of Japan’s surrender in the Australian press and the 
widespread coverage of alleged war crimes. The chapter tracks the early calls for 
trials and the steps taken to set them up. Chapter Two, ‘The Trials: Legalities and 
Limitations’, discusses the operation of the trials themselves. Issues of fairness 
and ‘victor’s justice’ are also examined. Chapter Three, ‘The First Phase, 1945-
1949: The Trials in a Changing International Context’, analyses the initial period 
of the trials and also the shifting international context of the late 1940s as the Cold 
War began to change Occupation priorities. Chapter Four, ‘Manus Island: The End 
of the Trials’, describes the revitalization of the Australian prosecutions after the 
change in federal government in 1949, including the preparations for the Manus 
Island proceedings and the prosecutions themselves. In Chapter Five, ‘The 
Postscript to the Trials: Repatriation and Release of War Criminals’, I show that 
the issue of war criminals remained intertwined with Australian diplomatic and 
political policy in the early 1950s and up to 1957. The Australian government 
throughout the entire war crimes trials process balanced political concerns with the 50 
 
determination to follow its agenda of punishing war criminals. Both 
considerations were evident through to the final executions of prisoners at Manus 
Island in 1951, the negotiations with Japan over repatriation after the peace 
settlement in 1952 and the move towards early release of war criminals and 
improved political relations from the mid-1950s onwards. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA 1945-1946: WAR AND 
WAR CRIMES 
 
The last year of the war in Asia was violent and destructive. As the Allied 
forces, led by the United States, approached the Japanese home islands across 
the Pacific, they were forced into a number of island sieges that were the scene 
of some of the most ferocious fighting of the entire Second World War.
1 The 
cost to the Americans was heavy but to the Japanese it was immense. From 
late 1944, US forces also bombed Japanese cities relentlessly. In August 1945 
atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with enormous loss 
of life, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, and the Japanese 
government finally surrendered. The battle for post-war political and 
ideological supremacy began as soon as armed hostilities ended,
2 and the 
surrender of Japan, like that of Germany three months earlier, quickly became 
entangled with the emerging Cold War. Meanwhile, the other combatants in 
the Second World War counted the financial and human cost of the conflict. 
No nation that endured the war for any length of time remained unchanged and 
few of them, if any, faced a secure and clear immediate future. 
  The post-war era in Australia began against a backdrop of relief, joy, 
pain and uncertainty. The government approached the new era with confidence 
in the nation’s standing, believing that Australia had lifted its international 
status because of its contribution to the war effort and could no longer be seen 
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as subordinate to its major allies. Nevertheless, the immediate post-war years 
were marked both by the ever-present memory of the war and its costs and by 
security concerns for the future of the Pacific region. Few other countries, 
leaving aside the Soviet Union and the USA, which were confronting each 
other as the major rivals in the Cold War, were as anxious about external 
security as Australia. Moreover, the government was confronted not only with 
the demands of recovery in a changing post-war world, but also with anger and 
shock in the electorate as servicemen returned home, sometimes in poor 
physical and mental condition. As for Japan, the war years had been much 
more traumatic there, and the future was much less certain. In the immediate 
post-war years the Japanese people had to come to grips not only with a 
devastated country, but also with massive social upheaval and with foreign 
occupation. Though the Japanese government continued to operate during the 
Occupation, in practice, unconditional surrender meant that the immediate 
future was in the hands of the Allied powers, which decided that Japan was to 
be occupied, demilitarised and democratised.
3  
In this chapter I show that in the early post-war years Japanese war 
crimes, Japan’s overall conduct of the war and the more general cost of the 
conflict emerged as important public issues in Australia. I discuss the way the 
Australian government approached the Japanese surrender and the immediate 
post-war world. The trials were a matter of justice and perhaps retribution for 
ordinary Australians. The war was not quite over yet: people felt that Japan 
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must not escape punishment. Many Australians felt a personal connection with 
the pursuit of Japanese war criminals; or at least, the Australian government 
took the view that the trials were important to ordinary Australians because of 
the public’s strong connections with returning POWs and desire for 
recompense for their suffering. There was no point in the trials, or in the lead-
up to them, at which they were left to legal experts or were used only for the 
purpose of dispensing international justice. Politicians were quick to present a 
tough stance on Japan centred on demilitarisation and pursuit of war criminals, 
partly because they believed that was what the public wanted. Already in 1945, 
in fact, the prosecutions were a potential policy tool for the government. 
 
A Newly Confident but Frustrated Australian Government 
The government’s growing desire for influence in Pacific-region politics 
contributed to the dynamic context in which the BC war crimes prosecutions 
took place; the prosecution of war crimes constituted an important foreign 
policy initiative in the early post-war years. In the second half of the 1940s 
Australia was in an unprecedented position in the history of its engagement 
with Asia, and the new situation produced an energetic and confident foreign 
policy agenda. During the Second World War Australia had demonstrated a 
much enhanced capacity to develop its own distinctive foreign policies by 
taking independent action to address the Japanese advance in Asia while 
Britain was preoccupied with the war in Europe.
4 Having drawn confidence 
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from facing the Japanese threat, the government then vigorously pursued 
policies aimed at peace, security and a greater role in regional affairs.  
The government believed that its wartime commitment had granted it 
the right resolutely to pursue its foreign policies in Asia, especially those 
concerning Japan.
5 Policies relating to Japan were based on a genuine desire to 
bring Japan to account and promote peace in the region, and it was clear from 
early on that Australian policy in the immediate post-war years would focus 
heavily on the removal of Japanese militarism in all its guises. At the same 
time, the conduct of Australian foreign affairs in general and treatment of 
Japan specifically during this era had a distinctly nationalist tone. Government 
officials often spoke of the sacrifice that Australia had made during the war. In 
terms of personnel and resources Australia’s wartime sacrifice had indeed been 
significant; but politicians often seemed to mean something more abstract and 
even mystical when they spoke of ‘sacrifice’. References to ‘sacrifice’ were 
linked with pride in Australian endurance and a perception that Australia had 
elevated its status in Asia and amongst its allies. War crimes trials had an 
obvious role to play in commemorating, justifying and compensating for the 
sacrifices Australia was believed to have made. 
The difference between the Australian government’s confidence in 
foreign affairs before and after the war is striking. On the one hand the war had 
reaffirmed Australia’s cautious approach to Asia and the ‘teeming millions’ 
who lived there. For the first time since European settlement Australia had 
been directly threatened by a foreign power. Not only had Australians been 
alarmed by the specific threat of the Japanese military, but the war also 
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reinforced the longstanding prejudice held by a great many Australians, 
however irrationally, that Asia as a whole was hostile to Australia.
6 On the 
other hand, the war brought about the realisation, within the government at 
least, that Australia needed to be stronger in its diplomatic and political 
approach to Asia, and to make its own mark in the region rather than relying 
on the foreign policies of the UK.
7 As much as the war confirmed for many 
Australians that they had something to fear from Asia, it also granted Australia 
an opportunity to realign its perceptions of its role in the region.  
Late in the war, the Australian government had feared that it would not 
be given the role in post-war Japan it considered it deserved. The government 
felt that Australia was being left out of the negotiations over the end of the war 
and therefore the initial planning for the peace.
8 The government and army 
were prepared to take practical action to ensure they had a suitable role in post-
war arrangements. On 21 January 1944 Australia and New Zealand signed the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement calling for, amongst other things, a 
conference on the future of the Pacific, and even suggesting a zone across the 
South Pacific that should be defended by the two nations to ensure security.
9 
Paul Hasluck has argued that Australian forces also took direct military action 
to secure their place in post-war planning. Australian troops participated in 
campaigns on Tarkan Island in Borneo; Labuan in Malaya; Brunei; on the 
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north coast of Borneo; and at Balikpapan, in the Netherlands Indies, late in the 
war. These battles were all in the region designated by US forces as the South-
West Pacific Area, close to Australia, and were no less fierce than earlier 
encounters of the war. Hasluck has criticised the decisions to engage in these 
battles as politically motivated, asserting that engagement with the enemy was 
designed primarily to keep Australians fighting vigorously against Japan until 
the end of the war to enhance the prospect of a prominent place at a future 
peace conference. Australian officials were concerned that their role in 
defeating Japan would be overlooked if the military did not remain active until 
the end, but the campaigns were actually irrelevant in the defeat of Japan and 
in Hasluck’s opinion led to an unnecessary loss of life.
10 Whether Hasluck’s 
view is justified or not, such comments draw attention to the determination of 
Australian officials to be a major part of the peace, and also to the fact that the 
final months of the war and the immediate post-war period were so politically 
fluid that drastic measures may have appeared necessary to ensure a proper 
role for Australia. Through the last months of the war and after the surrender, 
Australian officials did loudly claim a stake in post-war affairs. The major 
powers were not always sympathetic.
11 
  The Australian government thus viewed itself as a major party in the 
peace and in the future of the region, and there was a clear sense of frustration 
at the degree to which the bigger Allied nations controlled the peace.
12 Despite 
the disappointment at lack of recognition by others, however, Australian 
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officials spoke with an increasing sense of Australia’s worth. In December 
1946, Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, wrote: 
The Potsdam ultimatum to Japan was issued without reference to 
Australia. We expressed the gravest concern at the time that our 
position had been disregarded in this way, and, when the terms of the 
proposed reply to the Japanese Government’s offer of surrender were 
under consideration, we made direct representation and suggestions to 
all the allied governments concerned. The energetic affirmation of our 
rights to be represented at the surrender was successful. Our efforts in 
this and other contexts have meant that in the Pacific and the Far East 
the Australian contribution to post-surrender arrangements generally 
has been that of a principal and not a subsidiary power.
13   
Statements such as this show a growing confidence in Australia’s position, 
despite the simultaneous recognition that Australia had earlier been regarded as 
a subsidiary power by the other Allies. 
Prior to the Second World War, Australian foreign policy had usually 
followed that of Britain rather than setting an independent agenda.
14 In the 
wake of Japanese military successes in late 1941 and early 1942, and 
especially the fall of Singapore in February 1942, John Curtin’s Labor 
government realised Britain no longer had the presence and military power that 
it had once had in Asia, and therefore Australia’s security depended on the US, 
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rather than the strength of the Royal Navy.
15 Recent scholarship has confirmed 
that in moving towards closer ties with the US, Curtin did not envisage a split 
with Britain; rather he remained committed to the British empire and desired a 
greater role for Australia in empire issues, seeing himself as an ‘architect of a 
new form of empire’.
16 Still, the government gradually shifted further away 
from dependence on Britain for security. In a short space of time, the Pacific 
War had dramatically altered Australia’s official perception of its relationship 
with the UK. After the war, the government felt not only that Australia had 
claims as a major player in the Pacific War but also that it should be seen as 
the chief British Commonwealth nation involved in the peace.
17 Such a stance 
indicated that the Australian government now saw itself as an equal partner in 
peace, as it believed it had been in war, with both the US and the UK.
18  
In the initial post-war years, the Australian government under Prime 
Minister Chifley thus pursued a key role in the Occupation of Japan and the 
peace settlement, meaning that a significant part of its foreign policy agenda 
also relied on diplomacy with the US, the dominant power in the Occupation. 
Evatt as Minister for External Affairs played a major part in establishing 
Australia’s foreign policy agenda, which included launching the war crimes 
trials. After Robert Menzies took office in December 1949, as leader of the 
Liberal/Country Party Coalition, he visited the United States and thereafter 
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focused on building the closest possible ties with the US while also working 
for continued strong relations with Great Britain.
19 The pursuit of Japanese war 
criminals was a bipartisan concern, as noted earlier, and one of Menzies’ first 
actions as prime minister was to decide how to conclude the trials 
satisfactorily.
20  
A vigorous discussion of policy on Japan and post-war security had 
taken place in Australian politics since the war. Parliamentary debates from the 
initial months after Japan’s surrender show considerable concern amongst 
politicians for Australia’s security. Senator Charles Brand of Victoria, for 
instance, suggested in September 1945 that Japan had not yet been taught a 
lesson on the battlefield and would rise again, seeking revenge for its defeat.
21 
The fear that Japan could again go to war seems illogical or even irrational in 
hindsight given the scale of its defeat, the relative strength of its possible future 
enemies and the much changed geopolitical situation in Asia. Nevertheless, 
Australians and others did express apprehensiveness at the prospect of renewed 
Japanese militarism in the early post-war years. Comments in the press and in 
the broader community were equally as passionate as the discussion in political 
circles. As the Occupation progressed, the conviction that Japan might at some 
stage in the future move south and attack again weakened. The debate about 
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Australia’s security, however, remained lively, and as we have seen, Australian 
officials opposed Japanese rearmament for most of the Occupation.
22 
When peace was eventually made with Japan, the Department of 
External Affairs under Evatt’s leadership called for co-operation between 
Australia and the US in the Pacific and emphasised that co-operation meant, in 
part, a combined military contribution to Pacific security.
23Australian officials 
believed a strong alliance with the US would preserve Australia’s position in 
Asia, but the US government did not at first seem interested in maintaining a 
military commitment to Australia’s future security.
24 The US was involved in a 
much broader struggle globally, to promote democratic ideals and prevent the 
resurgence of extremist right-wing governments and the spread of 
Communism. The Australian government was not oblivious to the global 
concerns of the US, and was certainly hostile to Communism, both externally 
and at home. Australian newspapers covered global events relating to 
Communism and international affairs on a weekly basis.
25 Australian policy 
for Japan, however, focused on older and more regional concerns, and there is 
little evidence that at this early stage, government attitudes to Japan were 
altered by the acknowledged presence of a Communist threat. To this extent, 
Australia’s and America’s official priorities for Japan differed. Both 
governments considered a democratic Japan crucial for a secure Pacific. The 
US approach, however, was more ambitious and multi-faceted. By contrast 
                                                           
22 Waters, ‘War, Decolonisation and Post-war Security’, pp. 106-118. 
23 Herbert Evatt, ‘Co-operation with Allied Nations, Notes on Australian 
Policy’, 1946: Press Statements by Dr Evatt – Minister for External Affairs, 
NAA, Canberra, A1067, 193659. 
24 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, p. 197. 
25 For one early example of the coverage see ‘Russia’s Maginot Line of 
Satellite States’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/45, p. 2. 61 
 
Australian policy for Japan was both fearful and peremptory for the remainder 
of the 1940s. The government was confident that it had a major role to play in 
regional affairs, but nonetheless remained aware that diplomatic challenges lay 
ahead, especially concerning the future security of the Pacific. 
 
Pursuing Japan 
Australians were eventually given several key roles in the Occupation, as noted 
in the Introduction, but they did not necessarily deliver the influence the 
government sought. The appointment of Sir William Webb to head the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
26 was a prestigious one, and 
must have pleased the government. Evatt initially thought, moreover, that 
Australia had achieved one of its major post-war goals by gaining membership 
in October 1945 of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington; he believed 
that membership signified Australia’s status in the region and afforded it the 
power to influence policy for Japan. Evatt soon realised, however, that even 
with a position on the FEC Australian officials’ ability to affect Pacific policy 
would be very limited as SCAP and the US government dominated Occupation 
policy.
27 In Tokyo itself, the appointment of William Macmahon Ball to the 
Allied Council for Japan on 3 April 1946 was particularly prestigious because 
he represented not only Australia but the entire British Commonwealth, but 
Ball’s role, too, proved to be restricted in practice. 
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Ball’s job was difficult as he often found himself occupying the middle 
ground between British and US policy for the Occupation and also negotiating 
with the principal British Commonwealth nations that he represented, which 
did not always agree on policy for Japan.
28 Nonetheless, his position appeared 
to offer a significant opportunity for Australia to exert influence from within 
upon the future of Japan. Ball’s early impressions of his time in Japan confirm, 
however, that decisions were dominated by the US and were already 
influenced by the emerging Cold War, and that the decision-making power of 
the Allied Council was in practice negligible. MacArthur ruled in Japan with 
far greater authority than might have appeared on the surface, with the power 
of both the Japanese government and the Allied Council clearly subordinated 
to his goals.
29 In his diary, Ball points out MacArthur’s dominance.
30 He also 
refers often to US concern about Soviet influence in Japan. From the second 
day of his posting in Japan, on 5 April 1946, Ball was instructed directly by 
MacArthur to be wary of Russian tricks and infiltration of Japanese politics.
31 
The Soviet Union had a representative on the Allied Council, and as a result 
SCAP approached the Council with caution. In effect SCAP prevented it from 
functioning to its fullest potential as the Council was often seen as the chief 
area of official Soviet influence in Japan. Thus Ball’s high-profile appointment 
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was undermined and in practice was not as useful to the Australian government 
as it might originally have promised to be. Moreover, Ball had a major dispute 
with Evatt, and resigned his position in August 1947 while Evatt was on a visit 
to Japan.
32 
Australia’s contribution to the British Commonwealth Occupation 
Force, also noted in the Introduction, was the most significant of any 
country’s. Of all the forces participating, Australia bore the heaviest burden, 
providing the most soldiers between 1946 and 1948, a commitment of some 
12,000 at that time, compared with 11,000 Indian, 10,000 British and 4,400 
New Zealand troops.  After September 1948, as other countries reduced their 
commitment and gradually withdrew altogether, Australian soldiers comprised 
virtually the entire force. Between 1949 and 1952, BCOF was composed solely 
of Australians.
33 Australia also provided the two commanders of the force, Lt 
General John Northcott and his successor, Lt General Horace Robertson. 
Based in the southern part of the main Japanese island of Honshu, and later the 
island of Shikoku as well, Australian soldiers contributed at ground level to the 
disarmament, demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan. Their tasks 
included disposing of Japanese armaments, establishing health and welfare 
facilities and policing the black market. Thus BCOF played a significant role 
in promoting the Australian government’s policy for Japan.
34   
Like the Allied Council for Japan, however, BCOF was unable 
seriously to influence the overall direction of Occupation policy. BCOF was 
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under the command of the US 8
th Army. Senior Australian personnel found it 
difficult to communicate with both UK and SCAP officials from time to time. 
Moreover, BCOF was dwarfed by the size of the US military contingent in 
Japan, which numbered around 350,000, and Australian troops were confined 
to the relatively poor areas of southern Honshu and Shikoku, which were 
distant from the centre of Occupation activities in Tokyo. Australian soldiers at 
the ground level certainly had a strong sense that their role was subordinate to 
that of the Americans.
35  
  Nevertheless, the Australian government had succeeded in securing 
important appointments for Webb and Ball, and a leading role in BCOF. 
Meanwhile the government, mainly through External Affairs, pursued further 
Australian policies in the region. An important initial expression of official 
priorities was the government’s strong stance on bringing the Japanese 
emperor, Hirohito, to trial, an attempt that was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Australian representatives in Tokyo and Canberra passionately pursued the 
issue of Hirohito’s prosecution. In August 1945, Evatt contacted officials in 
the UK several times about Hirohito. External Affairs hoped that the UK 
would agree with Australia that the emperor should appear on the initial list of 
Class A suspects. It appears the UK government was at first sympathetic to this 
                                                           
35 See, for example, entries for 19/8/46, 23/10/46, 31/10/46, in Basil Archer, 
edited and with an Introduction by Sandra Wilson, Interpreting Occupied 
Japan: The Diary of an Australian Soldier, 1945-1946, Carlisle, Western 
Australia, Hesperian Press, 2009; Peter Bates, Japan and the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force 1945-1952, London, Brassey’s, 1993, pp. 
80-88. 65 
 
view, but changed its mind. The eventual list of key war criminals produced by 
the UK government did not include the emperor.
36 
As head of state, Hirohito represented Japan’s war of aggression in 
general and also the specific threat to Australia. Not only the Australian 
government, but also the army and many members of the public firmly 
believed he should be tried as a war criminal. An emperor cult was said to have 
driven Japanese soldiers to behave fanatically and according to what was 
assumed to be the style of the warrior code of Bushido.
37 Thus, the image of 
the emperor was inseparable from the memory of day-to-day fighting. The 
supposed emperor cult was thought to explain not only the battlefield 
behaviour of Japanese soldiers, but also, in part, why they treated prisoners the 
way they did. Australian prisoners of war were in contact with Japanese 
soldiers daily and they generally returned to Australia convinced that the 
emperor was the figurehead in a strict military system modelled on Bushido.
38 
In this system, soldiers supposedly showed no mercy, compassion, or regard 
for a surrendered soldier. More recent scholarly views of Japanese soldiers and 
their alleged fanaticism are far more sophisticated.
39 During the period 
immediately after the war, however, the emperor became a key target in 
Australia’s pursuit of post-war justice.   
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  Webb is the Australian most closely associated with pursuing Hirohito, 
but other officials, notably Evatt, were just as active.
40 Evatt was specifically 
concerned that there was no mention of bringing the emperor to justice in the 
Potsdam Declaration. The Australian government issued a statement in August 
1945, after Japan’s surrender, calling for an agreement with the other Allies 
that no Japanese would be exempt from prosecution, but this seems to have 
been an utterly forlorn gesture at a time when US policy for Japan was being 
made with little or no regard for Australian opinions.
41 External Affairs and 
Australian officials in Japan did not give up, however, and continued to follow 
the issue closely.
42  
Australia’s calls for the emperor to be prosecuted were indeed ignored 
and in one of the most controversial decisions of the Occupation, Hirohito was 
protected by SCAP and the FEC from prosecution. This decision was a blow to 
the Australian government. The explanation given to Australian officials in 
Japan was that his position as emperor had been weakened by the democratic 
process now in place and that he no longer had any real power in Japan.
43 The 
Australian government, however, as well as Webb, clearly felt that any 
conversion of Hirohito to democracy, even if genuine, was irrelevant. Webb 
stated in a telegram to Cabinet in September 1945 that ‘it would be a travesty 
of justice’ to punish the common Japanese soldier and not their sovereign.
44 
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Despite its disappointment that the emperor had escaped prosecution, the 
Australian government still vigorously pursued other leading Japanese military 
figures as well as lower-ranking soldiers in the trials which were by then 
already underway.  
 
Public Knowledge and Public Outrage 
Certainly Hirohito was a key symbol of Japanese militarism in Australia, along 
with Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, but with so much anger over the direct 
treatment of Australian POWs, the suspected BC war criminals appear to have 
been an equally important target of military justice.
45 Of all the confusing and 
bitter aspects of the Pacific War, the treatment of POWs was the most 
shocking and proved to be the most enduring issue for the Australian people.
46 
The Australian POW experience has continued to occupy a complex space in 
the national memory. The humiliation of defeat and captivity quickly faded 
from the mainstream narrative about POWs, the focus shifting instead to the 
courage and heroism of Australian prisoners as they steadfastly faced their 
Japanese captors.
47 Overall, anger towards the Japanese in the immediate post-
war period did not discriminate as to rank; leaders and those who had 
committed crimes in the field were considered equally culpable.
48 It had not 
taken long for returning soldiers to confirm the suspicion that conditions in 
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Japanese prisoner of war camps had been dire. The apparently dreadful 
treatment of Australian prisoners seemed alien and outrageous, constituting a 
disregard for, or even betrayal of, the supposedly long precedent of good 
treatment of prisoners of war in the West. The suspected ‘ordinary’ war 
criminals thus represented the aspects of the Pacific War that Australians most 
resented, and the alleged depredations of Japanese soldiers provided an 
extensive catalogue of wartime atrocities. The failure to try Hirohito was a 
setback for the Australian government’s vision for post-war Japan but the 
government still had the right to prosecute suspected BC war criminals, 
themselves a very potent symbol of Japanese militarism, as it saw fit. Webb’s 
sentiment, that it would be inappropriate to try lower-ranking suspects if 
Hirohito avoided prosecution, appears to have been either ignored, or quickly 
forgotten; Australia’s interest in war crimes trials did not decrease after it 
became clear that Hirohito would escape prosecution.  
By the time the Class B and C trials began in November 1945, outrage 
in Australia over Japanese war crimes had reached its zenith. It appears that 
knowledge of Japanese crimes had become widespread among the Australian 
public in 1944. The official Australian history of the Second World War 
comments that in 1944 the public was aware that Australians were being 
overworked and were starving in Japanese captivity, in contrast to Japanese 
POWs at Cowra in NSW, who were said to have been well treated.
49 In 
September 1945, parts of Webb’s 1944 report on Japanese atrocities, which up 
to this point had been confidential, were made public, contributing greatly to 
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the community outrage that had been slowly growing.
50 As press stories of 
POW experiences became more frequent, there was a marked lack of surprise 
among the public.  
It is hard to gauge what was generally known within the Australian 
army earlier in the war about atrocities. Although Australian authorities were 
investigating war crimes long before the conflict ended, it is unlikely that 
military personnel away from combat areas and POW camps and not privy to 
Webb’s report would have had concrete knowledge of war crimes. According 
to some soldiers’ memoirs and the flood of reports in the press after the 
Japanese surrender, however, it was common knowledge amongst Australian 
soldiers from early in the war that the Japanese were committing atrocities.
51 A 
small number of Allied POWs did escape from Japanese captivity and they 
could have returned with stories of hardship during their captivity.
52 It seems 
far more likely, however, that because of the wide dispersal of combat during 
the war, some of which took place in remote areas of the Pacific, knowledge of 
war crimes became truly widespread only after the surrender, when POWs 
began to be liberated.  
  Even though their suspicion was probably not based on concrete 
evidence, there was certainly a sense among both soldiers and members of the 
public that war crimes were occurring and that Japanese wartime conduct was 
barbaric. Such suspicion doubtless derived in part from propaganda associated 
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with the Pacific War. Western images of the ‘East’ contributed to the feeling 
that the ferocious fighting seen in the Pacific would develop into widespread 
war crimes. High-ranking Allied military officers described the Japanese as 
barely human and as half-ape barbarians in a discourse that Dower believes 
dehumanised the enemy and fuelled the ‘race war’ in the Pacific.
53 It is now 
widely accepted in scholarly circles that the Allies also committed war crimes 
and immoral acts: mutilating the remains of Japanese soldiers and taking body 
parts, for example, were not uncommon practices among Allied soldiers.
54 
With deeply negative impressions of the enemy and possibly the knowledge of 
potentially criminal practices on their own side, it is understandable that 
soldiers feared what might be happening to captured Allied soldiers. 
Speculation, assumption and perhaps partial information about Japanese war 
crimes proved to be accurate.  
The Australian government, for its part, had been aware of war crimes 
for some years. Reports in April 1943 from organisations including the 
International Red Cross had alerted the government to the possibility that war 
crimes were occurring, and the Webb reports then gave the government a good 
idea of the scope of Japanese atrocities. The government, however, censored 
the reporting of Japanese crimes until late 1944. The reasons given were that 
officials did not wish to endanger captured Australian soldiers, perhaps by 
inflaming Japanese sensitivities, and wanted to avoid damaging morale among 
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both the public and the military.
55 The strategy was undermined, however, 
when reports in a New Zealand newspaper in early 1944 detailing the 
mutilation by Japanese of Allied soldiers’ bodies confirmed that Australians 
were amongst the dead.
56 Nonetheless, the full scale of Japanese atrocities was 
not revealed until after the surrender. From that time on, there was no lack of 
public information. Any policy of censorship contemplated after the war would 
have been pointless as thousands of former POWs returned to Australia 
seemingly eager to tell their story. 
  Already by early 1944 it was clear to Australian officials that 
censorship, despite the government’s efforts, could soon be redundant due to 
stories leaking into the press from sources such as those in New Zealand, and 
the government instead began to develop a process to manage the reporting of 
alleged war crimes. A body known as the Australian Political Warfare 
Committee, which had been established in July 1942, handled the matter. 
Members included personnel from the army, navy and External Affairs, with 
External Affairs also acting as secretariat. The original role of this committee 
appears to have been to formulate policy on propaganda to use both against 
Japan and for domestic purposes; eventually this work came to include the 
management of information about war crimes.
57 A meeting held in early 1944 
concluded that as the US government was releasing stories about Japanese 
treatment of prisoners, Australia must do the same. The committee 
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recommended that Australian newspapers should publish factual accounts of 
atrocities in a way that would strengthen the will of the people to fight. 
Committee members also agreed on how best to handle reports of war crimes 
as they emerged, suggesting the best method was to ‘give full play to Japanese 
cruelties to pale [sic] the Japanese as humans as a whole’. Reports were to 
avoid the word ‘revenge’ and were not to emphasise the ruthlessness of the 
Japanese to such a degree that they would seem superhuman. They should link 
crimes to Asiatic people generally, although it is unclear what the committee 
believed the benefit of this would be, and where possible should embarrass 
Japan. At the same time, care should be taken to avoid giving the impression to 
Europe that Australia was trying to take attention away from the European 
theatre of war.
58  
These directions provide considerable insight into how the government 
wished the public to view war crimes. It is not clear, on the other hand, how 
the government communicated its wishes to the press or on what authority it 
could hope to control what was printed. The press did in fact report the crimes 
in the manner outlined by the Political Warfare Committee, but this may not 
have been because of government instruction. The strategy suggests, however, 
that the government was confident it could use the press to its advantage and 
could exploit the meagre public understanding of Asia. The ‘White Australia’ 
policy of restricting non-white immigration was in force, and the only 
knowledge many Australians had of Asia probably came from clichés about 
Asian cultures or from wartime propaganda. The Political Warfare 
Committee’s instruction to link the crimes to Asians in general, whatever the 
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motivation in doing so, shows the race element that underpinned early 
Australian understandings of Japanese war crimes.   
  The Japanese formally surrendered on 2 September 1945. Australian 
censorship of war crimes stories also ended around the same time. Even before 
the surrender instrument was signed war correspondents began to interview 
liberated Australian POWs and to send back to Australia reports of 
malnourished and brutally treated soldiers. The result of the increased access to 
POWs and other sources was that for almost all of September 1945, POWs and 
Japanese atrocities dominated the front pages of Australian newspapers. This 
coverage represents a very striking emphasis, given the scale of the conflict 
that had just ended and the many other social, political and economic issues 
confronting Australia and the empire. The length and depth of the reports on 
war crimes show just how important the issue of POWs was seen to be.  
The manner of the reporting varied slightly among newspapers, 
although all of the reports maintained an outraged tone. Headlines and the 
reports themselves were direct and provocative. The Melbourne newspaper, 
The Argus, printed one story headed ‘Japanese Sadists Who Should Die’.
59 The 
Argus also published an editorial piece from one of its correspondents, Rohan 
D. Rivett, who had been captured by the Japanese. The letter detailed 
conditions in POW camps and Japanese treatment of Australian soldiers in 
graphic detail. Rivett’s article defined Japanese soldiers as subhuman monsters 
and above all else demanded that they should not be treated as an honoured 
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foe.
60 Rivett’s coverage of POW issues is particularly confronting. The type of 
language he used, however, was representative of how Japanese soldiers were 
portrayed in the Australian press during the early post-war years. Some stories 
of a more general nature about the peace also appeared, especially in The 
Sydney Morning Herald, which commented, for example, on Australia’s 
forthcoming participation in the Occupation of Japan.
61 During September, 
some newspapers carried stories on what they portrayed as the precarious state 
of the British Empire and editorials on Australia’s future security and 
defence.
62  Otherwise, papers around the country mirrored the virulent tone of 
The Argus to varying degrees.  
  The extraordinary coverage of the prisoner of war issue and Japanese 
atrocities appears to have been based on genuine feelings of anger in 
Australian society. Officials seemed to see this kind of outraged press coverage 
as a desirable source of support for war crimes trials, as can be seen in the 
strategy developed to guide press reporting. In hindsight, though, the plan for 
dealing with the press that the government had put in place before the end of 
the war seems hardly necessary, given that the community appears to have 
been very supportive of post-war trials. Perhaps the government was not 
confident of the extent of public support for trials because it feared in these 
early post-war months that reports might surface to contradict the widespread 
perception that Australian prisoners had been mistreated. The Australian High 
Commissioner in New Zealand urgently cabled the War Cabinet in September 
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1945 to warn that an article had been published in New Zealand claiming that 
two soldiers had denied reports they had been ill treated by the Japanese. He 
considered that such softer views of the Japanese war record were potentially 
‘disastrous for the Australian view point on the treatment of Japan’.
63 Again, it 
is not clear to what extent the Australian government could exert influence 
over the Australian press or shield Australia from stories appearing in New 
Zealand, but the attentive reaction by the High Commissioner is nonetheless 
instructive. If his opinion was shared by members of the Australian 
government then politicians and others might have feared the widespread 
condemnation of Japan in Australia could prove fragile or easily diluted. On 
the other hand, perhaps the government simply believed that the more outraged 
and energetic the public remained, the stronger the case for a harsh stance on 
Japan would be. In these circumstances press, parliament and government took 
up the issue of war crimes trials with alacrity. Evatt summed up the feeling of 
officials and the public in 1946: 
If those responsible for those outrages [by Japanese soldiers] are 
allowed to escape punishment, it will be the grossest defeat of justice 
and a travesty of principle for which the war has been fought.
64 
As noted in the Introduction, many Australians considered their 
experience of the Pacific War to have been unique, and this is a crucial part of 
understanding attitudes to the BC war crimes trials. The high rate at which 
Australian soldiers had been captured by the Japanese was one distinctive 
feature. In fact, the most typical experience for an Australian soldier in the 
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Pacific War was as a POW of the Japanese, or fighting a valiant defensive 
action, or both.
65 As the Japanese military secured its stunning victories in 
Malaya, the Netherlands Indies and Singapore in late 1941 and early 1942, it 
took 22,000 Australians captive,
66 the majority in February 1942 at the 
surrender of Singapore, where the number of Australians captured, roughly 
15,000, far exceeded the 1,789 who were killed.
67 Hank Nelson discusses the 
frustration felt by those captured at Singapore, some of them without firing a 
single shot in the war.
68 Within a short time many of the prisoners were taking 
part in the building of the Burma-Thai Railway, joining in the Sandakan Death 
March in Borneo, or seeing out the war in a Japanese prison camp. Ultimately, 
8,031 Australians died in Japanese captivity.
69 Nelson points to Australia’s 
previously proud military history and the expectation that soldiers in the 
Second World War would be the ‘new Anzacs’.
70 The actual fate of this 
generation of Australian soldiers was very different. It was certainly less 
glamorous, but has been equally enduring in the national memory.  
In comparison, US victories in the Pacific War were frequent after the 
Battle of Midway of June 1942, and often clearly displayed the superiority of 
US over Japanese forces, in a complete turnaround from the early period when 
the Japanese military had inflicted defeats on American forces. Australian 
forces lacked the resources to achieve decisive victories which would have 
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highlighted their military superiority. Though Australia was on the winning 
side, there had not been enough opportunity for the military to demonstrate 
Australia’s individual superiority over the Japanese with a crucial victory that 
made a major contribution to the overall Allied triumph. Australian units did 
win in New Guinea, Borneo and elsewhere, but these victories had limited 
impact on the overall course of the war. This may be part of the reason that 
press reporting and memoirs went to considerable lengths to stress the 
adaptability, determination and ‘mateship’ of Australian soldiers. Such 
qualities represent a kind of triumph, but unlike a crushing naval victory, they 
do not speak for themselves. The Australian BC trials catalogued Japanese 
cruelty towards Australian POWs and gave the military the opportunity to 
bring Japan to account in courtrooms, something rarely achieved by the 
Australian military through force of arms.  
A further distinctive feature of the Australian war experience, 
compared with that of the US and the European powers fighting in Asia, was 
the apparent threat of invasion of home territory. Many Australians believed an 
invasion by the Japanese to be imminent in 1942, following the capture of 
Singapore and the Netherlands Indies,
71 and the government encouraged this 
fear. The Japanese offensive of 1941-1942 was, and still is, perceived as the 
greatest external threat Australia had ever faced.
72 Numerous air raids struck 
the north of Australia between 19 February 1942 and 12 November 1943, 
principally at Darwin but also Broome, Katherine, Wyndham, Derby and other 
locations. The 19 February 1942 attack at Darwin killed 243 people and 
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overall the air raids killed roughly 900.
73 Moreover, on the night of 31 May–1 
June 1942 Japanese ‘midget’ submarines sank the HMAS Kuttabul in Sydney 
Harbour. Other small-scale Japanese submarine activity also occurred off the 
east coast.
74 The raids on the mainland and in Sydney Harbour exacerbated 
fears of an invasion from the north that had been current for forty years, and 
had been worsened by a loss of faith in British military power since the 
Japanese severely dented British prestige in Asia by sinking the HMS Prince of 
Wales and the HMS Repulse off Singapore on 10 December 1941 and by 
capturing the key British naval port in the region, Singapore, two months 
later.
75 The immediate sense of vulnerability helped make Australia’s war in 
the Pacific very different from Britain’s or America’s.
76 Neither the US 
mainland nor the British Isles, by contrast, was ever bombed by the Japanese.
77 
For the UK, the conflict in Europe was the dominant experience of the Second 
World War. The shock of losing Singapore and of the Royal Navy’s loss of 
influence in the Pacific was significant, but the struggle against Germany was 
closer to home and threatened the actual survival of the country in a way that 
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the battle with the Japanese never did. For the US, the story of the Pacific War 
from mid-1942 onwards was one of continual victories far from home.  
Japanese soldiers never did invade Australia but the war inflicted many 
scars. Australian society was left shaken and politics cautious. Australians 
were able to rejoice as victors in the war, but significant questions remained 
about what the future held. It was clear that military security would rest 
heavily on relations with the USA, but the sense of vulnerability, as a Western 
nation on the doorstep of Asia, had not subsided. In fact, it seemed that those 
who had much earlier prophesied an invasion of Asiatic people from the north 
had almost been proven correct. Thus, while recovery from war and a return to 
normal life were important priorities in 1945, so was the eradication of 
Japanese militarism. In fact, the experience of Australian officials and BCOF 
soldiers facing the Japanese after the war did not suggest that the Japanese 
were planning to rise again. Though the Australian press continued to portray 
Japanese militarism as a threat, this assessment was not reflected at ground 
level in places where trials were imminent or underway. On Morotai in the 
Netherlands Indies, for example, Australian soldiers soon realised that the 
great majority of Japanese prisoners were unlikely to carry out sabotage or to 
rebel. Prisoners awaiting repatriation home and under guard of Australian 
soldiers were given tasks where rebellion or sabotage could well have been 
possible, but their guards did not find it necessary to take specific steps to 
prevent sabotage, and nor did it actually occur.
78  
Australian society was shocked and angry after the war. Life as a POW 
had been the dominant experience of the Pacific War for Australian soldiers. 
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War crimes, war criminals, POW camps and war crimes trials were thus a 
significant focus for the anxiety and emotion produced by the conflict. In the 
immediate aftermath of hostilities Australians felt strong ties to those who had 
served during the war.
79 In the press, outrage and sadness at what had 
happened to them sometimes took the form of expressions of hate and a 
determination to pursue Japan for its alleged war crimes. Underpinning the 
public anger against the Japanese was widespread private grief. For women, as 
Joy Damousi explains, grief was often an accepted and open part of post-war 
life, although war widows faced their own struggles for recognition in 
commemoration services.
80 Men, however, were generally not allowed to 
grieve in public in any obvious way. Gavan Daws contends that although the 
former Australian POWs were now free men, they found it very hard to adjust 
back to civilian life and their time in Japanese camps ‘turned out to be a life 
sentence’.
81 But social conventions at the time required men to be tough, to get 
on with the job, moving on with their lives yet always remembering the fallen. 
Many emotions must thus have remained suppressed, and Australian society 
was in an unsettled state in the mid- to late 1940s. War issues lingered in the 
1950s and beyond. According to Damousi, ‘shadows of war remained 
psychologically embedded in post-war Australia, challenging the tranquil 
image of the 1950s and 1960s’.
82  
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Official perceptions of public opinion undoubtedly helped shape the 
cautious government attitude towards Japan after the war. Although the full 
details of what returned soldiers were going through psychologically were not 
widely discussed, the government apparently recognised that lingering unease 
and pain over the war meant that dealing with Japan remained a delicate task 
even in the early 1950s. Former Australian POWs seemed to feel that although 
Japan had lost the war it was somehow going to ‘win’ the peace,
83 and the 
government appears to have been conscious, even at times fearful, of such 
public opinion. As late as 1953, the government concluded that public opinion 
still demanded a tough stance on Japan, and especially on war criminals. In 
fact, as will be shown in Chapter Five, the government continued to 
acknowledge anti-Japanese sentiment as late as 1957. Australian public 
opinion, however, was complex. Though examples of anti-Japanese attitudes 
could be found throughout the 1950s they were not universal. Anger towards 
and mistrust of the Japanese was not always dominant. For example, the 
response to the 1950 news that trials would resume at Manus Island was quite 
balanced. Some press articles even advocated leniency towards the Japanese, 
given the passage of time since the war’s end.
84  
Press coverage of the trials and of Japanese conduct during the war 
presented Japanese people as very different from Australians. War crimes were 
often linked to Japanese culture as it was commonly supposed to be, and 
simplistic racial stereotypes provided one explanation for what had occurred in 
the Pacific from 1941 to 1945. Australian personnel had been confronted with 
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what appeared to be idiosyncratic, fanatical Japanese military behaviour. At 
the same time, some alleged Japanese war criminals obviously did believe in 
Japanese racial superiority. Dower contends that the Pacific War was fuelled 
by propaganda on both sides about the essential differences between the 
enemies, maintaining that the racial stereotypes applied by Westerners to 
Japanese remained potent after the end of the war, yet proved adaptable to the 
needs of the Occupation: the Japanese were now seen as misguided rather than 
as a threatening race with irredeemable war-like characteristics.
85 In terms of 
dominant Australian perceptions of the Japanese, I will argue that while 
wartime stereotypes did indeed remain, they did not prove particularly 
adaptable to post-war circumstances. The old wartime sentiments seem to have 
continued far longer amongst the Australian public than elsewhere, and 
changed post-war circumstances had less effect on them. Fear in Australia of a 
possible conflict with an Asian nation, usually Japan, had been prevalent since 
the turn of the twentieth century and did not quickly dissipate. The White 
Australia Policy continued to be widely accepted on the grounds that it was 
based on sound racial theory and that it was absolutely crucial in the 
development of the country.
86 
 
Preparing for the Trials: The Military and Political Process  
The Australian BC war crimes trials began in November 1945, largely without 
the problems associated with other Australian policies for Japan. Arrangements 
for the trials had been hastily finalised after the war, but some aspects had been 
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in preparation much longer. Outside interference had been minimal. From the 
beginning, Australian officials took a lead role among the Allies on war 
crimes. Overlooked in negotiations over Potsdam, the government was left 
with few areas in which it could truly influence policy on Japan and achieve 
the hard-line results it desired. Frustration only increased with the US refusal 
to send Hirohito to trial. The Australian press now suspected that the US would 
go easy on Japan, and the same sentiment also existed at official levels.
87 The 
BC war crimes trials, on the other hand, did not depend on US policy. Though 
they took place within a generally agreed framework shared by the UK, US, 
France, the Netherlands, Nationalist China, Australia and later the Philippines, 
ultimately they could remain a wholly Australian project in which Australia 
could direct its own policy, and for which the Australian government could 
write its own legislation.  
Preparations started during the conflict itself. As noted above, secret 
official investigations into alleged Japanese war crimes began as early as June 
1943.
88 By this time International Red Cross reports had suggested that war 
crimes were occurring. Red Cross representatives in Australia then petitioned 
the government to investigate, expressing serious doubts over Japanese claims 
that conditions in POW camps were suitable. The Red Cross maintained that 
reports from its representatives were being altered by the Japanese.
89 The 
government does not appear to have made the Red Cross claims public but 
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responded by commissioning Webb to investigate them. Webb’s report covers 
this investigation process, the ways in which specific rules or conventions had 
been broken by the Japanese and details of the kind of atrocities being 
committed. It also seeks to justify the secrecy surrounding investigations of 
alleged crimes by claiming that a more open approach would endanger troops 
in Japanese-held areas,
90 presumably as Japanese soldiers might worsen their 
treatment of Australian soldiers as a reprisal. After its forces began to prevail 
in Japanese-occupied areas in early 1945, the Australian military applied itself 
diligently to the task of preparing as complete a record as possible of war 
crimes and indeed to trying to ascertain the fate of all of its servicemen. By 
May 1945, the military had gathered a significant amount of evidence of 
crimes. The methods by which it did so are discussed in Chapter Two.  
The Australian trial authorities originally intended to investigate all 
instances of alleged war crimes and to prosecute all suspected Japanese war 
criminals. Given that crimes included slapping prisoners, and depriving them 
of food or medicine, there must have been a daunting number of ‘leads’ to 
pursue. By the end of the trials, the Australian authorities had prosecuted 814 
Japanese soldiers, which is a considerable number at face value. Roughly 
142,000 Japanese soldiers were in Australian-controlled areas after the 
surrender,
91 however, and the number was higher initially, before some were 
transferred to Dutch and British control, so 814 represents a very small 
proportion. Trials were aimed at soldiers associated with POW camps in 
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particular, and the total number of Japanese prisoners included many who were 
not. Nevertheless, it must have been a demanding task for the Australian troops 
to identify suspected criminals and to arrest most of the ‘notorious’ candidates. 
Australian forces receiving the surrender of the Japanese in Australian-held 
areas numbered roughly half the Japanese forces, and apprehending war 
criminals was only one of their three major responsibilities. In addition to the 
arrest of suspected war criminals, priority was given to the liberation of 
prisoners in these areas, and the disarmament of Japanese forces and securing 
of the armaments that were recovered.
92  
Such was the fervour surrounding Japanese war crimes, partly by 
government design, that an ambitious attempt to bring as many war criminals 
to justice as possible was apparently the only realistic way of appeasing the 
public and returned soldiers. It is difficult, however, to assess how successful 
the authorities were in bringing war criminals to account. Most Australian 
soldiers returning from the war seem to have claimed that Japanese war crimes 
were very common. Webb’s report also highlighted widespread crimes. 
Officials had known of war crimes since 1943, while the public and army 
claimed that it had known about them ‘all along’. Moreover, the Australian 
War Crimes Act, as we will see below, allowed authorities a broad jurisdiction. 
Yet with 142,000 surrendered Japanese at their disposal, Australian authorities 
charged fewer than 1,000. It is fair to conclude that either trial authorities fell 
woefully short of the goal to prosecute all Japanese war criminals, or the 
frequency of crimes had been considerably exaggerated. If the allegations that 
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crimes were widespread are true, as some Australian historians assert,
93 then 
one point that has been overlooked is how statistically unlucky a Japanese 
soldier had to be to be convicted of a war crime. 
The prospective course of the war crimes trials was charted in broad 
terms by the Australian government before the public outcry over the treatment 
of POWs began. In October 1945, however, officials were still gathering 
evidence, the parameters of the trials were still being decided, in secret, and 
goals were being set for the number of trials to be completed before the end of 
the following year, as will be explained in Chapter Two.
94 In truth, at the end 
of the war, how best to try Japanese war criminals was far from clear. Japan 
was not a signatory to the Geneva Convention and, as we have seen, war 
crimes trials were a relatively new concept.  
 At the conclusion of the war, the Australian government had two main 
courses of action open to it. The government could try war criminals under the 
existing British Royal Warrant for war crimes, or could devise new legislation 
of its own. Existing Australian military law was evidently considered 
insufficient for the prosecution of war criminals. In the Australian Edition of 
Manual of Military Law 1941, war crimes were only briefly defined as 
‘Violations of the recognized rules of warfare by members of the armed 
forces’.
95 The British Royal Warrant, issued for war criminals on 14 June 
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1945, was the instrument applied by British war crimes courts. A Royal 
Warrant is essentially an expression of the Royal Prerogative and the authority 
of the crown. In practice, the warrant defined the jurisdiction and the structure 
of British war crimes courts, stating that ‘His Majesty deems it expedient to 
make provision for the trial and punishment of violations of the laws and 
usages of war’. The Australian government, however, decided that its BC trials 
should be conducted under new legislation and the separate Australian War 
Crimes Act was speedily put together in October 1945, allowing the military 
and government to try Japanese war criminals on their own terms.
96 The Act 
was based on the British Warrant but provided a greater jurisdiction to charge 
alleged war criminals with offences and a degree of flexibility in determining 
what a war crime was.
97 For example, the War Crimes Act, in addition to 
defining a war crime as a violation of the laws of war, also included any crime 
defined by a board of inquiry as a war crime. The offence in question could 
have been committed in ‘any place whatsoever, whether within or beyond 
Australia, during any war’.
98 Pappas points out that little is known about the 
creation of the Act as few relevant notes and sources were left behind. It was 
written by a small team using special wartime powers, and much of the 
comment on its creation is little more than speculation.
99  
                                                                                                                                                         
Diplomatic Papers 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, Vol. VI, 
Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1945, pp. 932-933. 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1945v06. Accessed 29/4/12.  
96 Pappas, ‘Law and Politics’, pp. 28-35. 
97 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, Buffalo, New York, William S. Hein & Co. Inc., 1997, pp. 105-
110; Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, pp. 124-125. 
98 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, p. 124. 
99 Pappas, ‘Law and Politics’, pp. 42-43. 88 
 
Australia’s war crimes legislation departed from that used by other 
governments conducting BC trials in a few respects. The most significant was 
that the Act specifically listed rape and enslaving women into prostitution as 
war crimes, even though such crimes are generally regarded as having been 
overlooked in international military law.
100 On the whole, however, the 
Australian War Crimes Act closely resembled other nations’ legislation, 
including in some contentious respects, like the rejection of the defence of 
Superior Orders, that is, the claims by some defendants that they had 
committed a crime under orders.
101 The wish to try alleged Japanese war 
criminals under a specifically Australian Act confirms the pattern in Australian 
foreign policy that I have already mentioned: the government was continuing 
to exhibit the growing independence from British foreign policy that had been 
evident during and near the end of the war. The Australian War Crimes Act 
was a further sign that the government wished to handle sensitive matters itself 
at this stage. Australians felt so strongly about alleged Japanese war crimes in 
particular that leaving the trials in other countries’ hands was not acceptable. 
The idea of a specifically Australian reckoning with Japan was a powerful one. 
 The Australian government took active steps to ensure its interests 
were protected in all matters relating to war crimes trials. The Cabinet cabled 
Evatt in October 1945 suggesting that Australia should, in negotiations with its 
allies, state its desire to investigate all war crimes in South East Asia, as 
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recognition of the scale of its war effort.
102 In fact, each of the seven 
governments conducting Class B and C trials had the right to try Japanese 
soldiers for war crimes committed against its own soldiers and for crimes 
committed against native civilians in Japanese-occupied areas in which the 
Allied country’s troops were stationed at the time of the Japanese surrender. 
The Australian trials were conducted within the area of the Pacific that during 
the war had been subject to the US-led South East Asia Command (SEAC), the 
headquarters of Allied military operations in the South East Pacific. According 
to a US directive, war crimes trials in the SEAC area were the responsibility of 
the Commander in Chief of SEAC in the case of the US, or otherwise of the 
individual governments whose troops were active in that area.
103 It was similar 
elsewhere in the Pacific: trials were conducted by the Allied wartime military 
command in a particular area, the occupying Allied nation or the individual 
Allied government that believed a crime had occurred in that area against its 
personnel or interests.
104 Local agreements, for example within SEAC, ensured 
that in cases where more than one government was interested in trying a 
particular suspect, each nation concerned could send a representative to 
observe the trial and would retain the right to try the suspect if the original 
prosecuting government dropped the charges against him.
105 An External 
Affairs telegram in December 1945 asked the British Foreign Office to allow 
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an Australian military representative to be present at all British trials that 
involved an Australian in any way.
106 It is evident that the Australian military 
and government were determined not only to take responsibility for Australia’s 
own trials but also to ensure that justice was served to their satisfaction 
whenever Australians were involved.  
Under the Department of Army’s Directorate of Prisoners of War and 
Internees, 1 Australian War Crimes Section was set up and attached to South 
East Asia Command in Singapore.
107 The Directorate served as the 
headquarters for all the initial Australian trials. As noted earlier, trials were 
held at Darwin, Labuan, Rabaul, Morotai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Wewak and 
Manus Island. It is not absolutely clear why each venue, other than Manus, was 
chosen. It seems likely, however, that trials were conducted at the closest and 
most suitable venue in relation to where Australian personnel had uncovered 
war crimes or arrested suspected war criminals. 
The Australian trials began under extraordinary circumstances which 
included many non-legal dimensions. The lead-up to the trials encompassed 
investigations, the bloody end to the war, press outrage at Japanese treatment 
of POWs, the ad hoc creation of the War Crimes Act, and the government’s 
desire to present Japanese war crimes in the worst possible way to the public. 
In early trials in Darwin, as we will see in Chapter Three, public zeal for a 
tough stance on Japan turned against the government over the sentencing. It 
was evidently impossible for the trials to be dedicated solely to the pursuit of 
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international justice. Political and social factors obtruded in very significant 
ways. 
  Chapter Two discusses the way in which the tribunals functioned, 
especially in the early period. In examining the trial procedures, the chapter 
also discusses the question of the fairness of the Australian tribunals, a matter 
that has preoccupied the small number of scholars who have dealt with 
Australian prosecution of Japanese war crimes suspects.     
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE TRIALS: LEGALITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
   
From the start, the BC war crimes trials were much more than a set of legal 
proceedings. In practice they represented an intersection of legal and political 
ideals. Webb stated in 1945 that the primary goal of the ‘lesser’ trials was to 
show what kind of war Japan had waged and to help build the case against the 
Class A war criminals while also punishing ‘minor’ ones along the way.
1 From 
Webb’s comment it is clear that authorities considered that ordinary Japanese, 
as well as the Japanese leadership, must bear responsibility for the Pacific War, 
even if the Class A suspects were more important to Webb. The ‘lesser’ trials 
did indeed provide a catalogue of crimes that illuminate the way the war in the 
Pacific was fought. They also reveal, however, the political dimensions of the 
Australian government’s handling of Japan’s surrender and subsequent events. 
Trial records show that, despite Webb’s own view, the Australian authorities in 
general did not consider the BC cases to be subsidiary to those in Class A. The 
‘minor’ war criminals were important in their own right in the development of 
Australia’s post-war policy for Japan. A delicate balance between meeting 
political goals and ensuring fair and just trials emerged. The balance, however, 
was not always successfully maintained. The Australian government’s desire 
to show Japan how a war should and should not be fought also clashed with 
the practicalities of prosecuting crimes in extraordinary circumstances, when 
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convictions even under normal court conditions would have been difficult to 
attain.  
  The way in which the trials were set up, and the way they operated in 
the initial period, confirm the Australian government’s determination to pursue 
Japanese militarism, and to be seen to do so expeditiously and successfully, 
despite difficulties that included limitations in the government’s and the 
army’s human and financial resources. It was clear from early on that a 
pragmatic approach was needed if the trials were to operate efficiently and 
successfully. Thus, for example, rules of evidence were relaxed, and large 
group trials were permitted. Other governments running Class B and C trials 
employed similar measures. Such features of the trials attracted criticism at the 
time, and have been controversial among historians and other commentators 
ever since. Indeed, the fairness or otherwise of the trials has often been taken 
to be the most salient aspect of their history. While I demonstrate in this thesis 
that the social and political significance of the trials goes far beyond questions 
of fairness, it remains important to examine the criticisms levelled at the trials, 
because such an examination highlights the fragile balance between legal and 
political objectives in the Australian prosecutions.   
Australian officials appear to have been conscious of this issue from 
the beginning. There is little evidence of trial authorities openly discussing 
how to balance politics and legalities, but some comments indicate an official 
awareness that the prosecutions might seem to be motivated by a desire for 
revenge. On 10 September 1945, six weeks before the first Australian trial, 
Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, commented as follows:  94 
 
In its demand that all Japanese war criminals be brought to trial, the 
Australian Government is actuated by no spirit of revenge, but by 
profound feelings of justice and of responsibility to ensure that the next 
generation of Australians is spared such frightful experiences [as those 
of the prisoners of war].
2 
Evatt’s comment was an attempt justify Australia’s tough stance on Japan. His 
remark also foreshadowed the tension between achieving justice from the 
Australian viewpoint and holding trials that would appear fair to those 
observing them from outside, as well as introducing the idea that future 
generations of Australians needed to be protected from Japanese militarism. 
This was a common theme in early post-war Australian discourse on Japan, 
and war crimes trials were clearly intended to play their part in providing such 
protection.  
  The question of the trials’ fairness is complex. In the main, Australian 
authorities attempted to conduct just trials that punished guilty Japanese fairly. 
In this chapter I describe the process of investigating war crimes and of setting 
up the Australian tribunals. I discuss the modifications that were made to 
courtroom practice, compared with civilian prosecutions and ordinary courts-
martial, to accommodate the extraordinary requirements of war crimes trials. I 
then provide five case-studies from the early period of prosecutions to 
illustrate the workings and consequences of these modified practices. 
Throughout the chapter I address the issue of the fairness of the Australian 
trials as that issue arose in preparations for the prosecutions and in particular 
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cases. At the end of the chapter I provide an overall assessment of the fairness 
or otherwise of the trials. 
Criticisms of the Australian trials, both at the time and later, can be 
divided into two categories. First, the trials are sometimes attacked from a 
general moral standpoint. In some cases it is hard to argue that a trial verdict 
was legally unjust, but it may be possible to say that on the balance of all the 
evidence the verdict seems misplaced in a moral sense. Japanese historians and 
contemporary Japanese commentators on the trials have often focussed on this 
moral dimension, referring, for instance, to Japanese soldiers who were made 
to pay for the crimes of their superiors, or who were in hopeless situations at 
the time of the alleged crimes.
3 I do not seek to judge the morality of the 
Australian trials overall. I do show, however, that while there was room for 
trial authorities to weigh broader considerations against the letter of the law, 
Australian authorities only did so if there was no risk of undermining the 
primary goal of running efficient and successful trials. The goal of running 
successful trials outweighed the goal of running trials that were always 
absolutely fair. Second, from a more technical standpoint, critics often note 
that the procedures in the Australian war crimes courts were altered to remove 
legal safeguards so that the trials fell short of ‘international legal standards of 
justice that we have evolved today’.
4 For example, it was not always required 
that witnesses be produced in court to give direct testimony; instead, signed 
affidavits could be presented. In such cases, witnesses could not be cross-
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examined, and thus a basic legal principle in a normal trial was abandoned.
5 
From the official Australian perspective, the changes to the trial procedures 
functioned well and made convictions much easier to attain.  
 
Investigating War Crimes 
The majority of personnel involved in the trials were responsible for the 
investigation of possible crimes.
6 As I have already mentioned, Webb himself 
had compiled an early report on Japanese atrocities, but this was not the only 
source of leads for investigators to pursue. As POWs were liberated and 
returned home, the Australian government issued questionnaires to all those 
who had been in Japanese prison camps. Between twelve thousand and 
fourteen thousand completed questionnaires, that is, virtually all the surveys 
originally sent out, were recorded by the military.
7 The questionnaires were 
two pages long, with one to two further pages of a full statement by the ex-
POW if he had indicated that he had witnessed or had knowledge of a war 
crime. The questionnaires were completed in the presence of an officer who 
countersigned the document and commented in writing on the reliability of the 
witness. Completed questionnaires were used both in pursuing investigations 
and to provide evidence in court, though only 248 were used directly in the 
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trials.
8 They proved useful to prosecutors; legal personnel believed they had 
helped in gaining guilty verdicts.
9 Other Allied governments used similar 
means of gathering information. 
If written or verbal evidence from an Australian soldier indicated that a 
war crime might have occurred, the army investigated further, beginning by 
identifying the area in which the crime was alleged to have occurred. Evidence 
was also gathered separately by the air force. A number of cases dealt with 
crimes against Australian airmen who had crashed in Japanese-occupied areas. 
The air force investigated crash sites to discover the fate of the plane and crew. 
If it appeared that the crew had survived the crash but had later died, the cause 
of death was then investigated. Once it was decided that a war crime was likely 
to have occurred, a process began to find which Japanese units had been in the 
area and who had commanded those units. It was not always easy to find the 
commanding officers. Australian units had received the surrender of many 
thousands of Japanese soldiers in areas where the two sides had been fighting. 
The Australian War Crimes Commission requested at the end of the war that 
all Japanese commanders and staff of POW camps be detained in the area in 
which they had surrendered. Although many arrests were made, it appears that 
this directive was not always followed, despite a further instruction that staff of 
POW camps should be held even if there was no evidence of wrongdoing.
10 
Many Japanese were allowed to leave the area to which they had been posted, 
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to be repatriated to Japan, for example, and this must have made it far more 
complicated to identify suspects.  
The search for written records of confinement and treatment of Allied 
POWs was often fruitless. In at least one case, surprisingly, the prosecution 
claimed to have received a great deal of help from Japanese authorities, who 
provided them with documentation on the soldiers under investigation, 
probably in order to ensure that other innocent soldiers were not tried 
mistakenly for the alleged crime.
11 In general, however, it seems highly 
unlikely that the Japanese navy or army provided any significant assistance in 
the pursuit of their men. In most cases, the investigation process was fairly 
rudimentary, and focussed on line-ups and photo identification of suspects by 
Australian soldiers. Even these procedures were time-consuming and difficult 
given that many Allied soldiers struggled to distinguish accurately between 
Japanese people even though they had been their captives for a considerable 
time. In one particular case concerning alleged crimes on Ambon Island in the 
Netherlands Indies, several Australian soldiers in turn failed to identify in a 
line-up the Japanese soldier suspected of committing the crimes. The case was 
nevertheless successful in the end, because one Australian soldier did 
recognise the alleged criminal. In fact, where several soldiers had failed to 
recognise even a single suspect, this one soldier was able to recognise over 
forty across a number of cases.
12 The investigating and prosecuting authorities, 
however, do not seem to have acknowledged any problem in accepting one 
soldier’s word over that of many others. 
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Identifying Japanese by name was also difficult. Many Japanese had 
given false names when they surrendered, fearing reprisals from their own 
military.
13 The resulting confusion was then compounded by the difficulty that 
Australians had with spelling Japanese names, and the fact that there were 
some very common surnames, such as Tanaka, Suzuki and Watanabe. It is 
possible that the wrong Japanese were tried in some cases due to such 
confusion.
14   
 
The Trials 
Two main factors increased the pressure for the trials to be both efficient and 
successful: early media attention, and time constraints and logistical 
difficulties. Both of these factors undermined the tribunals’ capacity to deliver 
verdicts and sentences that were conspicuously fair. 
In Australia, there was intense media interest in the trials, especially 
early on. The army kept the press informed mainly through press releases, 
although journalists were also present at the courts. Through both channels, the 
public was able to follow the trials closely. Australian officials had publicly 
taken a tough stance on Japan since the surrender and as seen in the 
Introduction, BC war crimes trials had emerged as a key part of the 
government’s plan to deal with Japanese militarism. The result was a sense of 
urgency and public pressure to achieve ‘results’. Public expectation of a large 
number of guilty verdicts was high.   
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Initial Australian assessments predicted that the trials would take 
twelve months to complete, and the government set a goal of 500 cases to be 
concluded by 31 July 1946.
15 The target number of cases was ambitious; 
eventually it took almost seven years to complete the 296 trials that constituted 
the entire Australian program. The reasons for the large discrepancy between 
the target and the actual number of prosecutions are not clear. There were 
shortages of resources and trial personnel after 1947 which will be discussed in 
later chapters. On the other hand, however, the trial legislation was constructed 
with efficiency and pragmatism in mind. One factor is that Australian 
prosecuting authorities repeatedly ignored calls from legal experts for smaller 
trials, rather than group trials featuring large numbers of defendants. It is likely 
that in conducting mass trials, the target of 500 cases was in effect reduced, as 
one large trial could make up for what would otherwise have been several 
smaller trials. A further factor was the amount of outside assistance initially 
available to trial personnel. In the early cases, Australian staff worked closely 
with their British counterparts in Singapore and Hong Kong, and the British 
war crimes authorities were keen to assist Australia to conclude its trials 
promptly.
16 In the second phase of the trials, on Manus Island, Australian 
prosecutors worked alone, which presumably slowed the completion rate. At 
this stage Australian authorities found both the UK and the US governments 
unwilling to assist them, for a number of reasons that will be discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four. Even taking these factors into account, however, the 
target of completing the trials within twelve months remains very wide of the 
mark. 
                                                           
15 ‘EA Cable to Webb’, 25/10/1945, NAA, Canberra, A816, 276977. 
16 Pappas, ‘Law and Politics’, p. 52. 101 
 
The trials absorbed a significant amount of money and a large number 
of personnel, which became a drain on government, military and legal 
resources. Transferring witnesses, prisoners and staff between venues after the 
Pacific War was a difficult exercise. Though trials were conducted mostly in 
areas close to where war crimes had allegedly occurred, the logistical 
undertaking was nonetheless significant. As an example, the twenty-six trials 
on Manus Island in 1950 and 1951 were reported to have cost £100,000.
17 On 
balance, it appears that Australian officials completely underestimated how 
demanding the tribunals would be, and their desire to ensure that Japan faced 
comprehensive justice placed their personnel and resources under significant 
strain.  
 All the same, the Australian trials began swiftly and with great 
impetus.
18 The first were held in November 1945, in Wewak, in Australian 
New Guinea. Roughly two-thirds of the total number of  trials were completed 
by the end of 1946.
19 After 1946, however, the trials proceeded slowly and so 
the schedule was less likely to meet public expectations.
20 Time pressures led 
to shortened periods between trials and to exhausted staff. In such 
circumstances, verdicts and sentences were not always conspicuously fair or 
consistent. Moreover, the fact that in some cases very large numbers of 
defendants appeared meant that evidence could be confusing and 
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contradictory. In some of the larger trials, the quality of justice that was handed 
out can be seriously questioned and there is evidence of individual Japanese 
soldiers being either wrongly found guilty or inappropriately sentenced. One of 
the Australian prosecutors, John Myles Williams, recounts a case where, in an 
attempt to gain convictions, the prosecuting team decided to put as many 
soldiers on trial as possible to see whether, during the trial, evidence about 
those against whom they had no case might emerge.
21 Such methods may or 
may not have led to convictions of innocent Japanese soldiers, but either way 
they appear to be unscrupulous.    
The general framework of the trials was similar to that of Australian 
courts-martial. Each court was set up by a convening officer, whose 
responsibilities were to appoint the president and members of the court, and to 
decide if the charges in any particular case warranted a trial in the first place. 
The military personnel who made these decisions were, where possible, of a 
higher rank than the accused and from the same service.
22 The tribunals were 
staffed mainly by military personnel with legal training. Usually three or four 
officers sat in judgment. If personnel with appropriate legal training were not 
available to hear a case in a particular court, a military lawyer acted as Judge 
Advocate and was appointed to sit in the courtroom. The role of Judge 
Advocates was to ensure that proper legal procedures, as set forth by the War 
Crimes Act and the various guidelines pertaining to Australian military courts-
martial, were followed. The Judge Advocate also asked questions during the 
trial, if he felt that a part of the evidence or the procedure needed to be 
                                                           
21 Captain Williams to Lt Van Nooten, 21/2/46, Papers of John Myles 
Williams. 
22 Pappas, ‘Law and Politics’, pp. 128, 131. 103 
 
clarified, and provided a summary of the evidence for the trial record. At 
times, it was difficult to recruit personnel to sit in judgment on the military 
tribunals; one reason may have been their remote locations, as Webb 
suggested.
23 The problem was compounded after January 1947 when all staff 
except those who had volunteered for the trials were released from court duty 
and returned to Australia, leaving trial authorities understaffed in all areas.
24 
 Trials were subject to review by the Judge Advocate General (JAG), a 
civilian legal expert who was located in Australia. Two JAGs served in the 
Australian trials, J. Bowie Wilson until April 1946, and W. B. Simpson 
thereafter. The JAG was responsible for reviewing trials and also defendants’ 
petitions against the verdicts or sentencing. In the absence of any opportunity 
for formal appeal, these reviews appear to have functioned like an appeals 
system and were designed to offer a legal safeguard. Crucially, however, 
neither the findings of the Judge Advocate nor those of the JAG were legally 
binding. 
The JAG’s legal opinion then accompanied the trial documentation to 
the confirming officer, a military official in Australia who reviewed and 
confirmed or rejected sentences.
25 On occasion the confirming officer, on the 
advice of the JAG, altered a sentence that the court had handed down. Both the 
JAG and the confirming officer usually referred to the process of reducing a 
sentence as ‘mitigation’, though the term ‘commuted’ was sometimes used 
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when a death sentence was reduced to a prison term. The decision of the 
confirming officer was legally binding. For most of the trials the confirming 
officer was Lt General Vernon Sturdee, Commander in Chief of the Australian 
army, who had no legal training.
26 In 1948 Sturdee handed over responsibility 
for confirming the sentences of war criminals to Adjutant-General of the army 
W. M. Anderson, who continued to act as confirming authority for the later 
prosecutions on Manus Island as well. Anderson does not appear to have had 
legal training either. The new Coalition government, elected in December 
1949, became involved in the confirming process during the Manus trials when 
reviewing the case of General Nishimura Takuma, which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Five. After the Nishimura case, in the final months of the 
trials, Cabinet was active in confirming or commuting death sentences: at this 
stage the only sentences yet to be confirmed were for death, in contrast to the 
early years when the army confirming officer, first Sturdee and then later 
Anderson, had been the sole authority to confirm all sentences. The trials 
remained a military undertaking, not subject to the restrictions of a civilian 
legal system. Cabinet’s decision on death sentences was binding, however, just 
as the confirming officer’s had been in the early trials. 
Records of the trials include detailed transcripts from the court, but 
they do not normally include comprehensive reasons for the judgment. The 
best guide to the reasons a court reached its decision is often the summation of 
the evidence by the locally-based Judge Advocate.
27 The Judge Advocate’s 
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comments at the trials and the JAG’s review from Australia constitute the 
clearest examination of trial procedure available and together with the trial 
transcripts make up the complete record of each Australian BC trial.  
The need for clarification and confirmation of judgments suggests that 
the military personnel at the tribunals were not always clear in their written 
assessment of the evidence. Indeed, findings of the courts could be erratic and 
at times appear unreasonable, as sentencing was not always uniform, even for 
similar crimes committed in similar circumstances.
28 Twenty per cent of the 
sentences were altered at the JAG’s suggestion and his role at home, along 
with that of the Judge Advocates at the courts, probably did ensure that a 
reasonable number of the problematic findings or sentences were overturned.
29 
On the other hand, there were many occasions on which the JAG’s 
recommendations were ignored. Compelling arguments for reduction of a 
prisoner’s sentence were dismissed by the confirming authority even in serious 
cases where a prisoner faced a death sentence. Examples can be found in the 
case studies at the end of this chapter. Removing accepted legal safeguards and 
expecting the review system to handle all problems that arose during the trials, 
then not making those reviews binding in any way, seems an inadequate 
method of ensuring that the trials met their legal goal of being just and fair in 
all cases. On the other hand, this method of procedure would certainly allow 
the trials to continue to fulfil their role politically, as successful and expedient 
means of dealing with Japanese war crimes.   
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In the trial records, the legal proceedings seem straightforward and the 
prosecutions were sometimes concluded rapidly, once they had been convened. 
Non-official sources reveal, however, that at the ground level, commencing the 
trials was far from simple, and that legal and military personnel were often 
frustrated because they felt, for instance, that the Japanese involved were guilty 
but trying to trick their way out of being held accountable for their crimes. 
Captain Athol Moffitt’s diary, later published as Project Kingfisher, gives a 
raw account of the initial period of the trials.
30 Moffitt, an Australian military 
legal officer working for the prosecution side in Rabaul, portrays an emotional 
and highly charged atmosphere. He feared that the US authorities would go 
easy on Japan, and considered that they displayed a lax attitude towards 
Japanese soldiers. This perception seems to have contributed to Moffitt’s 
determination to prosecute the Japanese as effectively as possible. He remarks 
on one occasion that he was comforted to hear an Australian officer who was 
about to sit in judgment on a case say ‘I am not going to let this bastard get 
away’.
31 In another entry he comments that if the Australian soldiers who had 
actually fought the war could have stayed to deal with Japan’s surrender, a 
harsher form of justice that was more appropriate for the trials, in Moffitt’s 
opinion, would have been carried out.
32 It is difficult to see exactly what 
Moffitt meant by this comment, however, as some personnel in the trials 
certainly had fought the Japanese. 
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In practice there was not a great burden on prosecutors to gather 
evidence locally, as the rules had been altered to allow written statements to be 
used by the court.
33 The relaxed rules of evidence made it easier for the 
prosecution to attain convictions and whilst the prosecution was often 
frustrated with the Japanese defendants, the trial records reveal that the 
courtrooms rarely, if ever, saw dramatic exchanges between the defence and 
the prosecution or detailed examination of Australian witnesses. Nevertheless 
the strain on the prosecution teams was high, due more to the complexities of 
the investigation process and the physical conditions in the trial venues than to 
the proceedings themselves. From the beginning, the Australian legal 
personnel who were to prosecute the Japanese faced a difficult task. 
Identifying individual prisoners and establishing their correct names was often 
challenging, and in general the language barrier presented many obstacles. The 
army did have interpreters but they sometimes struggled, especially during the 
early years. Basil Archer, a BCOF linguist who participated in intelligence 
work in Japan, though not in war crimes trials, notes that even though he had 
been near the top of his language class in Sydney, when he got off the plane in 
Ambon in the Netherlands Indies on the way to Japan and approached two 
Japanese soldiers with the aim of testing his language skills, he found that he 
had no idea what the prisoners were talking about. Archer claims that this was 
a common problem and that it took considerable time for him to understand the 
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Japanese language as it was actually spoken outside the classroom and by 
military men.
34 
Trial personnel faced unique circumstances and a task that was 
emotionally very taxing as well as physically and mentally tiring. The army 
legal personnel were often working in difficult climates and remote locations 
with the additional burden of knowing that Australians were relying on them to 
deliver justice. Personal memoirs, such as Moffitt’s, provide evidence of the 
pressure they were working under. The papers of John Myles Williams also 
indicate that prosecutors were often exhausted and low on morale. 
Correspondence between Williams and other prosecutors shows dissatisfaction 
with their job and conditions and a desire to return home.
35 The prosecutors 
appear concerned about JAG reviews of their trials and attentive to rumours 
that death sentences would be overturned. Williams’ correspondence indicates, 
however, that despite the workload and dissatisfaction with aspects of the 
process, prosecutors were committed to bringing war criminals to justice. 
Williams himself does not appear to have been motivated by strong anti-
Japanese sentiment, as he made friends with the Japanese defence teams and 
conducted a professional relationship with them. On the other hand, he was 
very aware of the significance of the trials for former Australian POWs and felt 
that he was now partly responsible for punishing on their behalf those Japanese 
who had committed war crimes against Australians.    
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Anti-Japanese sentiment was high in Australia after the war, and as 
noted above, some of the military personnel working on the trials had actually 
fought the Japanese. Taking these factors into account, it is not surprising that 
some staff harboured feelings of resentment against the Japanese. Outspoken 
officers did sit in judgment at times, and were heavy-handed in their 
sentencing. Some officers were renowned for their aggressive sentencing; 
indeed, they seem to have had no intention of hiding their feelings.
36 As we 
have seen, the Australian government had stated that the trials would not be 
marked by any spirit of vengeance. At ground level, such a spirit was 
nevertheless evident at times. Tellingly, and contrary to the opinions of others 
at the trials, Williams wrote in 1988 that the prosecutions had been an 
‘expression of contemporary national sentiment’, adding that a ‘spirit of 
vengeance in this sentiment is not denied’.
37 The JAG reviews were often 
critical of sentencing and thus they had the potential to moderate the effects of 
the aggression shown in the courts. Arguably, however, the review process, 
especially a non-binding one, was an inadequate substitute for the removal of 
those officers who could not restrain their desire for vengeance.  
  Trying Japanese war criminals uncovered issues about Australian as 
well as Japanese conduct during and after the war. Japanese prisoners made 
several accusations of ill-treatment against their Australian guards. For 
example, an Allied interrogator, Captain Sylvester, was the subject of a 
relatively lengthy investigation into his interrogation techniques which 
allegedly included coercing confessions and evidence out of Japanese soldiers 
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by violent means. The investigation ultimately found, however, that Sylvester 
did not have a case to answer.
38 It appears that the Australian military 
authorities took such accusations seriously and attempted to investigate them 
thoroughly. Investigations were not received well by Australian personnel; the 
investigators were referred to as ‘white nips’.
39 Investigations also uncovered 
accusations of bad behaviour among Australian soldiers during the war. 
Australian POWs were alleged to have stolen from each other or otherwise to 
have taken advantage of each other.
40 The details in the trial records thus 
reveal that not everyone was able to cope with the intense pressure on 
Australian POWs as stoically as the popular stereotype suggests.  
   The fairness of the trials themselves has been challenged on several 
grounds, with changes to the rules of evidence as the chief area of criticism. 
Carrel suggests that while these changes were questioned at the time, it was the 
huge public pressure for convictions that made relaxation of the rules 
acceptable to the Australian authorities.
41 It would be wrong, however, to see 
the changes primarily as the result of vindictiveness towards the Japanese. The 
rules were changed because of legitimate concerns over how an existing 
courtroom process could be adapted to the special needs of war crimes trials, 
which were, on this scale, a new aspect of international law. Moreover, as 
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Pappas shows, the procedures used in Australia’s trials were very similar to 
those in the BC trials conducted by other Allied nations.
42  
 The rules of evidence dictate what evidence may be presented to the 
court and how. A major problem for prosecutors in the BC trials was the lack 
of written evidence confirming alleged orders to lower-ranking soldiers to 
mete out brutal treatment to prisoners or perform executions: even if written 
orders had been issued in the first place, documents had been destroyed by 
Japanese soldiers at the POW camps at the war’s end.
43 Moreover, many 
witnesses who might have been produced to the court in person were thought 
to have died, and it was hard to find and produce witnesses even if they were 
theoretically available to testify.
44 Thus, rules of evidence were greatly relaxed, 
as can be seen in several case studies later in this chapter. The most notable 
change was that signed affidavits were deemed to be acceptable as evidence, 
even if the person making the statement was still alive and able to be presented 
to the court.
45 A certain amount of protection was provided by the fact that 
tribunals were staffed mostly by the military, and personnel with legal training 
were provided to the courts where the military personnel did not have any. 
Therefore, unlike in a civil or criminal court in Australia, lay jurors would not 
be deciding the case but rather people familiar with military law and the 
circumstances of the crimes. The review system was also designed to pick up 
any flaws in the trials. Arguably, however, neither the review system nor the 
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expertise of the personnel in the trials was sufficient to overcome the problems 
that the acceptance of affidavit evidence created. 
  Because of the changes to the rules of evidence, there was little 
opportunity for the defence to cross-examine witnesses. The quality of the 
defence was thereby seriously reduced in some cases. Affidavits were not 
always even read out in court, but were simply admitted into evidence. In one 
Australian case, the accused was found guilty without hearing any evidence in 
court at all, an aspect of the trial that was criticised by the JAG.
46 Estimating 
the number of convictions that may have been affected by the relaxation of the 
rules of evidence is difficult and in any case the JAG review process provided 
a safeguard. The outcome of most trials was probably not seriously affected, 
but some cases were built almost entirely on affidavit evidence and this would 
at least have lessened the ability of the defence team to examine the 
prosecution’s case. Convicting a person on affidavit evidence alone would not 
have been acceptable in a normal courtroom in Australia or in Australian 
courts-martial. It seems unlikely, moreover, that the review process picked up 
every injustice in the trials, and for that matter, as we have seen, the JAG’s 
findings were not binding.  
Whether in practice they led to unfair convictions or not, such aspects 
of the trials provided opportunities for criticism and suspicion about fairness. 
The credibility of the trials would have been better served by maintaining as 
many conventional legal safeguards as possible, rather than removing them. 
There were certainly practical limitations to consider, however, and it is 
unlikely that a more conventional system could have operated effectively 
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under the prevailing circumstances. Without the relaxed rules of evidence, it is 
doubtful that as many convictions could have been gained and this would have 
been highly problematic for the Australian government. In fact, the trials 
would almost certainly have been a disaster politically if normal courtroom 
conventions had been observed. The Australian community’s connection with 
POWs and the way the issue of Japanese war crimes had been driven by the 
press in the early post-war period meant that the government could not afford 
to hold unsuccessful trials. Only effective and far-reaching pursuit of Japanese 
war crimes would be acceptable to the electorate. The rule changes allowed the 
trials to be far more effective than they would otherwise have been. This does 
not mean that the tribunals amounted to no more than victor’s justice, but some 
individual trials or sentences were manifestly unfair.  
The liberal use of capital punishment in the BC trials has also attracted 
criticism. Within Australia the use or otherwise of capital punishment was a 
state rather than a federal issue and practice therefore varied. For example, 
Queensland abolished capital punishment in 1922, and New South Wales in 
1955, but the last person executed in Australia was Ronald Ryan in Victoria in 
1967.
47 Application of the death penalty in the war crimes trials, however, was 
necessarily a federal matter. Nelson notes that the Australian Labor Party, in 
power at the federal level during 1945 and 1946 when the majority of death 
sentences were handed down, strongly opposed capital punishment in 
Australia, but yielded to public pressure and the enormity of Japanese war 
crimes to set aside its stance and allow the use of the death penalty for war 
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crimes. Nelson sees this as a ‘massive exception to policy’.
48 Leaving aside the 
application of the death penalty in civilian cases in Australia, capital 
punishment was more widely available for use against the Japanese than it was 
for Australian soldiers in their own military courts. The number of offences 
that could attract the death penalty was far higher in the BC trials than in 
Australian courts-martial.
49  
Domestically, by the 1950s, the argument justifying the retention of 
capital punishment on the basis of its value in achieving retribution for crimes 
was becoming less prominent. By this stage public discourse emphasised 
almost entirely the value of capital punishment as a deterrent.
50 Justification of 
the use of the penalty in the war crimes trials mirrored this emphasis in part. 
Public and official assessments of the threat from Japan after the war seem to 
indicate that Australians believed Japan could quickly regain strength and 
threaten the Pacific a second time. War criminals would then be in a position 
either to reoffend themselves or to transfer militarist ideals to the next 
generation of Japanese. Debate in parliament over punishment of war criminals 
in the post-surrender period often focused on preventing such a resurgence, 
and thereby also preventing any opportunity for alleged war criminals to 
offend again, and to encourage others to follow their example.
51 Capital 
punishment provided the ultimate guarantee. War crimes are committed in 
unique circumstances, however, and for any of the war criminals to have had 
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the chance to reoffend, or for others to have committed similar crimes, 
dramatic changes to the political situation in Asia would have had to occur. 
The argument that the death penalty would deter war crimes in a future conflict 
may be plausible, but the assertion that it provided any protection specifically 
against resurgent Japanese militarism is very weak. In practice, the death 
penalty provided only retribution. 
 There was strong support in the Australian press for the death penalty 
for war criminals and if the Labor Party had constructed war crimes legislation 
that did not provide for its use, it would have done so at great cost politically. 
For example, in early 1946, when reports appeared of a hold-up in executions, 
newspapers expressed a fear that they would cease. The Herald Sun was quick 
to defend capital punishment, in an article entitled ‘No Room for Mercy Here’. 
Whether the abolition of the death penalty in its civil application is 
wise or even humane can be argued. But that it should be replaced by 
lifelong confinement for Japanese convicted of some of the worst 
savageries of a brutal army would have been galling sentimentalism. 
Australia therefore will expect to hear – and soon – that the death 
sentences are being carried out.
52  
The writer of this article separates debate about the domestic use of capital 
punishment from war criminals but also issues what almost amounts to an 
ultimatum to the Labor government. The press wanted swift and final 
retribution; there seemed to be no thought that criminals of this kind could be 
rehabilitated. In many Australian eyes the alleged Japanese atrocities meant 
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that Japanese soldiers had in some way forfeited any right to be seen as equal 
to others where the use of the death penalty was concerned.  
The government also discussed how decisions should be made on 
whether or not to execute a prisoner. For reasons that are unclear, Secretary of 
the Department of Army Frank Sinclair suggested in early 1946 that the army 
should not be responsible for confirming death sentences. Sinclair evidently 
believed a convicted Japanese soldier should have his death sentence 
independently reviewed. Webb, however, was not impressed, remarking to the 
Minister for the Army, Eric Forde: ‘Apparently Mr Sinclair thinks we owe the 
same duty to Japanese guilty of war crimes as we do our own soldiers. This is 
wholly erroneous’.
53 Webb was arguing a point of law here and he was correct: 
war criminals were subject to Australian war crimes legislation, not Australian 
military law or Australian civilian law. In September 1948, however, Webb 
objected to the application of the death penalty to the Class A war criminals in 
Tokyo because he had concerns over the findings of the court, particularly in 
light of the non-trial of Emperor Hirohito.
54 It seems that Webb was more 
confident of the verdicts of the BC trials than the Class A, though it is not clear 
exactly why he held this view. In any case, it was never likely that the Labor 
government would choose not to use the death penalty, nor that the army 
would give up the chance to administer it. Australian officials, politicians and 
journalists were well aware that Japanese soldiers were facing execution for a 
greater range of crimes than Australian soldiers normally did, but both the 
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press and the government made a firm distinction between Japanese war 
criminals and Australian soldiers and civilians. 
  In practice the death penalty was applied in a confusing and 
inconsistent manner across the trials as a whole. As will be seen in the case 
studies later in this chapter, there are startling examples of a Japanese soldier 
being executed for a very minor offence. The death penalty, once carried out, 
is by definition final and irrevocable and therefore, unlike a life sentence, is not 
open to any future exercise of clemency. The availability of the death penalty 
made it all the more serious that Australian military courts were not always 
able to provide uniformity in sentencing proportionate to guilt.
55  
The issue of Command Responsibility has also been controversial in 
commentary on the BC trials, though less so in the Australian than the US 
prosecutions. The trials sought to punish not only lower-ranking individuals 
who had committed war crimes, but also the commanding officers of Japanese 
forces and units that had committed large-scale crimes. The offences for which 
commanders were held responsible ranged from the mistreatment or murder of 
prisoners and civilians to the use of POWs for military purposes such as 
building gun emplacements and loading munitions.
56 The Command 
Responsibility or ‘senior officer’ trials dealt chiefly with how a commander 
met his responsibilities; what he knew or should have known at the time of the 
alleged atrocities; and whether and how he had acted to prevent them. On this 
scale, Command Responsibility was a new principle in international military 
law. Australia conducted twenty-two Command Responsibility trials, 
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following the early precedent set by the American prosecution of General 
Yamashita Tomoyuki between 29 October and 7 December 1945 in Manila. 
The Yamashita trial was not only a test case for the principle of 
Command Responsibility but was also the first of all the BC trials. Its political 
value was significant. General Yamashita had led the Japanese capture of 
Singapore and Malaya in February 1942, the success of which earned him 
international notoriety. After his early victories, he spent most of the war in 
less prestigious roles, before taking command of the Japanese 14
th Area Army 
in the Philippines on 9 October 1944. In US eyes, Yamashita was also a 
notorious commander because of the extensive atrocities committed against 
Allied prisoners and Filipino locals by soldiers under his command, including 
during the siege of Manila in January and February 1945. Yamashita’s 
knowledge of the atrocities, however, was severely limited at best because of 
the division of the command structure of the Japanese forces in the Philippines 
into three groups, which were dispersed over difficult terrain and hastily 
organised under the pressure of an imminent US invasion. Yamashita had 
instructed his subordinate commanders to act independently of each other and 
during his subsequent trial claimed he had not been able to stay in contact with 
those forces not under his direct command. One of his subordinate officers 
confirmed this during the trial. It was an important point because most of the 
atrocities were committed in areas outside Yamashita’s direct command. US 
prosecutors did not attempt to prove what Yamashita knew at the time about 
the atrocities. Instead, they produced testimony of extensive war crimes 
committed by soldiers under Yamashita’s ultimate command, with barely any 
effort to link Yamashita himself to any of the crimes or even to establish that 119 
 
he knew or could have known of them. The charges against Yamashita thus did 
not imply any form of criminal negligence or intent: he was in effect sentenced 
to death not for what he had done, or known about and failed to prevent, but 
only for who he was, that is, a commander. Yamashita was executed on 2 
February 1946, after unsuccessful appeals to the US Supreme Court and to US 
President Harry S. Truman.
57   
The Australian trials did not enforce the principle of Command 
Responsibility as strictly as in the Yamashita case, but did use the principle 
that a crime could be committed by omission as well as commission. One of 
the flaws in the Yamashita trial was that court officers had insufficient 
understanding of the practicalities of military command over difficult terrain 
and of the challenge of managing such a large force as the 14
th Army, or a lack 
of willingness to accept such factors as mitigating or even removing 
Yamashita’s guilt. The fact that none of the presiding legal officers had combat 
experience was presumably a major reason for the failure to take such 
circumstances into account. The Australian trials appear to have been more 
sensitive to such factors. Senior military personnel dealt with the Japanese 
senior officers, theoretically providing a level of understanding about the 
rigours of military command. A common defence for a Japanese commander 
was that he had had no knowledge at the relevant time that crimes were 
occurring. The prosecution was sometimes able to prove conclusively that a 
commander had in fact known of the crimes. In the trial of Lt General Baba 
Masao, sentenced to death at Rabaul in June 1947 for his responsibility for the 
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Sandakan Death March in Borneo, for example, it was proven beyond doubt 
that he had known of the conditions on the march.
58 Although he had issued 
orders for the march to be better provisioned, the court decided he had not 
taken sufficient action to prevent the loss of life that occurred. Baba’s was an 
uncommon case, however, in that there was clear evidence, partly by his own 
admission, that he had given orders to his troops to continue the marches and 
knew of the crimes that were occurring. Most such trials relied at least in part 
on less direct evidence, paying particular attention to the scale of atrocities, 
with the implication that commanders could reasonably be assumed to have 
known that large-scale crimes were occurring. Practical factors such as the 
nature of the terrain and the distance between the commander’s position and 
the place the offences occurred were taken into account.  
Command Responsibility was nevertheless a tricky issue. How much of 
a commander’s leadership is a matter of personal responsibility and how much 
can be delegated is a difficult matter to assess. Commanders should be able to 
trust their subordinates, yet can be held accountable for their actions. The 
Pacific War was fought over difficult terrain, often bitterly and at great cost, 
with many thousands of soldiers involved in battles. Commanders were under 
great pressure. Generally the personnel at Australian Command Responsibility 
trials were careful to ascertain how much control a commander could 
reasonably have been expected to exercise over his troops, and the sentencing 
in such trials was usually light, unless it was proven beyond doubt that a 
commander had had actual knowledge of crimes in time to take steps to 
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prevent them. Thus, the Australian Command Responsibility trials have not 
been criticised to the same extent as the Yamashita trial has been.  
Treatment of the defence of Superior Orders has been another 
controversial matter. Superior Orders refers to a claim that a soldier committed 
a war crime under orders, and is thus in a sense the mirror image of Command 
Responsibility. In the Australian BC trials, the defence of Superior Orders was 
deemed by the courts to be incomplete. That is, the accused might be eligible 
for mitigation of sentence with a defence of Superior Orders, but it was not a 
defence against guilt.
59 A defendant was expected to have known if an order he 
received was illegal, and if it was, he was expected to have refused to carry it 
out, however impractical this may have been in the Imperial Japanese Army 
(or any other army). The position of legal experts working on the trials was 
that the assertion that an alleged war criminal had been adhering to the general 
Japanese military code of the time, which stressed obedience, or was following 
specific but unwritten orders, was not a valid defence against guilt.
60 In effect 
this means that the imperative to follow the general laws of one’s own military 
should have been superseded by a knowledge of, and regard for, internationally 
accepted military practices. Examples of the use of the defence of Superior 
Orders can be found in the case studies later in the chapter. A number of 
criteria were used to determine the legitimacy of this defence, including the 
rank of the soldier concerned and the war situation at that point.
61 Australian 
courts considered that Japanese officers should have known better than to carry 
out an illegal order from a superior. Very low-ranking soldiers (enlisted men, 
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not officers), however, often received mitigation of sentences by using the 
defence.   
In the case of the Nuremberg trials, it was recognised that the crucial 
point was not whether an order had been given, but if, for the defendant, a 
‘moral choice was in fact possible’.
62 In the Australian trials the courts 
apparently expected the Japanese soldier to have resisted an illegal order, 
though it is unclear how he could have ascertained that the order was unlawful, 
how he was expected to have resisted it or what would have constituted a 
sufficient protest. The way the courts and the JAG treated the defence of 
Superior Orders was erratic: on some occasions the JAG recommended 
mitigation of sentence because of a defendant’s junior rank, while on others the 
soldier’s rank was ignored. In some cases the JAG engaged in more complex 
assessments, evaluating, for instance, whether the soldier had had any reason 
to doubt claims by the senior officer that the order he was giving was lawful. 
The moral choice that was a key part of the Nuremberg trials was often 
impractical for both low-ranking Japanese enlisted men and low-ranking 
officers, who were themselves usually young and inexperienced soldiers 
answering to men senior in rank, experience and age. The inability to use 
Superior Orders as a complete defence has seemed to some observers to 
constitute an example of how ordinary, lower-ranking Japanese soldiers, 
whether officers or not, were made to pay for the crimes of their superiors.
63  
Japanese military manuals, moreover, made clear that Superior Orders 
constituted a legitimate defence, which meant Japanese defendants were being 
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tried according to rules that had not applied in their own military at the 
relevant time. In fact, Superior Orders had also been listed in the Australian 
Edition of Manual of Military Law 1941 as a complete defence: 
Members of the Armed forces who commit such violations of the 
recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their government, or by 
their commander, are not war criminals and cannot therefore be 
punished by the enemy.
64 
 It is unclear why, but this provision was removed from Australian manuals in 
1943 and by the time of the BC trials the relevant section read as follows: 
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an 
order of the belligerent Government or of an individual belligerent 
commander does not deprive the act in question of its character as a 
war crime; neither does it, in principle, confer upon the perpetrator 
immunity from punishment by the injured belligerent. Undoubtedly, a 
court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in 
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact 
that obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of 
every member of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in 
conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh scrupulously the 
legal merits of the order received. The question, however, is governed 
by the major principle that members of the armed forces are bound to 
obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability 
if, in obedience to a command they commit acts which both violate 
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unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of 
humanity.
65  
The situation was, therefore, that a Japanese soldier claiming the defence of 
Superior Orders in the Australian tribunals was being tried by the victor’s 
military law rather than his own and also by a law that the victor had only 
recently changed. It is difficult to understand how a Japanese soldier could 
realistically have made a decision to ignore his own military regulations in 
preference to those of another nation, or how he could have followed 
Australian military law closely enough to have evaluated changes in 
regulations during wartime. If the argument is that the new Australian position 
represented an accepted international norm, it is not obvious that the average 
Japanese soldier would have known that either.  
Defendants often claimed they had had to obey orders because of the 
Japanese military code. The idea of a ‘Japanese military code’ is a vague one. 
There were a number of ‘military codes’, specific to particular services or 
periods of history, but the fundamental one was the Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors of 1882.
66 The Rescript states that orders from a superior 
should be treated as if they came from the emperor himself and that soldiers 
must render total obedience to their superiors. There was no room to interpret 
an order from a superior as unfair, if the soldier did not wish to contravene his 
own military code. In practical terms the penalty for disobeying an order could 
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be death or other physical punishment; soldiers certainly seem to have 
assumed they would be very severely punished.  
Fighting in the Japanese military during the war placed ordinary 
soldiers in extraordinary circumstances. Australian authorities seemed happy 
to acknowledge the need for their own trial procedures to work around 
extraordinary circumstances in order to gain convictions, for example by 
relaxing the normal rules of evidence, but not to recognise the extraordinary 
wartime circumstances that Japanese soldiers had also been in. As noted above, 
there was little uniformity in the recognition of ‘Superior Orders’ to mitigate 
sentences. The JAG review often pointed out inconsistency in sentencing, 
especially in relation to Superior Orders, but his review was not binding, and 
such comments were sometimes ignored. In any case, those soldiers who 
believed they had had no choice but to follow orders surely saw themselves as 
not guilty of a war crime. Even if they were spared the death penalty, it must 
have been little consolation for arguably innocent men spending time in prison.  
 
The Process in Practice: Case Studies  
As a result of the Trial of Sub-Lt Katayama Hideo and Two Others between 25 
and 28 February 1946 on Morotai in the Netherlands Indies, three Japanese 
soldiers were sentenced to death and shot for their part in the execution of four 
captured Australian airmen on Ambon Island, also in the Netherlands Indies.  
The Katayama trial attracted more popular interest in Australia than any other 
BC war crimes trial, though much after the event, when a series of articles by 126 
 
journalist Philip Cornford appeared in The Australian newspaper in 1981.
67 It 
was Katayama’s defence of Superior Orders that attracted the most attention. 
The final article in The Australian series maintains that Katayama had been 
acting under orders that he could not have refused, although the journalist 
nevertheless concludes that Katayama himself was guilty.  
According to archival sources, the facts of the Katayama case are as 
follows. Katayama was ordered by Lt Commander Baron Takasaki Masimitsu 
to organise an execution squad for four captured Australian airmen whose 
plane had crashed near Ambon Island in March 1944. He did so, and 
personally executed one of the airmen.
68 A wartime directive from the 
Japanese High Command in Tokyo had made the bombing of civilian 
structures an offence punishable by death,
69 and according to Japanese 
witnesses, before the Australian plane crashed it strafed a native hamlet, killing 
a number of Indonesian civilians.  In 1946, however, the Australian 
prosecutors alleged that the airmen had not faced a court-martial and had 
certainly not formally been found guilty of an offence. This had seemingly 
been confirmed by the admission of a Japanese officer in another trial, 
Kobayashi, that no courts-martial had been held in the area at the time. 
Kobayashi informed Australian authorities of this in writing, and his evidence 
was tendered as ‘Exhibit C’ by the prosecution during the Katayama trial.
70 
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Kobayashi, however, was not presented to the court in the Katayama case. The 
Australian prosecution argued that Sub Lt Katayama, as senior officer in the 
execution squad (albeit still of a low rank), should have known the order to 
execute the men was illegal under international law, as they had not been 
formally tried, and that Katayama should not have allowed the executions to be 
carried out.
71 The Judge Advocate General reviewing the case in Australia 
found it difficult to believe Katayama’s claim that he had sincerely believed 
the men had been found guilty in a court-martial. 
Sub-Lt Katayama in evidence insisted that these prisoners had been 
tried and sentenced by court-martial. I do not for a moment believe that 
this was so and there was evidence in fact that no court-martial was 
held at the relevant times. The truth is, I believe, that instructions were 
given to Katayama by Lt Commander Baron Takasaki at H.Q. that the 
men were to be executed without trial and it was in obedience of such 
orders that Katayama proceeded with the executions. I am of the 
opinion that Katayama should at least have known that such an order 
without trial was illegal and may therefore be held responsible for it 
though the fact that he was ordered to do it by a much superior staff 
officer may be considered mitigation for the sentence of death.
72 
Baron Takasaki was not tried for the incident and escaped the war 
crimes trials unpunished, despite being interrogated about this case by 
Australian investigators. It appears, as Nelson suggests, that he escaped trial 
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because the Australian authorities believed what he said when he denied he 
had given an order for the executions, or in other words they took his word for 
it.
73 The Judge Advocate General in the Katayama trial stated in his review that 
Takasaki was fortunate to have avoided responsibility for the crime, noted that 
he had been tried (though found not guilty) for the deaths of two other airmen 
in a case unrelated to this one, and recommended that his evidence in that 
earlier trial should be reviewed, presumably because the JAG felt the 
Katayama case had revealed that Takasaki was likely to be a war criminal.
74  
  Katayama had not been alone in the execution squad. Sub Lt Uemura 
Juro (at the time a Warrant Officer, a lower rank than Sub Lt) and Sub Lt 
Takahashi Toyoji were also present. The JAG recommended that Takahashi’s 
death sentence should not be confirmed, given how junior he was. He felt it 
was unreasonable to expect such a junior officer to have had detailed 
knowledge of the orders for the executions or to have been able to judge how 
legitimate they might be. Moreover, the JAG strongly suggested that Sub Lt 
Uemura should not have been convicted at all, as no evidence indicated he had 
been involved in the actual executions. Evidence that Uemura had driven the 
vehicle to the execution site but had not executed any of the prisoners had been 
accepted in court. Nor was he the senior officer present.
75 Despite the Judge 
Advocate General’s recommendation, Uemura’s death sentence was confirmed 
on 3 May 1946 and he was executed the following day, and Katayama and 
Takahashi had their sentences confirmed on 22 October 1947 and were 
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executed the day after. The reason for the long delay in confirming the latter 
two sentences is not evident.
76 
The defence of Superior Orders was a key element of the Katayama 
case. Katayama had been given a direct order to form the execution squad by a 
far more senior officer. If Katayama realised that the order was illegal, it is 
doubtful he had many reasonable options to refuse it. Although Katayama was 
an officer and not an enlisted man, he was still of a low rank and the JAG 
suggested the defence of Superior Orders justified a lighter sentence. The 
JAG’s recommendation was not binding, however, and the confirmation of the 
death sentence was legally legitimate. In terms of responsibility for the actual 
crime, the case against Katayama was very strong. He confessed to executing a 
man in a way Westerners viewed as particularly brutal, that is, by beheading 
him. Without any doubt Katayama did execute one of the Australian airmen 
and had led the whole execution party. The Australian authorities had failed to 
produce a character witness requested by his defence, Barney Porter, but even 
if Porter had been presented to the court, there is no guarantee that his 
character reference for Katayama would have swayed the court in any way.
77 
The fact that Katayama had surrendered himself to the Australian authorities 
and the fact that he was a Christian had not persuaded the court to show 
leniency, so it seems highly unlikely that testimony to his good character 
would have done so.  
By any measure, under the Australian War Crimes Act, both 
Katayama’s trial and his death sentence were legitimate. On the other hand, 
however, Katayama’s sentence does not accord with the lofty goals of the 
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trials. The verdict raises moral issues and several significant points relating to 
trial process. In the opinion of the JAG, Katayama was no guiltier than 
Takasaki, the senior officer, yet Takasaki escaped punishment and Katayama 
did not. Katayama may have led the execution party but Takasaki gave the 
order for it to be formed. If it were not for Takasaki’s order, the Australian 
airmen, at least for the time being, would not have been executed. Not only 
does Katayama seem to have been unable to refuse Takasaki’s order, he later 
appears to have been powerless even to prove the order had been given: the 
Australian authorities took the senior officer’s word over Katayama’s that he 
had not given the order and Takasaki was not presented to the court during the 
trial for cross-examination. The JAG asserted that Takasaki was guilty and 
expanded on his comments, quoted earlier, by stating that he should have been 
sentenced to the same fate as Katayama, yet Takasaki did not face punishment 
for this particular incident, or any other, though he had been prosecuted for 
other crimes.
78 Leaving aside Takasaki’s own guilt, his involvement should at 
least have mitigated Katayama’s guilt and the chance for mitigation of 
Katayama’s sentence should have been taken, but it was not and Katayama 
received the maximum penalty. Thus, the more junior officer with relatively 
less control over his own fate was sentenced to death, and a senior officer who 
gave the order, deemed to be illegal, that ended the lives of the four airmen, 
walked free. The fate of Uemura is even more disconcerting. He was shot for 
driving the execution party to the scene of the crime. It is exactly this kind of 
situation that suggests some senior Japanese escaped their crimes while lower-
ranking soldiers paid dearly for them.  
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Katayama himself believed that he was innocent and that his trial was 
unfair. He wrote personally to Evatt as Minister for External Affairs, 
complaining about the trial process and claiming that he had been treated 
poorly by Australian guards, although this claim was baseless in the view of 
Australian officials.
79  If the aim of the trials was to remove so-called fanatics 
or militarists, then Katayama was a poorly chosen target. As a graduate of the 
Tokyo Foreign Language School, his background was not humble, but he was 
in fact of relatively low rank for an officer and had no record of violent 
conduct.
80  He was a Christian, a significant factor given the importance placed 
by Australian authorities on the supposed link between Japanese treatment of 
POWs and bushido, Shinto and the emperor cult.
81 According to two 
Australians who have since informally testified to Katayama’s character, 
Barney Porter and Don Bill, his general conduct towards POWs was good. 
Katayama had also turned himself in to authorities when he found that he was 
wanted for questioning, even though he had made it back to Tokyo 
successfully, having been posted there three weeks after the offences he was 
eventually tried for occurred. Once in Tokyo, Katayama married and resumed 
civilian life. He would not speak of the events on Ambon until after the war, 
when he saw his name in a newspaper, as a wanted criminal. He reportedly 
turned himself in on the advice of his English aunt, who convinced him he 
could trust British justice.
82  
Katayama’s rank and experience worked against him. Although he was 
senior enough to be the leader of the execution party, he was too inexperienced 
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to have built a long history of good conduct as a senior officer. The BC trials 
often took into account a senior officer’s position and his general record as an 
officer throughout his career. In the Command Responsibility trials, an 
officer’s war record and training were considered when the court was assessing 
how much he had known about atrocities in his area. Takasaki’s senior 
position certainly influenced Australian authorities, who believed his story. 
Katayama, by contrast, had joined the navy in 1941 and therefore the Second 
World War was his first chance to compile any kind of war record.
83 Although 
it was a record that included no history of violent conduct, it was not long 
enough to convince anyone that he was a military man of substance. 
  Aside from the workings of the defence of Superior Orders, the 
Katayama trial raises other questions about the fairness of the Australian 
prosecutions, including the military’s capacity to produce witnesses in court. 
Katayama’s defence team expected to be able to rely upon an Australian 
character witness, Barney Porter, but Porter was never brought before the 
court; the Australian military claimed he could not be contacted. Porter would 
later assert that he had been contactable and that he would certainly have 
wished to testify on Katayama’s behalf.
84 Although it seems doubtful that it 
would have helped in this case, character witnesses in other comparable trials 
proved to be successful in getting a defendant a lesser sentence.  
The Katayama trial also shows how significant an impact the changes 
to the rules of evidence could have. The defence was unable to cross-examine 
crucial testimony because affidavit evidence was deemed admissible and 
witnesses therefore did not need to be presented in person. Thus, Baron 
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Takasaki was not produced as a witness, meaning that the defence could not 
question him over the orders Katayama claimed he had received. Regardless of 
how compelling Takasaki appeared to be to Australian authorities before the 
trial, things may have been different when he faced cross-examination. In this 
case, the JAG concluded from the evidence that orders to Katayama had in fact 
been given, though he did not specify how he reached this conclusion. 
Moreover, in the unlikely event that a witness had testified that a court-martial 
of the four airmen had taken place, Katayama would surely have gone free or 
at least received a reduced sentence. Every effort should have been made to 
afford Katayama’s defence the opportunity to achieve this result. In the end, 
Katayama’s fate rested chiefly on the likelihood that the court would take into 
account his unsupported defence of Superior Orders and sentence him to a 
period in prison. As Takasaki was neither found guilty of any charges nor 
cross-examined by Katayama’s defence, however, it was his word against 
Katayama’s.  
The appointment of experienced legal personnel to review proceedings 
was intended to ensure that trials remained fair despite their individual 
idiosyncrasies. Considerable evidence suggests that in many cases, the review 
was an effective counterbalance, so far as it went. Even in the Katayama case, 
the JAG, despite the lack of cross-examination of Takasaki by the defence, did 
recommend prison rather than a death sentence for Katayama, also 
recommending that the sentences passed on Uemura and Takahashi should not 
be confirmed. The JAG was able to discern from the evidence something that 
the court perhaps was not. In other words, the inference from the Katayama 
trial is that the technical shortcomings of the trials may have had a great impact 134 
 
on the courts, but less impact on the JAG. In Katayama’s case, the review 
criticised all three sentences or convictions in some way. That constitutes an 
especially damning assessment of the case, suggesting that none of the 
sentencing was appropriate and that one of the convictions, that of Uemura, 
was completely unfair. The fact that even though inadequacies in the trial were 
uncovered by a senior legal expert his recommendations were not implemented 
suggests that the ability of the JAG to act as a true safeguard is highly 
questionable. The sole authority to confirm the death sentences in this case was 
the Commander in Chief of the Australian army, Lt General Vernon Sturdee. 
Unfortunately, the paperwork concerning Sturdee’s role in the war crimes trials 
is unavailable, so there is no record of his reasoning. Sturdee claims to have 
burnt his personal papers from this period immediately after he retired in 1951, 
on the grounds that the job was finished.
85  
In many cases the confirming authority agreed with the JAG 
recommendations, but in this case Sturdee chose to ignore them. The lack of 
transparency at this final stage of the trial process is another area that leaves 
the prosecutions open to criticism. According to what is known of Sturdee, he 
was a very professional soldier.
86  He was well within his rights to ignore the 
JAG, but it is hard to see why he did so in this case. Perhaps commuting the 
death sentences of Katayama and the others in the case might have seemed an 
embarrassing option. It would not only have indicated that a war criminal in 
Baron Takasaki had escaped punishment, but would also have meant that the 
executions of four Australian airmen were not punished by any death sentence. 
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Katayama’s case has on occasion been treated sympathetically in 
Australia, unusually for a BC war criminal, because of the hopeless position he 
appeared to be in. The lead Japanese character in the 1990 film Blood Oath is 
loosely based on Katayama and is sympathetically portrayed.
87 Much of the 
Cornford series of articles is also sympathetic to Katayama.  His story 
reinforces the impression that was prevalent in Japan in the 1950s and later 
that the wrong people were prosecuted in the BC trials and that ordinary 
Japanese were made to suffer for the crimes of people higher up the chain of 
command.
88 Accounts of Katayama’s case like those in Blood Oath and the 
Cornford articles emphasised the point that the trial authorities had failed to 
acknowledge his plight, and had also failed to punish one of his superiors who 
had contributed greatly to his hopeless situation.  
In the case of Okada Toshiharu and Others, prosecuted in January 1946 
at Labuan, a number of soldiers of low rank were found guilty for their role in 
executing seventeen ‘or thereabouts’ soldiers during the ‘Sandakan Death 
March’.
89 In June 1945, 536 Australian and British POWs were made to march 
roughly 260km from Sandakan to Ranau in Sabah, British North Borneo. The 
health of the POWs even before the march was generally very poor and 
conditions on the march were oppressive. Only about 140 of the POWs 
survived. By late July 1945, most of those survivors had died from illness. The 
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march itself was not the focus of this particular trial; the incident in question 
occurred in June when Japanese soldiers began to shoot, bash or bury alive 
some of the survivors.
90 Seventeen or so of the surviving, but ill, men were 
shot by Japanese guards in a cemetery near where the prisoners were camped.
91 
The JAG in this case commented at length on the sentencing of the defendants 
who were found guilty. First, he suggested that the sentences, which ranged 
from eight years to life, were excessive. He noted that the men had been acting 
under orders, which could be considered reason to mitigate their sentences. He 
commented as follows. 
I am of the opinion that it is unnecessary and uneconomical that these 
men should be kept for such a length of time in Australian prisons and 
would recommend for your consideration that the sentences should be 
mitigated to imprisonment for 3 years and that at a future date, such 
sentences should be considered and the accused returned to Japan.
92  
The sentences were in fact all reduced to three years. The ultimate 
result of this trial appears reasonable under the circumstances of Superior 
Orders, in comparison with other cases including Katayama’s. This trial raises 
the question, however, of why a recommendation of mitigation was accepted 
by the confirming authority in some circumstances and not in others. It was not 
because of a change in the confirming authority. Sturdee remained in this role 
until the Hong Kong prosecutions in 1948. The JAG’s comment regarding the 
cost of keeping the men in prison, moreover, suggests that although neither he 
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nor the confirming officer, as legal professionals, should have had any role in 
assessing the cost of trials and subsequent imprisonment, they did take account 
of such concerns rather than concentrating solely on the facts of the case. It is 
even possible to speculate, on the basis of this comment, that economic 
considerations might have affected Katayama’s sentence: there was less cost in 
executing Katayama than there was in giving him life in prison. It is unlikely 
that such considerations did play a role in the determination of Katayama’s 
sentence, but the comparison of the two cases shows that the thinking of the 
courts, the JAG and the confirming officer was sometimes blurred, and leaves 
the sentences open to criticism.  
  In the case of Lt Asaoka Toshio, Superior Private Suzuki Asamasa and 
Private Oichi Tuichi, the JAG again accepted Superior Orders as a justification 
to mitigate the sentences of two very junior Japanese soldiers. The two low-
ranking soldiers and Lt Asaoka were tried in mid-December 1945, on Morotai, 
for bayoneting Australian prisoners.
93 It was originally alleged that Lt Asaoka 
had ordered Suzuki and Oichi, during a military parade, to step forward with 
fixed bayonets towards prisoners who were tied to crosses on the parade 
ground, and on command, to lunge with their bayonets, stabbing the prisoners 
through the heart. Eventually, the court only had to decide on the fate of the 
two privates, as it was revealed by another Japanese officer, senior to all of the 
men, that Lt Asaoka had not in fact given any orders for Suzuki and Oichi to 
bayonet the prisoners.
94 The lieutenant had previously confessed to the crime, 
but later claimed that he was confused during interrogation. The two privates 
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were sentenced to ten years in prison, but the sentences were reduced to five 
years after the JAG review.  
In this case the JAG went into great detail about the way in which the 
defence of Superior Orders should be treated in the BC trials, presumably 
because it was one of the earliest prosecutions. He quoted from the Australian 
Edition of Manual of Military Law, noting that the defence of Superior Orders 
had previously precluded soldiers following orders from being considered war 
criminals, but that Superior Orders later became an incomplete defence in the 
Australian manuals.
95 He went on to recommend that the two men not receive 
any punishment as they could not be expected to have known what was and 
was not a lawful order. This would seem to have been the fairest result 
possible. Staff officers in the Japanese military would likely have known of 
major changes in international military law but to expect low-ranking men to 
have known the rules of the most recent version of another country’s military 
code, or to have accepted these rules as some kind of universal norm, appears 
unrealistic. Furthermore, the men were accused of committing the crimes in 
front of the unit on parade, in what must have been an intense situation where 
they would not have wished to face punishment for publicly refusing to obey 
an order. Nor would they have had a great deal of time to discuss their orders 
with their superior. Despite the mitigating circumstances in the Asaoka case, 
the confirming authority still gave the two junior men five years in prison.  
Without any way to assess how and why the confirming authority 
arrived at his decisions following the JAG reviews it is impossible to ascertain 
why a defence of Superior Orders ultimately attracted different sentences in 
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different cases. The three cases described here all arose from similar 
circumstances yet produced different sentencing. The only substantial 
difference among the three is that the accused in the Katayama case were 
officers; however, they were still low in rank and in experience, and their death 
sentences were far more severe than the three years given to those found guilty 
in the Okada trial, or the five years given to the two privates in the Asaoka 
trial.     
The JAG reviews are useful in assessing how the trial processes and 
verdicts appeared to senior legal professionals, who themselves were as 
unfamiliar as everyone else with war crimes trials. The JAG often uncovered 
legal shortcomings in a trial. This was the case in the trial of Shirozu Wadami 
and Others, at Morotai in January 1946. Ninety-two prisoners were tried as a 
group, in what appears to be the largest of all the BC trials run by Allied 
governments. It was alleged that the accused had mistreated Australian (and 
Dutch) prisoners by beating them and not supplying them with sufficient food 
and medical supplies. The JAG commented as follows. 
The number of accused was 92 and I desire to enter the most emphatic 
protest against the administrative system that asks a court to try such a 
number at once or expects the reviewing or confirming authority to be 
able to do justice to all of the accused. I have spent six full days on this 
file and am far from satisfied that I may not have overlooked, through 
sheer inability to remember some cogent detail of the trial, something 
in favour of one or other of the accused.
96 
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A large number of defendants were acquitted in this case, as is 
discussed in the next chapter. It is likely that in some ways, rather than easing 
the burden on the JAG, the acquittals made the trial records even more difficult 
to follow and the verdicts even trickier to weigh up. The JAG’s role was to 
assess not only the severity of sentencing, but also the basic question of guilt 
or innocence, and significant variation in the verdicts in a large trial must 
therefore have complicated his task. Despite his protest, in this case, the JAG 
found that most of the guilty sentences, which ranged from six months’ 
imprisonment to death, could be confirmed. He admitted that he was not 
certain of the validity of the verdicts and sentences given the large number of 
defendants, but recommended that the sentences be confirmed anyway, an 
approach that seems to give the benefit of any doubt to the prosecution. The 
case certainly demonstrates the pressure the authorities were under even from 
this early point to try as many suspects as possible. The JAG review shows that 
the cost of achieving the political goals of the trials was a reduced capacity to 
present cases to the courts in the fairest possible way. Had time pressures been 
less, there would have been no necessity to try ninety-two people 
simultaneously.  
A similar case concerned forty-six guards at Kuching Prison Camp in 
Borneo. The guards were mainly Korean and were tried together, at Labuan in 
January 1946, for allegedly frequent assaults on prisoners between May 1942 
and September 1945. Sentences varied from one year to life, with three 
acquittals. This case received a damning review from the JAG, for procedural 
reasons. The JAG made an issue of a large amount of irrelevant evidence, 
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irrelevant, and also criticised the failure of the court to produce witnesses 
rather than affidavit evidence:  
This trial is unsatisfactory. The great number of the accused tried 
jointly make [sic] it extremely difficult to follow and allocate evidence 
to the individual and in addition, the evidence for the prosecution 
consisted of wholly written documents a great deal of the contents of 
which was irrelevant, even taking into context the relaxed rules of 
evidence by the [War] Crimes Act and it is difficult to be sure that such 
irrelevant evidence did not have some effect on the members of the 
court. 
The JAG also commented on the impact that the changes to the rules of 
evidence had had on the defence. 
It is a serious disadvantage that an accused person has no opportunity 
of cross examining upon such [damning] statements. When an accused 
person is before a court with the power to award a death sentence, 
every opportunity for the accused to defend himself should be given. 
The JAG suggested that where possible witnesses should be brought before the 
court. Apparently this could have occurred in this trial, but no effort was made 
to produce witnesses. The suggestion seems to be that the court was unfairly 
taking advantage of the relaxed rules, rather than relying on the written 
documents for lack of a more suitable and traditional alternative.
97  
The JAG also questioned the considerable variation in sentencing in 
this case, further noting that three of the men were acquitted, when all forty-six 
had faced the same charge. He questioned the verdicts, and even the basis for 
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the case, concluding that the increase in mortality among Allied prisoners 
towards the end of the war was not due to an increase in ‘slapping’ of 
prisoners, as was implied by the prosecution, but rather to the shortage of food 
and medical supplies. The JAG concluded his review by stating his overall 
disquiet. 
These proceedings are so unsatisfactory that I would suggest 
instructions should be given that in the future such a great number of 
men should not be tried together and also that when tendering written 
statements, only such particulars as are relevant as being evidence 
against some of the accused should be admitted by the court. If this had 
been a court-martial and governed by the laws applying to courts-
martial, I would have recommended that none of the sentences should 
be confirmed [instead he suggested that the sentences overall were too 
harsh], but as previously stated, the laws of evidence for war crimes 
courts have been greatly relaxed.
98 
  The JAG review of the Kuching Guards case once again reflects the 
intersecting moral and legal ambiguities of the trials that were discussed earlier 
in the chapter. From a legal standpoint, the JAG’s review clearly shows the 
difficulty that the relaxation of the rules of evidence posed for defence 
counsels. Commentators on the trials have claimed that defence counsels often 
put up spirited cases for the accused.
99 Yet it seems unlikely that their fervour 
could have overcome the handicap they were under in some cases. The JAG’s 
reference to Australian courts-martial again raises the question of how far the 
trials should have deviated from what would be expected in prosecuting the 
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soldiers of the country conducting the trials. Legally, there was no need for the 
JAG to consider this difference, and indeed other governments tried war 
criminals in very similar ways to Australia. The trials are often portrayed, 
however, as not only legally sound but also morally justified. The examples 
given here suggest that moral, as opposed to legal, justification was weak in 
some cases.  
  The prosecutions examined here are not typical of all proceedings. 
Katayama’s case is a particularly famous example, and large trials such as that 
of the Kuching Guards and Wadami and Others were not typical in all trial 
venues. The tribunals were neither uniformly fair nor uniformly unfair, and it 
is not particularly enlightening to seek to characterise them in either of these 
ways. They were very much part of the starting-point in a new era of 
dispensing international justice after a war, and not the end-point. It is 
reasonable to assume that a number of war criminals escaped any kind of 
justice; Baron Takasaki is just one example. It is also clear that some of those 
accused, including Katayama, Takahashi and Uemura, received more than their 
appropriate share of the tribunal’s justice. The pressures on the trials that 
brought about the relaxation of rules of evidence and the conduct of the courts 
that allowed obviously questionable tactics and even verdicts suggest the 
difficult circumstances in which the trials were conducted and indicate the 
priority given by the Australian authorities to speed and efficiency.  
 
Fairness: An Assessment 
Almost all of the literature on the war crimes trials in the Pacific attempts to 
answer the question of whether the trials were fair or not. Despite extensive 144 
 
discussion, no consensus exists, except an acknowledgment that the question is 
more complicated than was first thought. In my view, however, the problem 
with the issue of fairness derives from the way the question is posed, rather 
than from any inherent difficulty in finding the answer. It is the search for a 
comprehensive assessment of such a complex issue that leads to distortion. 
One would be unlikely to interrogate any other civil or criminal legal system 
with such an overarching question in mind, and far more likely to acknowledge 
that legal systems have elements of both fairness and unfairness. In an effort, 
however, to gain a better understanding of the trials I propose that their 
fairness can be assessed on the basis of four different though overlapping 
criteria. The first is whether there was a legitimate legal and moral basis for the 
prosecutions. The second is whether the people who committed crimes were 
punished. The third is whether they were punished proportionately, and the 
fourth is whether the procedures used in the trials were fair. These four 
separate questions constitute what is commonly thought of as the one question, 
whether the trials were ‘fair’.  
To take the first point, the trials of suspected Class B and C war 
criminals after August 1945 were undoubtedly without precedent and without a 
solid basis in codified law, despite a growing consensus among the elites of 
various countries in the interwar period on general principles of international 
war crimes justice, but that does not automatically mean they were illegitimate. 
Certainly it would have been preferable for an international doctrine on war 
crimes to have existed before the outbreak of hostilities and for the Australian 
War Crimes Act to have existed as well. The BC trials, however, helped to 
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deal with war crimes in the future. If international moral consensus on what 
constituted a war crime in the B and C categories had been established, as 
appears to be the case, then the belatedness of the formulation of the law, 
though undesirable, does not fatally undermine the legitimacy of the trials. The 
defendants were prosecuted under laws that did not exist at the time the crimes 
were committed, but the acts for which they were charged were generally 
regarded as criminal and the international community had agreed, broadly, that 
the conduct of war needed to be guided by rules and conventions, and 
regulated by punishment of the guilty. The tribunals were, undeniably, 
influenced by politics and one of the key advantages in studying them is that 
they illuminate Australia’s political stance on Japan and on the Cold War in 
the late 1940s and 1950s. The fact that they were influenced by politics, 
however, does not automatically impair their legitimacy. In very few cases, 
and never conclusively, does it appear that political influence directly affected 
the outcome of a particular trial. The Australian government’s zeal for 
developing international war crimes law, indicated by its vigorous contribution 
through its own trials, tells us much more about post-war Australian policy on 
Japan than it does about the fairness of the Australian tribunals. The 
government’s decision to continue prosecutions on Manus Island does 
represent a stern and resolute stance, but resolute justice does not necessarily 
mean justice that was overly heavy-handed. Doubtless, some individuals on the 
prosecuting side desired vengeance against Japan, but again, this does not 
necessarily indicate that each trial was a ‘witch hunt’ aimed at satisfying a 
thirst for revenge.  146 
 
  Second, on the whole, the people who committed crimes were 
punished. The fact that Allied conduct during the war was not legally 
examined remains contentious. In terms of the BC trials of Japanese suspects, 
however, crimes were investigated and the perpetrators were prosecuted. 
Doubtless, some guilty men escaped punishment and some who were not 
guilty, or were less guilty, were punished. In the confusion of some of the 
Australian mass trials scope certainly existed for both of these outcomes. There 
is also a question over how reliably trial authorities were able to identify 
perpetrators. It is likely that the authorities misidentified some Japanese 
soldiers and incorrectly apportioned blame for some crimes, but it is difficult 
to assess how widespread these errors were. The complaints made by 
convicted war criminals suggest that these kinds of errors were not common, 
as prisoners complained far more about being caught in circumstances beyond 
their control, or of being made to take the blame for their superiors’ actions, or 
of the trial procedures not affording them a satisfactory defence.       
On the question of whether those convicted received proportionate 
punishment, the Australian trials are more problematic. Sentencing was erratic, 
mainly due to the inconsistent treatment of Superior Orders, as demonstrated in 
the case studies in this chapter. Doubtless, a soldier should have some 
responsibility to question the validity of orders that appear to be illegal, and 
this responsibility should be reflected in war crimes law. Such responsibility 
needs to be interpreted very carefully by war crimes courts, however, because 
it can also serve to absolve senior commanders from blame by allowing them 
to take advantage of more junior soldiers by not issuing orders in writing and 
by intimidating them into believing that the order must be carried out. It is 147 
 
fanciful to believe that executions of POWs occurred solely at the whim of 
junior officers and enlisted men, who, without orders from commanding 
officers, organised execution squads and attempted to cover up evidence of the 
crimes. In the Australian trials, moreover, it is far from clear why some 
convicted criminals had their sentences mitigated by the confirming officer and 
some did not. The decisions of the confirming authority throughout the early 
years of the trials are not transparent. It is difficult even to assess how 
seriously Lt General Sturdee regarded the JAG’s opinion. In the next chapter, 
while examining differences among trial venues, I speculate on what may have 
guided Sturdee’s decisions, but without his papers a definitive answer is not 
possible. The sentencing issue is compounded by the fact that convicted war 
criminals could not appeal their cases formally. Indeed, the JAG himself could 
not issue a binding opinion, which undermined his ability to act as a safeguard 
in place of an appeals system.  
The fourth question, about process, is ultimately a matter of balancing 
legal ideals and the practicalities of the situation. There were certainly very 
significant differences between the legal proceedings in the Australian trials of 
suspected Japanese war criminals and those used in normal Australian civil 
and military courts. Legal experts in the trials, the JAG especially, were moved 
on occasion to comment on unsatisfactory legal procedures and to complain 
about, for example, the confusion produced when large numbers of defendants 
were prosecuted together, or the difficulties for defence counsel when 
witnesses could not be cross-examined because of reliance on affidavits. On 
the other hand, the consensus in the scholarship thus far is that the legal 
proceedings, while not ideal, were still capable of producing fair trials. This 148 
 
seems to be a plausible conclusion with regard to allowing affidavit evidence, 
which was probably a necessary change given the unique circumstances in 
which war crimes were perpetrated and prosecuted. The use of affidavit 
evidence in place of a witness who could actually have been produced was 
unfair, but this probably did not happen on a large scale. The same assessment 
does not hold for the practice of prosecuting large numbers of suspects in mass 
trials, however. Some alteration of procedure was necessary, as acknowledged 
above, but in holding mass trials the authorities seem to have taken 
pragmatism too far, with the result that the need for efficiency undermined the 
principles of justice. The fact that large trials continued despite stern criticism 
from the JAG underlines the point.  
Addressed individually, these four questions provide a clearer picture 
of the fairness or otherwise of the Australian tribunals. Taken as a whole, the 
trials do not measure up to the lofty goals set by the Australian government, 
but nor do they exhibit enough flaws to justify the most damning or dismissive 
views of them. There was a sufficient moral and legal justification to hold BC 
war crimes trials. The need to balance political considerations with what was 
ostensibly a legal undertaking did not always produce fair results in individual 
cases. On the other hand, political influence in the trials was not 
overwhelming. It did not seriously undermine the legal verdicts and it did not 
turn the trials overall into an example of ‘victor’s justice’, that is, arbitrary 
justice carried out by the victorious nation. By and large the perpetrators of 
war crimes were punished and usually punishment was proportionate, though it 
could also be erratic. Procedural changes, introduced in response to the special 
circumstances of the trials, did not systematically result in unjust outcomes, 149 
 
but they did permit individual claims of injustice, which were sometimes well 
founded, and there were few procedures for remedying such cases. A blanket 
assessment of the tribunals is thus difficult to reach. Essentially, two aspects 
appear highly problematic: the inconsistent handling of the defence of Superior 
Orders and the practice of conducting mass trials. These issues could have 
been resolved. On balance, however, the trial system was not unjust, although 
it did fail individual defendants on some occasions.   
   
       
The case studies in this chapter are drawn from the first period of the trials and 
are designed to highlight the procedural issues and questions of fairness I have 
discussed. In Chapter Three I deal more systematically with the early period of 
the prosecutions and the international context in which they occurred. As 
mentioned above, the trials began swiftly and progress in 1946 was good, 
though it fell short of the initial targets set by the Australian government. 
Progress remained solid throughout most of 1947, but the number of Japanese 
facing court began to drop off. Eventually there was a hiatus in the 
prosecutions. In 1950 a second era of proceedings began on Manus Island. In 
Chapter Four I show how the tension between politics and legal goals 
developed in this second stage of Australia’s war crimes trials.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST PHASE, 1945-1949: THE TRIALS IN A 
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
 
The first of the two phases of the Australian trials lasted from November 1945 to 
December 1948. Progress between January and June 1946 was steady. 
Prosecutions took place at three major centres, Rabaul, Labuan and Morotai, with 
a small number of trials at Darwin and Wewak as well. Prosecutions slowed in the 
second half of 1946, however, and delays accumulated in 1947 as the tribunals 
began to encounter logistical difficulties. By the end of 1948, the future of the 
Australian prosecutions appeared to be in jeopardy and in 1949 the trials did in 
fact cease. It was not because the government considered them to have been 
satisfactorily completed: in fact seventy Japanese suspects remained in Sugamo 
Prison in Tokyo awaiting trial and a number of known suspects were still at large 
in Japan, having not yet been arrested. The Australian government did want to 
continue the trials but problems with resourcing them in 1947 and then in securing 
access to a venue after 1948 became significant obstacles.  
During the first twelve months, the international political context for the 
trials was favourable. The Occupation of Japan began with an emphasis on reform. 
Allied policy there focused on the eradication of Japanese militarism, a project in 
which war crimes trials played an important role. The Occupation began to change 
in 1947, however, and certainly by 1948 US policy for Japan had turned away 
from punitive measures and towards the promotion of economic, political and 
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advantageous: to Australia’s key allies, war crimes trials were part of an old policy 
and were associated with the early and now less relevant period of the Occupation, 
not with the future. As a result Australia’s major allies began to wind their trial 
programs down. This meant that just when Australian tribunals were beginning to 
encounter disabling practical difficulties, causing them to slow markedly, 
challenges were also emerging politically that would eventually place the program 
under considerable pressure.  
The perception that Communism was becoming a major threat to the 
prospects of democracy in Asia grew increasingly influential in US policy during 
the late 1940s, and was the most significant factor in the change in Occupation 
policy in Japan. Australia did not feel the effects of the Cold War as acutely or 
directly as some of its allies. Nonetheless, the alleged danger of Communism was 
a factor in Australian politics too. In the December 1949 general election Labor’s 
loss was due in significant part to the Coalition’s successful campaign to link the 
left in Australian politics with susceptibility to corruption from socialist influence. 
The result of the election meant that the Coalition inherited the stalled war crimes 
trials program and the political and diplomatic challenges that were associated 
with it. 
  This chapter examines the period from the beginning of the Australian 
trials to the period of stagnation in which difficulties were encountered in all 
venues. I begin by discussing the political context in Australia, in Japan and in 
Asia more broadly, and the political changes that eventually affected Australian 
policy on war crimes trials and on Japan. I then describe the proceedings at each 152 
 
trial venue in the early period, the differences among the trials at each location, 
and the 1948 negotiations over a new venue and over future Australian trials. 
During the latter negotiations, the political context of the trials became 
problematic. For the first time since the clash of views over prosecuting Emperor 
Hirohito, the Australian government found itself opposing the policies on war 
crimes trials of its main allies. Nevertheless, the government maintained its tough 
policy on Japanese war criminals and on eradicating Japanese militarism. The 
tension between the need to conduct just trials and the need for pragmatic 
procedures, and also the tension between the desire to complete a substantive 
number of prosecutions but also to proceed with the program speedily, were 
already evident in this early period.   
 
Before the Communist Threat: Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Late 
1940s 
The Australian government entered the post-war era committed to becoming more 
prominent in politics relating to Asia and more active in pursuing Australia’s 
interests in Asia. After the war, the Chifley Labor government concentrated, for 
the most part, on regional rather than global issues and threats.
1 Asia remained the 
focus of defence policy. As we will see, on matters relating to war criminals the 
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government acted confidently even when it was at odds with the US, showing a 
marked willingness to pursue its own path in foreign relations.  
Throughout the second half of the 1940s, Australia pursued a vibrant 
foreign policy on Japan. Australia’s agenda began with the push to try Hirohito, 
followed by the negotiation of important roles in the Occupation machinery and in 
the war crimes trials, as discussed in earlier chapters. Outside of Japan, the major 
post-war foreign policy initiative in Asia was the support for Indonesian 
independence. By 1948, Australia was the fledgling Indonesian Republic’s 
greatest ally in international politics. At times on this issue the government was at 
odds with the US and the UK, providing an early sign that Australia in the post-
war era was prepared to follow its own agenda, despite a possible cost to its 
relations with its allies. Even as the USA and Britain backed the Dutch presence in 
Indonesia, Australia spoke out favourably at the United Nations about an 
independent Indonesian republic.
2 The government’s desire for a stronger 
presence in Asian politics was frustrated, however, by the fact that the United 
Nations was not functioning as Australia had hoped it would, in that the 
machinery seemed to favour the major powers and provided only limited 
opportunity for the Australian government to influence regional affairs.
3 This 
frustration may have contributed to the government’s eagerness to speak out on 
regional issues directly, where opportunities existed. The government remained 
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aware, nevertheless, of the need to avoid openly offending Britain or the USA: it 
appeared to believe that a balance had to be struck.
4 
In domestic politics, there was strong support for the Chifley Labor 
government between 1945 and 1947. The electorate approved of the way Labor 
had handled the war, and wartime issues were still prominent. The government, 
for example, advocated interventionist management to secure Australia’s 
immediate economic future, including rationing and tight government control of 
the economy. By 1948, however, support for Labor was decreasing. Liberal leader 
Robert Menzies began to attack Labor for taking Australia close to socialism and 
this position started to resonate with parts of the electorate. At times Labor played 
into the Coalition’s hands, especially in the adoption of its key policy during 1948, 
a plan to nationalise Australia’s banking system. The policy proved a disaster for 
Labor partly because of its socialist undertones, but also because of Labor’s 
stubbornness in promoting it. The High Court of Australia ruled against 
nationalisation of the banking system but Prime Minister Chifley refused to back 
down. Along with Labor’s unwillingness to abandon other policies, such as 
rationing, as they began to become unpopular, this inflexibility reduced the party’s 
prospects in the forthcoming election of December 1949. Meanwhile, 
conservatives adopted Cold War rhetoric to portray Labor as an advocate of the 
ideology of socialism.
5  
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Although Australia was a long way from Europe, initially the frontline of 
Communism, the fear of Communism was nonetheless prominent after the war.
6 
During 1948 the press gave considerable amounts of space to the spread of 
Communism in Europe and elsewhere, and in a climate of growing uncertainty the 
electorate reacted increasingly negatively to domestic moves or policies that could 
be characterised as socialist. It does not appear that the Australian people felt a 
Communist revolution in Australia was likely, but concern about Communism led 
to a general distrust of left-wing politics. Menzies linked Labor’s allegedly 
socialist domestic policies to external security issues, suggesting that Chifley was 
unable to take a tough stance on Australia’s potential enemies because of 
subversive left-wing influences throughout the union movement and the Labor 
government.
7 
Labor’s prospects continued to dim during 1949. As December drew near, 
the election campaign was characterised by a clash of ideologies. Chifley’s Labor 
appears to have been genuinely committed to a socialist ‘spirit’ in governance, 
while the Coalition condemned such a position and portrayed itself as focused on 
security, democratic values and recovery from the war.
8 The election resulted in a 
complete turnaround of Labor’s position, ending the longest period that Labor had 
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been in power and bringing a 5% swing to the Coalition.
9 Years later, Menzies 
declared that the election had prevented state socialism from taking hold in 
Australia.
10  
 
Emerging Perceptions of a Communist Threat to Asia 
Australia and the US remained more or less aligned on policy on Japan in the early 
post-war years, with the question of trying Emperor Hirohito as one major 
exception. This relative harmony was changed by the Reverse Course in US 
Occupation policy. By 1948 at the latest, many US officials perceived the threat of 
Communism in Asia to have increased to the point that it presented a far greater 
danger to Japan and to Pacific security than did ultra-right influence within 
Japan.
11 They began to note increased Communist activity in Japan and to 
perceive a vulnerability to Communist influence in some areas, especially the 
labour movement.
12  
Japan’s economy was struggling to recover from the war without direct US 
economic aid, and under the weight of the Occupation democratisation program 
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that was intended to produce major changes and upheaval in Japanese industry.
13 
Food was scarce in 1945-1946 and there was insufficient housing. Poor economic 
conditions seemed to be fostering unrest among workers throughout the country. 
At the end of the war, moreover, exiles and political prisoners, many of whom 
were Communists, had returned to Japanese society. Communists enjoyed much 
greater political freedom than ever before: under SCAP they became a legal party 
for the first time.
14 Communist views were at first allowed to flourish, in the 
interests of promoting pluralist politics, and were much less subject to suppression 
than were ultranationalist views. SCAP’s media censorship focussed not on left-
wing material, but on stories attacking SCAP, promoting militarism or reporting 
on any fighting that might still have been occurring in the Pacific islands.
15 Thus, 
on the one hand, Japan’s economy was struggling, and on the other, Communists 
had been granted a greater voice than ever before. Consequently, Communist 
influence strengthened in Japan’s major trade unions and elsewhere. Industrial 
action became aggressive and ambitious, especially in 1946 and 1947. SCAP was 
initially content to counter Communist influence by promoting liberal democratic 
principles in contrast to left-wing activity, and took a sympathetic view of the 
exercise by workers of their democratic rights.
16 When a general strike across 
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Japan was planned by trade unions for 1 February 1947, however, SCAP 
abandoned its tolerance of left-wing activity and banned the strike action 
directly.
17  
At the same time, US officials were also concerned about events outside 
Japan, and the prospect that Communist activity in China or even Europe might 
influence Asian countries. The Reverse Course in Japan more or less coincided 
with the deteriorating outlook for democracy in China. When the Second World 
War ended, China had been the logical hope to promote US interests in the region 
as it had been an ally of the US (and Australia) in the war and had received US 
aid. The situation in China immediately became very complicated, however. China 
was soon divided once again by two groups racing to gain control of land, the 
Nationalists and the Communists. The result was a three-year civil war, despite 
attempts by the US to mediate negotiations. The US government attempted to aid 
the Nationalist forces, to varying degrees over time, maintaining some hope that 
the non-Communist power would win; but ultimately, in October 1949, the 
Communists gained control over China.
18  
To the US government, losing China as a potential democratic ally in East 
Asia reinforced the importance of Japan, and thus also the need to maintain 
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Japan’s economy, especially with a significant external Communist influence now 
close at hand. As if to bolster US anxieties about Communist influence in Asia, 
the January 1949 national election in Japan was a very successful one for the 
Communist Party. The Communists gained nearly 10% of the popular vote and 
won thirty-five seats, an impressive result for a party that had been illegal until 
late 1945. Before the end of the war, membership of the Japan Communist Party 
had remained well under 1,000 but by April 1950 it had reached nearly 110,000.
19 
The ‘fall of China’ and the electoral success of the Japanese Communists further 
marginalised anti-militarist policies in the Occupation, in favour of anti-
Communist policies.  
Occupation policy thus began to change. The start-date of the Reverse 
Course is contested by historians, but is generally placed in the period 1947-1948, 
with MacArthur’s banning of the general strike on 30 January 1947 as one 
prominent landmark. US policy for Japan began to focus on economic 
rehabilitation and institutional stabilisation, rather than on punishment or 
democratisation, in order to strengthen Japan as a bulwark against Communism in 
Asia.
20 The Reverse Course encompassed forthright policies such as the purge of 
Communists from Japanese institutions, the provision for limited Japanese 
rearmament, the curtailment of the program to reform Japanese industry, which 
had had the side-effect of dangerously weakening the economy, and the 1949 
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suspension of US war crimes trials.
21 The US government now avoided any 
policies that continued to treat Japan as an enemy. Eventually many of the 
Japanese once considered to be militarists and purged from public office by SCAP 
returned to positions of influence.
22 The Australian government, meanwhile, 
remained cautious towards Japan, suspicious that the Reverse Course, by 
strengthening Japan and downplaying reform, could in itself threaten Japan’s 
neighbours and the Pacific.
23 The government continued war crimes trials and did 
not fully accept the need to promote a democratic Japan against the danger posed 
by Communism, at least not at the expense of Australia’s tough policies for Japan. 
This stance endured until the government agreed that Japan should be brought 
‘back into the fold’ in 1954 and created a series of policies to reflect this new 
position, as discussed in Chapter Five. Thus, from the beginning of the Reverse 
Course up until 1954, the Australian government was to varying degrees at odds 
with US policy for Japan, due to differing interpretations of how to meet the rise 
of Communism in Asia.  
   The Australian government does appear to have shared the US concern 
about the Communist threat in Asia, but crucially, officials took a different view 
of the role that Japan should play in meeting the new challenge. As we have seen, 
the government was determined to be active in politics relating to Asia after the 
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Second World War and to pursue initiatives it felt were important to the future 
security of Asia, even if its policies clashed with those of the US or of European 
powers. Though the Australian government relied heavily on US military power 
for protection, it would not easily relinquish its existing views on the best course 
of action to guarantee Pacific security. To both of the Australian federal 
governments of the late 1940s, Japan did have a future role as a democratic nation 
in Asia. Nevertheless, official Australian assessments of Japan remained cautious 
and rooted in the immediate post-surrender fear of, and anger at, Japanese 
militarism. The Communist victory in China apparently did not obviate the need 
for watchful policies on the old threat from Japan. The government was reluctant 
fully to support Japan as a true and reliable ally; it hoped to meet any new security 
challenges in the Pacific without undermining the policies it had designed to 
counter Japanese militarism.
24Anti-Japanese sentiment was still strong in Australia 
in 1950 and some politicians seemed genuinely convinced that Japan remained a 
danger. Senior government ministers claimed on public record that Australia must 
guard against any possible resurgence of Japanese militarism and that the nation 
had not forgotten the war.
25 Though the government acknowledged the apparent 
Communist threat, Communism joined Japanese militarism as twin foci of a 
security policy that was based on promoting democracy and maintaining a firm 
military commitment to the region, strongly backed by the US.
26 
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  While events in Asia were developing and the 1949 federal election 
campaign was underway, the Australian military was trying to proceed as 
efficiently as possible with its war crimes trials. The proceedings in the early 
period represent the bulk of Australia’s prosecutions, spread over little more than 
twelve months. I turn now to the trials themselves in this first period of the 
program.   
 
The Initial Progress of the Trials 
The first trials conducted by Australian authorities were at Wewak in Australian 
New Guinea, in Borneo, and in Morotai, in the Netherlands Indies’ Maluku 
Islands. In the very first trial, in Wewak, Tazaki Takahiko was accused of 
cannibalism. According to Piccigallo, the shocking nature of the initial case was 
not an accident: a particularly gruesome crime was deliberately chosen.
27 If indeed 
this first case was selected for its confronting nature, it follows a pattern of 
deliberate manipulation of the press by the Australian government where war 
criminals were concerned, in an attempt to create or strengthen an atmosphere of 
outrage and shock in Australia. It is difficult to assess why this might have been 
considered necessary. The war was over so there was no need to compel the public 
to fight. Recruitment to BCOF had been strong and there was little or no 
opposition to the Australian government’s policies on Japan. Preparations for war 
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crimes trials were progressing smoothly and more trials soon began in other areas. 
By the end of 1945, trials had started in Labuan and Rabaul. 
Only two trials were held in Wewak, with a single defendant each. One 
was convicted, and one acquitted. The man convicted was Tazaki. His case 
provides a significant though unusual example of the post-trial mitigation of a 
sentence, and also constitutes a relatively rare instance of a defendant who was 
prosecuted for a crime against an Australian soldier who was not a POW. Tazaki’s 
victim had not been under his care at any point as a POW but rather had been 
killed in combat between Japanese and Australian forces.  
Tazaki faced trial on 30 November 1945 on two charges, the first of 
mutilating the dead on 19 July 1945 and the second of cannibalism on 20 July, at a 
place called Soarin Ridge. He was sentenced to death, but the sentence was 
mitigated by the confirming officer to five years’ imprisonment.
28 A death 
sentence changed to five years in prison must have been one of the most generous 
sentence reductions in the Australian trials. Yet no petition had been filed by, or 
on behalf of, the accused. The JAG report did not exactly recommend mitigation, 
but passed on the recommendation of the unnamed officer, most likely the court’s 
Judge Advocate, who had forwarded the trial proceedings to him. That written 
recommendation noted that the defendant had no history of cannibalism and took 
such drastic action because of the conditions in which he had been living at the 
time.
 The recommendation also states that cannibalism was not a crime under 
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British law or under any other international convention, though maltreatment of 
the dead body of an enemy was.
29 It is unclear why this was thought to be 
relevant, since cannibalism was certainly a crime punishable under the Australian 
War Crimes Act. The record of the court proceedings listed most of the mitigating 
circumstances surrounding the crime, but also noted that the defendant had an 
intense hatred of Australians. In the transcript of the court proceedings, Tazaki 
even cites this hatred as one reason for eating the Australian soldier, presumably 
rather than one of his own dead comrades.
30 
  In March 1946, trials began in Darwin, scene of the most destructive 
Japanese wartime air raid on an Australian target. These tribunals were a public-
relations disaster for the government, so much so that they lasted less than two 
months, and war crimes trials were never held on mainland Australian soil again. 
Three cases were heard in Darwin. Twenty-two accused were tried; ten were 
convicted and twelve acquitted. One of the ten convicted was sentenced to death 
and one received ten years in prison. The other eight received sentences of less 
than ten years. Several sentences of less than a year were handed down.
31 The 
apparently light sentencing produced a furore in the Australian press. Newspapers 
asserted that the public should be affronted by the sentencing and that an official 
explanation was expected. Members of the government were soon called upon to 
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defend the Darwin verdicts.
32 The President of the Darwin court, Lt Colonel 
Arnold Brown, stood by the decisions, expressing his belief that once the full facts 
of the cases were made public, the sentencing would be seen as fair.
33 The press 
responded with graphic details of the torture inflicted on Australian prisoners by 
the Japanese on trial at Darwin. Prisoners had had their beards set alight and had 
been hung from rafters for long periods of time.
34 Veterans’ organisations also 
expressed astonishment at the sentencing. A spokesman from the Returned 
Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia, the organisation 
that from 1965 onwards was known as the Returned Services League of Australia 
(RSL), J. R. Lewis, suggested that future courts should have presidents who had 
experienced Japanese brutality at first hand.
35  
  The intense press focus and resulting political pressure put the government 
in a difficult position. Discussion of Japanese war criminals had become 
unreasoned and blinded by sorrow and anger. The RSL’s suggestion that ex-
prisoners should be given key positions in the courts was legally absurd but it 
reveals how the trials were viewed by the veterans’ organisation: the RSL 
obviously expected retribution. It is unclear how much of the public fervour is 
attributable to the government’s own encouragement of the press to report fully on 
Japanese cruelties, though the Australian public did not seem to need 
encouragement to take a tough stance on war criminals. Public reaction had now 
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become a problem, however. The government had promised the people ‘justice’ 
and sentences of less than a year, let alone acquittals, were seen to be insufficient. 
Of course harsher sentencing was occurring elsewhere but Darwin was the closest 
to the public eye. Henceforth, trials were staged in far-flung locations well away 
from the Australian public. 
Of all Australian trial venues, Rabaul was easily the largest, with almost 
400 suspects prosecuted in 188 trials between 12 December 1945 and 6 August 
1947. Rabaul accounted for over half the number of Australian trials and also the 
majority of the death sentences, eighty-seven in total.
36 In terms of the number of 
defendants in a case, however, hearings at Rabaul were often small in comparison 
with other venues. At Labuan, by contrast, only sixteen trials were held, but 145 
defendants were tried. Rabaul, a port in New Britain, had been captured by the 
Japanese in 1942 and used in the build-up to the proposed assault on Port 
Moresby, becoming the largest Japanese military base in the region. The attack on 
Port Moresby never actually happened because of strong Australian resistance in 
the area and the general turning of the tide of the war against the Japanese. Rabaul, 
however, was the scene of significant war crimes against POWs. After the war, 
155,000 Japanese surrendered to Australian forces there.
37 With so many 
surrendered Japanese in the area, a wealth of evidence of war crimes and a 
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comparatively large contingent of adequately resourced Australian forces, Rabaul 
was always likely to be a busy area for war crimes trials. 
  The second biggest trial venue, by number of defendants, was Morotai. 
Between November 1945 and February 1946, 148 suspects were tried there in 
twenty-five cases. Only eighty-one were convicted, but twenty-five death 
sentences were handed down, making Morotai also the second busiest trial venue 
by measure of death sentences. The high rate of death sentences on Morotai can be 
explained by the nature of the cases there. A number of them dealt with the 
execution of Australian airmen who had crashed in nearby areas during the war. 
Details of the case of Katayama and Others and the Tsuaki case, which are 
examples of such prosecutions, can be found in Chapters Two and Four. These 
trials dealt with what were perceived as brutal executions of crashed airmen and 
therefore were far more likely to result in death sentences. Mitigation of death 
sentences in such cases was less frequent than, for example, in the trials on 
Labuan, which commonly dealt with the forced march of prisoners. Forced 
marches also resulted in charges of murder, but the circumstances were different. 
The crime of directly executing a soldier was gruesome and the defence of 
Superior Orders was harder to justify, or perhaps harder for the court or even the 
JAG to accept. On the other hand, Morotai had a relatively high number of 
acquittals, at sixty-seven. The reason appears to be that Morotai was the location 
of the largest single BC trial ever held, with ninety-two defendants, as described in 168 
 
the previous chapter, and in that trial alone, fifty-five defendants were found not 
guilty, a result that somewhat distorts the picture of the Morotai trial results.
38 
  Labuan’s trials ran for a short period of several weeks in December 1945 
and January 1946. Of the 145 accused, 128 were found guilty, which is a fairly 
high rate of conviction compared with some of the other venues in the Australian 
trials. The majority of those convicted received relatively moderate sentences of 
between ten and twenty-four years in prison. Only seven death sentences were 
handed down by the court. The Labuan trials were often large ones, dealing 
mainly with crimes arising from forced marches of Allied prisoners between 
Sandakan and Ranau, in British North Borneo, during 1945.  
The case of Nagahiro Masao and Twenty Others, tried at Labuan between 
7 and 9 January 1946, suggests some of the reasons for the comparatively light 
sentencing. The defendants in this case were alleged to have murdered Australian 
(and British) POWs between 29 May and 26 June 1945, somewhere between 
Sandakan and Ranau.
39 All except two of the accused were found guilty. 
Sentences ranged between eight and twenty-six years in prison, but the JAG 
recommended that the sentences should be mitigated to reflect the circumstances 
in which the crimes had been committed. The JAG commented that at this point 
the area near the POW camp run by the Japanese was being bombarded by Allied 
forces and that according to the Hague Convention of 1899, the prisoners therefore 
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needed to be moved. The track along which the prisoners were moved was not 
suitable for vehicles and although the prisoners were clearly not capable of 
making the journey on foot, the JAG believed the men on trial in this case had 
been acting under orders in forcing them to do so.
40 The confirming authority 
apparently took the JAG’s comments into account, reducing all the sentences by 
half.  
This case illustrates several typical features of the Labuan tribunals. Large 
numbers of defendants appeared in comparatively few trials: it seems from the 
records that it was not so much their individual conduct that was on trial, but their 
representative part in a much larger collection of war crimes, that is, the forced 
marches from Sandakan. In other words, these cases reflected an apparent 
emphasis on collective responsibility rather than individual guilt. The courts 
themselves showed some leniency and the JAG’s recommendations to the 
confirming authority evidently were compelling, sparing the lower-ranking 
Japanese from heavy sentences in most cases. The large trials, however, may also 
help to explain the high rate of conviction. Once the court was certain that some of 
the defendants were guilty, it seems to have assumed that most of the accused 
were implicated in the alleged crime. But if this line of reasoning was indeed 
followed, it contrasts markedly with the trial of the ninety-two defendants on 
Morotai, in which fifty-five were found not guilty.  
  Singapore and Hong Kong began operating as trial venues after the initial 
surge of prosecutions in early 1946. Hearings at Singapore opened in June 1946 
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and the last trial concluded in July 1947. The British were also prosecuting 
Japanese for war crimes in Singapore at the same time, and Australia shared the 
British venue and facilities. The Australian courts at Singapore dealt with alleged 
crimes arising from Japan’s use of Allied prisoners in constructing the Burma-
Thai railway. In the Australian cases, sixty-two defendants were tried in twenty-
three cases. Fifty-one were found guilty and eighteen sentenced to death. When 
the Singapore courts closed after Britain had completed its trials there, the 
Australian government still wanted to continue prosecutions. The trials at Rabaul 
were about to wind up, and those in other venues had finished. A new location was 
needed. The British had completed their prosecutions at Hong Kong, leaving a 
venue available, and Hong Kong was seen as the most suitable location.
41 The 
Australian trials in Hong Kong opened in November 1947 and closed in 
November 1948. At Hong Kong, the rate of conviction was also high. Forty-two 
suspects were tried in thirteen cases and thirty-eight were found guilty, though 
only five were sentenced to death. The high rate of conviction there can probably 
be explained by the fact that resources for war crimes trials were beginning to be 
severely strained by this point and only prosecutions of serious crimes backed by 
considerable evidence were likely to proceed. A further feature of the Hong Kong 
trials was the change to a new confirming officer, Adjutant-General W.M. 
Anderson.  
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The Singapore and Hong Kong trials occupy a liminal position between the 
initial burst of Australian activity in early 1946 and the Manus trials in 1950-1951. 
The Hong Kong trials, in particular, became the subject of delicate negotiations 
among the Australian government, the British colonial authorities in Hong Kong 
and SCAP during a period of limbo for the Australian prosecutions. These 
negotiations will be discussed in detail later.  
   As shown in the Wewak and Labuan cases described above, a good 
number of sentences in the Australian trials were reduced by the confirming 
officer, at this point Sturdee. It is difficult to reconcile this willingness to reduce 
sentences with the examples of other cases where mitigation seemed appropriate 
and was recommended by the JAG, but was not enacted by the confirming officer. 
It seems unlikely that Sturdee would treat war criminals from different areas 
differently, simply because of where they had committed their crimes. One 
possible explanation for his decisions on which JAG recommendations to uphold 
and which to ignore is that it depended on the type of crime. It also appears, 
however, that the context mattered a great deal. As we have seen, both the type 
and context of the crimes tried at Labuan were different from those prosecuted on 
Morotai. It is likely that Sturdee weighed defences such as Superior Orders 
differently depending on the crime and the circumstances. In the crimes associated 
with forced marches tried at Labuan, Sturdee took the JAG’s advice and was 
lenient. When soldiers had been ordered to execute airmen, as in Katayama and 
Others, he was not lenient. The charge in all these instances was murder, but 
evidently the different circumstances mattered. Sturdee was surprisingly sensitive, 172 
 
too, to the difficulties faced by the soldier in Wewak who had eaten an Australian 
soldier, and greatly reduced his sentence. Thus, to add a further layer of 
complexity to the question of fairness, the fate of a convicted war criminal seemed 
to depend to some degree on Sturdee’s personal opinion of the seriousness of 
different types of crime and the circumstances in which they had been committed. 
Without his personal papers, it is impossible to know how he weighed the 
difference between the crimes committed by soldiers who had been ordered to 
guard prisoners on a forced march, resulting in a charge of murder, and those 
committed by soldiers forced to execute prisoners directly, but it appears that he 
regarded the latter as worse than the former. 
Convicted Japanese war criminals who received a death sentence and 
whose sentence was confirmed were executed where they had been tried. Those 
who were sentenced to terms of imprisonment were initially held where they had 
been tried. Eventually, however, most surviving prisoners appear to have been 
moved to Rabaul, where they remained until 1949. The Australian military 
contingent at Rabaul was significantly larger than in the other trial venues and also 
had the assistance of local civilian personnel, so it would have been easier to 
manage prisoners there. Moreover, criminals in Australian custody in Rabaul were 
not idle but were used as cheap labour on a civilian construction project. In March 
1949 all prisoners on Rabaul were shifted to Manus Island to assist a small 
number of war criminals who were already there to complete the base that the 
Australian navy was building.
42 Rabaul and Manus Island did not account for all 
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of the surviving war criminals convicted in Australian courts, however. About 
sixty convicted in Singapore and Hong Kong went neither to Manus nor to 
Rabaul, but instead remained in Hong Kong and Singapore,
43 before being 
repatriated to Japan in 1951 along with prisoners convicted in British courts, to 
serve out their time in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. Eventually, after a series of 
protracted negotiations, all surviving war criminals prosecuted in Australian courts 
were transferred to Sugamo, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
   While Australia’s prosecutions were progressing, the Class A trials were 
also being conducted in an international courtroom in Tokyo. Twenty-eight 
Japanese leaders had been selected for indictment from a much longer initial list, 
and the trials began on 29 April 1946. Verdicts were handed down in December 
1948. By this time the Reverse Course was underway and Allied priorities had 
changed. There was little appetite to continue prosecuting Japanese leaders.
44 
Australia, as one of the eleven prosecuting nations, had in fact agreed in 
November 1947 that the Class A trials should end. According to External Affairs, 
the reason was that the government no longer considered the trials to have much 
political value, given that press reports usually focused on the defence.
45 
Presumably, this means that the government believed the trials did little more than 
afford the Japanese wartime leaders the chance to promote their own cause, rather 
than revealing the detail of the crimes they had committed and making an example 
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of them. Moreover, the government needed Sir William Webb for several key 
legal cases in Australia.
46  
To Australians, however, there remained an imperative to bring Japan to 
account. There was also a growing suspicion that the other Allies did not fully 
understand Australia’s position; they were too pragmatic and lenient.
47 This belief 
that Australian policy for Japan was different from that of other governments, and 
that the Australian BC trials ‘belonged’ to Australia whereas the Class A trials did 
not, helps explain the apparent contradiction that although the trials of senior 
Japanese were seen as no longer useful to the government, those of ‘lesser’ war 
criminals remained politically significant.  
 
The Slowing of Australia’s Trials 
Despite the continuing enthusiasm for completing the BC trials in a resolute way 
and fully punishing those Japanese suspects who were in Australian hands, 
prosecutions began to slow in 1947, chiefly because of a shortage of trial 
personnel. In 1947 all non-volunteers serving in the tribunals returned to Australia. 
Pappas suggests that getting further volunteers to work in oppressive tropical 
conditions was difficult.
48 In 1948 many Japanese suspects were still being held in 
Australian custody without trial, but prosecutions proceeded slowly. In June 1948 
thirty-five cases were ready for trial and a further 125 were open for investigation; 
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officials estimated that to hear all of these cases would have taken roughly another 
two years.
49 Hong Kong was the only place in which Australian trials were still 
being conducted, but the Hong Kong venue was only available until August that 
year, as the lease on the premises was due to expire. All UK trials, regardless of 
venue, had ended in March 1948, meaning that Australia was the only country 
pursuing war crimes in Hong Kong at this stage. The Australian High 
Commissioner in Singapore, who also covered Hong Kong, advised that it would 
be impossible to secure another venue in Hong Kong once the current premises 
became unavailable.
50 Nor was any other space available that would be suitable 
for trials anywhere in the colony.
51 If it wanted to continue trials, the government 
had to find a new venue.  
The government first had to resolve the question of whether further trials 
should go ahead at all and if so, for how long. In February 1948 the Australian 
army asked External Affairs for the Minister’s opinion on whether further trials 
should be held. External Affairs replied that prosecutions should continue until 
they were properly completed, adding, however, that although finishing the job 
was important, the ‘effectiveness’ of trials would be lessened if they continued for 
too long.
52 It is unclear what the Minister meant by ‘effectiveness’ but the remark 
implies there were limits to the trials’ perceived political and diplomatic value, 
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which might not last much longer. By 15 June 1948, the question of whether to 
continue or not had been presented by the Minister for Army to Cabinet for 
consideration. Cabinet decided that trials should continue after 31 August 1948, 
the date on which the Hong Kong venue would become unavailable, for roughly 
twelve months, and that a suitable new venue should be identified in the area of 
Japan managed by BCOF. Cases ready for trial were to be ‘expedited as much as 
possible’ with a view to completing the program by June 1949.
53 
Given the slow progress in the previous twelve months, the aim of 
completing the trials within another twelve months of Cabinet’s June 1948 
decision seems highly ambitious. The government was, however, prepared to 
concede that the two-year period that had initially been suggested as the necessary 
time-frame to complete investigation of the 125 outstanding cases was too long 
and that only the thirty-five cases now ready for trial should be convened.
54 The 
drastic decision to abandon a significant number of cases was made because the 
government was now very conscious of other governments’ policies on the war 
crimes trials. In June 1948, Cabinet was informed that the UK had completed its 
trials in March. The US authorities were attempting to complete their prosecutions 
by 31 October 1948,
55 and SCAP took the view that other governments should 
also finish prosecuting by 31 December.
56 External Affairs, after considering the 
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views of the US and the UK, had informed the Minister for Army that the 
department’s stance had changed and that External Affairs now believed 
Australian trials should only continue to June 1949.
57  
This position provides an early indication that Australian officials were 
conscious it was not in the government’s best interests to have a war crimes policy 
that was dramatically out of step with those of the UK and the US. SCAP and the 
Far Eastern Commission in Washington had little control over other countries’ 
policies on war criminals. They could recommend that certain actions should be 
taken, but war crimes trials outside of Japan were legally the business of the 
prosecuting nation.
58 Therefore, any influence that the US had on trials conducted 
by other countries was in the form of political pressure to support US objectives in 
Japan. The Australian government did sense this pressure and was attempting to 
match the actions of its allies, but balanced this approach with the desire to 
complete its own trials more or less in the manner originally planned. The target of 
thirty-five cases in twelve months appears to have been a compromise. By 
insisting that the thirty-five cases ready for trial should be completed, which, after 
all, would still take Australia’s trials six months past the December deadline that 
SCAP was pushing for, the government would show it was not prepared to 
abandon prosecutions altogether just to match SCAP’s and the UK’s policy.  
     Whether the government could actually have managed to conclude its 
cases in the twelve-month period proved to be irrelevant because the main 
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problem with Cabinet’s June 1948 decision was the plan to conduct future trials on 
Japanese soil. Throughout the 1948 discussions, Australian officials only 
considered two venues to be viable, Japan and, in theory, the Australian mainland. 
Japan was seen as a better option, because it would be easy to call witnesses and 
the number of personnel available to the trials would be significant, presumably 
because members of BCOF would be available. Under these circumstances, 
perhaps meeting the twelve-month goal would have been possible. It does not 
appear that the government seriously considered holding further trials in Australia; 
the difficulties encountered with public reaction to the 1946 Darwin cases must 
have been a significant disincentive. The issue of hearing cases in occupied Japan, 
however, turned out to be complicated. Trials could not be held without the 
approval of SCAP. According to Cabinet documents, SCAP was initially opposed 
to the holding of Australian trials in Japan but at some point indicated to 
Australian officials that it would be open to the idea if prosecutions were 
conducted according to US procedures. The Australian government, however, did 
not wish to conduct trials under SCAP regulations, because it would necessitate 
new legislation, as previous trials had been conducted according to the Australian 
War Crimes Act 1945. The Minister for Army advised Cabinet on 10 June 1948 
that a venue in Japan should be found and trials conducted according to Australian 
procedures.
59 It is not clear how the government thought it could get around the 
key stipulation that SCAP had made: that trials would only go ahead under SCAP 
regulations.  
                                                 
59 ‘Cabinet Agendum Item 1471’. 179 
 
In any case, in August 1948 SCAP advised the Australian government that 
it was not prepared to allow Australian trials on Japanese soil as they would have 
‘no direct connection’ to the Occupation and ‘for this and other reasons’ trials 
could not go ahead.
60 The Australian government then revisited the idea of 
maintaining a war crimes court in Hong Kong. Space for military and bureaucratic 
offices there was very tight. After several attempts, the government could only 
manage to secure an extension of its lease on the existing premises until December 
1948.
61 In itself though, this appears to have been a minor diplomatic victory. 
Meanwhile, the FEC had decided that all BC trials should end during 1949. 
An FEC policy decision of 24 February 1949 called for all investigations to cease 
by June and trials by September.
62 The US authorities were already trying to 
complete their own prosecutions, so in practice the FEC directive did not put any 
further pressure on them. In fact, the FEC decision endorsed what had been SCAP 
policy for some time already.
63 Nor did the FEC policy exert any unwelcome 
pressure on Australia, at least initially. The first of two FEC decisions to call for 
the trials to end had been passed by the steering committee on 16 November 1948 
and even though opinion on the committee at that point was not unanimous, 
Australia voted to bring the trials to a close, despite the fact that the government 
was then searching for a new venue in which to conduct its own cases.
64 
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Evidently, when it first appeared, the FEC’s stance was not considered to be 
overly restrictive. Moreover, the Australian government expected to be able to 
wrap up its trials quickly. Presumably, the government also felt that opposition to 
the FEC directive would damage relations with the US. The fact that other 
representatives voted against the directive must have provided Australian officials 
with some diplomatic relief. The vote was still not unanimous in February 1949, 
when it was put to the full Commission, but the motion was carried, again with 
Australian endorsement.
65  
The FEC could not actually prevent Australia from holding trials outside 
of Japan. The Australian government was in a difficult position, nonetheless, for 
three reasons. First, SCAP held Japanese suspects in Sugamo on Australia’s 
behalf, and could release them if it chose. Second, repeatedly ignoring SCAP and 
FEC policies, even if they were not binding, was diplomatically undesirable. 
Third, the Australian government did not have a viable long-term trial venue 
anywhere and was forced to negotiate with SCAP for assistance in getting access 
to a venue. The FEC directive to end the trials quickly went from something the 
Australian government supported, and which in any case was not strictly binding, 
to something with which the government struggled to comply. Without other 
options, the government returned to the possibility of trials in Japan, requesting in 
February 1949 that SCAP reverse its policy on permitting Australian trials there. 
Despite the FEC directive, SCAP did still appear sympathetic to Australia’s 
situation, at least according to official Australian documents: it offered to convene 
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courts itself to try cases in which Australians were interested, or even possibly to 
delegate that authority to BCOF.
66 This offer was withdrawn in March 1949, 
however, when SCAP stated it had been ordered to cease trials by June 1949.
67 It 
is odd that the FEC directive was interpreted as an order to SCAP at this point, 
since it had been SCAP policy to end trials promptly long before it became FEC 
policy. It appears either that the FEC ruling meant SCAP no longer had scope to 
negotiate on the issue, or that MacArthur used the FEC directive to put an end to 
Australian requests for trials in Japan. After all, Australia had a representative on 
the FEC and could have opposed the FEC directive on the trials but had chosen 
not to.  
Leaving aside the FEC directive, it is evident that at least some SCAP 
officials believed the Australian requests should be rejected out of hand. Official 
US records portray the issue of further Australian trials in Japan in a slightly 
different light from how it appears in Australian Cabinet documents. US legal 
opinion apparently decreed that trials conducted under Australian law could not 
take place in Japan, where war crimes trials were legally under the jurisdiction of 
SCAP. There were other considerations as well, as is made clear by the comment 
of senior officials from SCAP’s Legal Section, whose chief wrote in an internal 
communication in July 1948:  
It would be a serious loss of prestige, as well as a derogation from the 
authority of the Supreme Commander if he did not control and exercise 
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supervision over the conduct of these proceedings [i.e., Australian trials in 
Japan].
68 
Furthermore, in the opinion of SCAP’s Legal Section, Australian trials in Japan 
would be ‘inconsistent’ with SCAP’s policy, which had been moving away from 
war crimes trials for some time. On the matter of SCAP taking responsibility for 
further Australian trials itself the Legal Section was equally forthright, suggesting 
that the extra responsibility would place a burden on the American taxpayer and 
have the ‘highly undesirable effect’ of delaying completion of the US trials by 
adding an entire new set of prosecutions.
69 These comments do not appear in the 
Australian files, suggesting that SCAP was not prepared to be this blunt in 
discussing the issue with the Australian government. 
Internal opinion in SCAP was thus not receptive after July 1948 to the idea 
that Australia could conduct independent war crimes trials in Japan, and the 
apparent US offer to hear cases on Australia’s behalf was short-lived. 
Nevertheless, Australian officials were complimentary about how helpful and 
cordial SCAP had been in dealing with the issue. In an effort to resolve the 
situation, it appears that SCAP indicated privately to Australian officials that 
despite the setback of not being able to hold trials in Japan, scope to continue 
prosecuting the worst war criminals still existed and Australia could pursue trials 
of serious crimes at a venue such as Manus Island.
70 How Manus Island came to 
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be recommended as a venue or who first suggested it would be suitable is not 
clear, but it was not the only possibility examined. Port Moresby and Dreger 
Harbour in New Guinea were also considered but were ruled out, as the majority 
of Australian personnel in those areas had been redeployed elsewhere.
71  
On top of all these confusing and difficult negotiations, in late 1949, SCAP 
indicated to the Australian government that it intended to release from Sugamo 
Prison the sixty or so suspects held there who were awaiting trial by Australia. 
Such action was prompted partly by the new FEC policy but also by the belief that 
many suspects had been held without trial for too long. In part, SCAP appeared to 
be losing patience with Australian officials, and did not seem to believe that the 
Australian government would make a timely decision on what to do with its 
suspects. The government was able to negotiate an extension until 1 January 1950 
on SCAP’s decision to release prisoners, by claiming that Cabinet was about to 
decide on the issue. In the meantime, Australian officials began to assess Manus as 
a venue.
72 
Throughout 1948 the future of the trials was in limbo, but ultimately the 
government was at least able to negotiate with the US authorities to prevent 
suspects from being released. Eventually it was able to secure a suitable trial 
venue, on Manus Island, and to hold further prosecutions. The next chapter 
discusses the resumption of the Australian government’s war crimes trials. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MANUS ISLAND: THE END OF THE TRIALS 
 
The last Australian trials, which were also the last trials of suspected Japanese war 
criminals by any of the wartime Allies, began on Manus Island, in Australian New 
Guinea, in June 1950. They ended in April 1951, roughly five and a half years 
after the first Australian trials began. The Manus prosecutions concluded 
Australia’s pursuit of Japanese war criminals, finally punishing some Japanese just 
a few months before the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed and almost a 
decade after their crimes had been perpetrated, as some defendants were tried for 
crimes committed in 1942. It was a very late point at which to be completing a 
trial program that had commenced early in the Occupation as part of the project to 
demilitarise and reform Japan, a project that had since been abandoned. In this 
second era for the trials, the legal framework remained the same, but both 
domestically and internationally, the social and political context was dramatically 
different. The trials were by now part of an old policy of dealing with Japan as 
former and perhaps future enemy, whereas Japan had since become an 
acknowledged ally of democratic countries opposed to Communism. The nature 
and scale of Western political and diplomatic interventions in Asia had changed 
radically by this stage. The Manus trials are intriguing because of their late timing 
and the resistance they offered to the changing international context in which they 
took place.  185 
 
  This chapter discusses the lead-up to the Manus trials and the prosecutions 
themselves. As the Australian government planned the Manus trials, the 
Occupation was moving steadily towards its conclusion and the restoration of 
peace. These last trials indicate the Australian government’s resolve to punish 
Japanese war criminals to the extent that it regarded as appropriate, even if that 
punishment no longer served the best interests of the Occupation. Procedurally, 
the prosecutions exhibited many of the flaws of the earlier trials. One key 
difference, however, was that they focused almost entirely on crimes against 
Australian soldiers rather than local civilians; another was that the government 
became heavily involved in the confirming of death sentences for the first time. 
Other writers on the BC trials have acknowledged that the ‘Reverse 
Course’ changed the context of the Australian trials.
1 The significance of this point 
in Australian foreign policy, however, has been understated. The decision to 
resume trials on Manus Island was made deliberately and against SCAP’s wishes. 
The Australian government did not negotiate on or compromise its own goals in 
dealing with Japan. It was a strong stance to take considering that the trial program 
had been encountering serious logistical obstacles for the previous two years. The 
Australian position on the trials is even more significant when one considers how 
closely the Australian government was co-operating with the US in other ways, 
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and what was at stake in displaying opposition to the ‘Reverse Course’. Australia 
had worked hard in BCOF and on the Allied Council for Japan, and through Webb 
and others in the Class A trials. Australian officials and personnel had thus 
zealously supported early Occupation projects, including demilitarisation in 
general and war crimes trials specifically. Prior to the ‘Reverse Course’ it is hard 
to see how any nation could have been considered a closer ally to the US in the 
Occupation of Japan, or a more important one. Australia was also the first country 
to commit to assisting the US in the Korean War.
2 Clearly, co-operation with the 
US was an important priority in almost all situations in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Even while the Australian military was contributing soldiers to the anti-
Communist cause in a new war in Korea, however, and the government was 
supporting the new cause of Indonesian independence, Australians were still 
dealing with leftover issues from the Second World War in their prosecutions of 
suspected Japanese war criminals. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Australian government needed a 
new venue if trials were to continue after 1949. Eventually, Manus Island was 
chosen and the trials began. At face value the prosecutions appear to represent the 
completion of unfinished business by the Australian government and military. The 
Manus trials, however, were more than that. As much as the finishing of a job, 
they also constituted a positive assertion that official Australian views on Japan 
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had not greatly changed despite the US-led new direction of the Occupation and 
the more general change of US policy for Asia. The Australian government 
believed that Japan should still be treated as a threat and was not afraid to say so. 
It would have been more convenient and efficient for Australian officials 
serving either the Labor or the Coalition government to have concluded the trials 
in 1948 when they began to encounter bureaucratic problems, or to allow the 
program to lapse in 1950 rather than rejuvenate it. Many war criminals, after all, 
had already been convicted. The government remained conscious of anti-Japanese 
sentiment in Australia until well into the 1950s, however, and the fact that neither 
federal government in the 1940s was prepared to abandon the war crimes trials 
when it would have been convenient to do so, instead exploring difficult and 
costly ways to reinvigorate them, suggests an acknowledgement in political circles 
that the trials had high political value domestically. The political value of the trials 
lay in the fact that they allowed the government to demonstrate a response to the 
perceived pressure from the electorate for a tough stance on Japan. An early end to 
the trials was thus never likely. The BC prosecutions had been an important part of 
the government’s post-war foreign policy agenda as well, intended in part to 
secure Australia’s status and position in Asia. As mentioned in earlier chapters, 
the Australian trials were virtually unique as an area of policy on Japan over 
which Australian officials had total control. This was still the case in 1950. If the 
trial program were to cease before the government was satisfied with its progress, 188 
 
very few, if any, areas would remain in which Australia could deal with the 
Japanese independently.  
A major effort was made for the Manus Island trials. New suspects were 
arrested in Japan in 1949-1950, which came as a shock to those who knew 
suspected war criminals as sons, lovers, husbands and community members, and 
had assumed that at this late stage no more former soldiers would be charged. In 
the spirit of reconstruction in Japan after the beginning of the ‘Reverse Course’, 
pulling people from their communities appeared unjust to many Japanese. 
Eventually an increasingly vocal Japanese campaign for the repatriation and 
release of convicted criminals would place significant pressure on the Australian 
government, as we will see in Chapter Five. The news of the Manus trials also 
drew reaction from the Australian press. Reports first appeared in December 1949, 
just prior to the federal election. The revelation that trials would resume at such a 
late stage worried some Australians who believed Australia should be treating the 
Japanese fairly.
3 Others, however, seemed less concerned about fair treatment of 
Japan and more concerned that war criminals might escape prosecution because of 
the government’s tardiness in bringing them to trial. 
    
Planning for Manus 
Official sources show that despite the slowing of the trials under the Chifley 
government, Labor had had no intention of abandoning them. As Pappas suggests, 
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in December 1949 Menzies inherited a flawed and stalled process but not one that 
was totally dead.
4 Labor’s commitment to the trials appears to have fluctuated 
during 1948 but by the middle of 1949 the government had been investigating the 
possibility of restarting prosecutions, and had laid the foundations for what would 
later become the Manus Island trials. Menzies and the Coalition thus built on the 
planning conducted under the previous regime, rather than rescuing the trials 
solely through their own policies and energy. As a matter of fact, discussions were 
well advanced by the time the Coalition took them over. As shown in the previous 
chapter, Labor conducted vigorous diplomacy with the US and with officials in 
Singapore between June 1948 and April 1949 in the search for a new trial venue, 
and it is doubtful that Australian officials could have done much more to expedite 
the process at that time. Had the Labor government been able to secure a venue 
promptly, Australia might well have managed to finish its trials by mid-1949, and 
thus to have remained in line with other prosecuting countries.  
   Labor was voted out of office before it could complete the task of 
restarting the trials, and Menzies inherited the problem. By this time, Manus had 
emerged as a possible venue, though nothing had been settled.
5 In December 1949, 
the new government considered the question of continuing the trials: Menzies 
claimed it was one of the first issues on which he took action and that the previous 
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delay ‘violated the fundamental concepts of British justice’.
6 After discussions 
with SCAP the government decided that only cases already prepared for trial and 
covering serious offences would be pursued, in an effort to minimise the time that 
Manus would be operational. Cases already prepared covered fifty-one suspects; 
the remaining suspects in custody were to be released. The government took the 
view that those to be released were only minor criminals and that their cases were 
far from ready for trial.
7 The Coalition criticised the previous Labor government in 
parliament for the slow progress of the prosecutions so far.
8 In fact, however, the 
new government restarted the trials with a lower number of cases than had been 
planned under Labor.  
The government was keen to start the Manus trials as soon as possible, and 
began to make preparations. Suspects had to be transported to Manus, along with 
legal personnel. The government initially thought the trials would take roughly 
four months, not the twelve months they eventually required. The biggest factor 
affecting how soon prosecutions could begin would be organising Australian 
personnel and Japanese legal teams. Fortunately for the government, staff who had 
been investigating war crimes elsewhere were now available to prepare the trial 
venue, organise other personnel and the suspects, and work in actual tribunals, as 
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all Australian investigations then underway had stopped to focus solely on the 
cases that were ready for trial at Manus.
9 As agreed, SCAP had held on to suspects 
in Sugamo Prison on behalf of the Australian government, and upon receiving 
confirmation of the decision to continue trials, organised for the transfer of 
prisoners from Tokyo to Manus Island.
10 The initial cost projection for the entire 
Manus program was £37,000, though the press later claimed the trials had actually 
cost £100,000.
11 
Taken as a whole, the negotiations with SCAP over the Manus 
prosecutions indicate a number of things about the Australian trials. First, the trials 
had bipartisan support in Australia even in the face of the changing political 
landscape in Asia. Second, the Australian government was not oblivious to the 
changes in US and other Allied policy for Japan, and made efforts to conform with 
those changes but only up to a point. The Australian governments of 1948, 1949 
and 1950 were conscious that their actions on war criminals would stand apart 
from those of other key Allies, if they went ahead with Manus Island. Government 
assessments showed that Australian policy on war criminals was closer to that of 
the Philippines, a minor Pacific power, than it was to that of the US and UK, two 
countries officials would have considered more important to Australia’s standing 
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in the region.
12 The government did make an effort to complete its trials as quickly 
as possible after the Manus hearings were set to go ahead, and did agree to drop all 
cases except those ready for prosecution. This foreign relations pragmatism had its 
limits, however, and at no point in the discussions, within either the Labor or the 
Coalition governments, were war crimes trials likely to be abandoned. Third, the 
continuation of the trials had new implications. Prosecuting Japanese war 
criminals had been a part of Australian foreign policy ever since the final stages of 
the war. These late-stage tribunals at Manus, however, potentially portrayed 
Australia as too harsh on Japan or unwilling to support ‘Reverse Course’ policy, 
and thus might have serious political and diplomatic ramifications. In short, the 
Australian government was taking a risk in holding the Manus trials.  
At Manus Island, the trial process itself remained more or less the same as 
in earlier Australian tribunals but officials were even more conscious that they 
were under time pressure. Though the authorities had decided to deal only with the 
most serious cases, and the press openly noted this point,
13 the government does 
not seem to have believed that that decision undermined the tribunals in any way: 
there was no sense that the government was ‘giving in’ on war criminals. Again, 
this decision shows that the government was willing to compromise, but not to 
concede the trials altogether. The decision to concentrate almost solely on crimes 
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against Australian personnel, rather than local civilians,
14 was also made in the 
interests of speedily concluding the hearings by narrowing the normally broad 
scope of the prosecutions. One trial at Manus did deal with crimes committed 
against Indonesians, as will be discussed below, though the reason for inclusion of 
this case remains unclear.
15  
 
Public Views of the Trials, 1949-1950 
The Coalition government acted quickly on war crimes trials and was able to make 
its plans public relatively soon after taking office. A press release was prepared by 
the new Minister for Army and Navy, Josiah Francis, in January 1950, the month 
after the election, stating that action would be taken against remaining prisoners 
with the ‘utmost expediency’.
16 The press announced on 24 February that Menzies 
was about to clarify the government’s stance on further trials, and he did so in 
parliament, later that day.
17 It was then over two months since the election, but 
Menzies’ action still appears swift in contrast with the gradual loss of momentum 
in the trials under Labor.  
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The two-month gap since the election, however, did allow pressure to build 
from veterans’ and other grass-roots political organisations that wanted to ensure 
the new government would be firm with Japanese war criminals. For example, the 
Lidcombe Branch of the NSW Housewives’ Association wrote to Minister for 
External Affairs Percy Spender to advise him as follows. 
We view with alarm the benevolent attitude towards those responsible for 
the welfare of those who were in Japanese P.O.W. camps and all those 
who suffered and were killed and we demand that these criminals be 
brought to justice.
18  
To accuse the government of displaying a ‘benevolent’ attitude towards war 
criminals was a clever tactic. The delay in organising the Manus trials had 
evidently produced a robust reaction amongst sections of the general public, and 
apparently much of the discussion on war criminals was occurring out of the 
public eye. The New South Wales Ex-Prisoner of War Association wrote to the 
Department of the Prime Minister in late December 1949 registering its ‘strong 
protest of their [suspects’] release before trials and strong disapproval of the time 
it has taken to bring them to trial’.
19 The letter was a follow-up to one that had 
been sent to the outgoing Labor government. It, too, highlights how passionately 
some Australians still felt about war criminals. The news that prosecutions were to 
be held on Manus Island led to an increase in reporting on war criminals once 
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again, after a period during the lull in the trials when few stories had appeared.
20 
The public comment in 1949 and 1950 suggests there might have been a 
significant backlash from the press and lobby groups had either the Labor or the 
Coalition government decided to abandon war crimes trials.    
In 1950, the press initially expressed concern that the government had 
mishandled the situation and that guilty Japanese were going to escape 
punishment, because of the decision to drop all cases except those ready for 
prosecution. Some stories suggested that SCAP might take a hard line on releasing 
untried war criminals and that many could be freed: that is, they suggested that 
SCAP might release even those prisoners who were scheduled for trial at Manus. 
As late as this, the prospect of suspected Japanese war criminals escaping trial was 
evidently still unpalatable to some Australians. The press informed readers that 
Japan remained a possible threat to Australia.
21 Politicians and other prominent 
figures added to the concern over leniency by speaking out publicly on the issue.
22  
The Coalition deflected some of the criticism by blaming the previous 
government, triggering heated debate in parliament in early 1950 over the reasons 
for the lapse in prosecutions in 1948-1949. When questioned after losing office on 
the trials’ progress in 1948, Labor’s position was that Australia did not have the 
                                                 
20 Michael Carrel, ‘Australia's Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli 
and Constraints’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2006, 
pp. 130-131.  
21 For example, ‘Australia to Try Japs on Manus Island’. 
22 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
Vol. 206, 16/3/50 -21/3/50 (Comments on Leniency to Prisoners), pp. 881-897, 
983-984.  196 
 
resources to complete its trials as efficiently as had its allies.
23 The new Coalition 
government claimed upon taking office, however, that departmental bickering 
under Labor and a willingness to appease the Japanese during 1948 had been key 
factors in the decline of the trials.
24 Some Coalition comments were later retracted, 
but in responding to uproar in parliament triggered by the Coalition’s allegations, 
Labor reiterated that delays had been inevitable, insisting that the chief cause of 
delay in 1948 was that the government could not secure a suitable venue to hold 
further trials: there had been no intention of releasing suspects in order to end the 
proceedings or appease the Japanese.
25 Minister for the Army and Navy Francis 
nevertheless claimed publicly that under-resourcing of the trials had been only 
partially to blame for the delay.
26 The fact that as late as 1950, one side of politics 
was prepared to accuse the other of ‘appeasing’ the Japanese, and that the charge 
was so hotly refuted, suggests the continuing political potency in Australia of 
decisions on how to treat post-war Japan. The commitment to prosecuting war 
criminals may have been bipartisan, but policy on trials could still become a 
political football, and when it did, the stakes were high. Most press stories, 
meanwhile, suggested that Australians still viewed further BC trials as necessary 
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and that anger about Japanese war criminals had not greatly subsided.
27 The 
subtext to some articles was that Japan was deliberately harbouring militarists and 
the language used in reporting Australia’s pursuit of suspects was emotive.  
At the same time, the press expressed concern that Australia’s reputation 
might be tarnished by the delay in conducting further trials or because Australia 
now found itself at odds with the US. Though the FEC had no actual power over 
Australian prosecutions outside Japan, one Sydney report suggested that the US 
government was questioning whether it was legal for Australia to continue trials, 
given that the FEC had stated that the prosecutions should end in 1949.
28 Veterans 
were said to be disappointed that Australia’s reputation was in danger because 
alleged Japanese war criminals had been held for over three years without trial.
29 
One veterans’ association, the Council of the 8
th Division, claimed that to leave 
people in such an uncertain state for so long was almost a war crime in itself.
30 
Such comment shows that the issue of war criminals was recognised as a complex 
one; it was not simply a matter of the public opposing leniency towards the 
Japanese. By 1950 there was also pressure on the government to conduct the trials 
fairly and to be seen internationally to be doing so.   
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Matters relating to war criminals were always closely entwined with public 
concern for the well-being of returned POWs. In 1950, returned Australian 
prisoners were still experiencing problems reintegrating into society.
31 During the 
lead-up to the Manus trials, the press began to report on how ex-POWs were 
recovering from their time in captivity; this coverage added a further layer of 
complexity to the planning for Manus. In January 1950 the Australian Repatriation 
Department began calling up ex-POWs to undergo complete health checks. In 
reporting on this, the press drew attention to the fact that former POWs were still 
dealing with health issues from the war.
32 Indeed, during this period, returned 
servicemen’s organisations appear to have been making a conscious effort to give 
full play to the harshness of conditions under the Japanese, as a reminder to the 
general public of the great sacrifices that had been made.
33  
   The government was sensitive to press reaction to matters associated with 
war criminals. Official sources make clear that the government closely followed 
reports on the Manus Island trials and related issues; it even took positive action 
on occasion to try to lessen potential press reaction. In June 1950, Japanese Bishop 
Michael Yashiro, presiding Bishop of the Anglican Church of Japan, visited 
Australia. The purpose of the visit from Yashiro’s point of view was to promote 
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reconciliation between Australia and Japan. He was also attempting to gain 
support, presumably from the government or from the Anglican Church in 
Australia, for a campaign to Christianise Japan, a campaign that accorded with 
MacArthur’s own wishes.
34 Many Australians were indignant at his proposed visit, 
a reaction that bemused Anglicans in Japan, and it was evident from an early point 
in the planning that Yashiro’s visit would be controversial. He had travelled 
outside occupied Japan before, to attend the Anglican Church’s Lambeth 
Conference in England in May 1948. Although he was on a SCAP list of approved 
travellers, the Australian government, however, had not previously allowed him to 
visit Australia.
35 Government correspondence concerning the forthcoming visit 
underlines the official sensitivity to public opinion on war criminals. A letter from 
the Prime Minister’s Department to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo in March 
1950 states: 
Press and Radio have already given some prominence of forthcoming visit 
to Australia including report that Bishop will seek reduction on sentence of 
convicted Japanese War Criminals. Please point out to Bishop Yashiro 
importance of refraining from any remarks that may be taken in Australia 
as focal point for public controversy. He should be under no illusions of 
delicate nature of situation likely to meet him here and the care which he 
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will have to exercise over his actions before arriving and while in 
Australia.
36 
In June 1950, the Canberra Times summarised the opinions of various 
veterans’ organisations in Canberra about Bishop Yashiro’s visit. Although one 
group pointed out that Japan had been Australia’s ally in World War One and that 
a man should not be judged solely on the actions of his countrymen, most 
associations viewed the visit as hypocritical and poorly timed, given that the 
Manus trials were beginning, and generally protested at the visit.
37 On the other 
hand it was reported that BCOF soldiers in Japan held the Bishop in very high 
regard, even helping to pay for his travel to the Lambeth conference, and that the 
Bishop himself had been persecuted by the Japanese wartime regime.
38 The visit 
passed without major incident, although the Bishop was guarded by Australian 
police officers at certain times.
39   
 
Reaction in Japan  
In 1949 and 1950, the ‘Reverse Course’ was underway and Japan was moving 
towards a new role in Asia aligned with the US against Communism. Some 
Japanese war crimes suspects, however, had only just been released and further 
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Australian trials were still in prospect. At the beginning of January 1950, SCAP 
had released prisoners from Sugamo who had been arrested at Australia’s request 
but had faced a long period without trial and were not on the Australian list of 
suspects for the Manus tribunals. Meanwhile, convicted war criminals were still 
incarcerated in Manila amongst other places overseas, in the custody of the 
Philippines, the UK and Australia, and Australia was still holding untried suspects 
in various places outside Japan who eventually ended up in the Manus trials. Thus, 
while peace had become the prime goal for Japan, and reform of Japanese 
institutions had halted under the ‘Reverse Course’, many former soldiers still 
faced retribution. Meanwhile, SCAP began to develop a parole system at Sugamo 
Prison around the same time that the Manus Island trials were being initiated, a 
move which probably reinforced the sense that Australia, in preparing for a whole 
new set of trials, was a long way behind other countries.
40  
 In these circumstances, the Manus trials caused a wave of uncertainty in 
Japan, even though the number of trials was relatively small. The Australian 
government planned to try around 150 suspects, some of whom remained in 
Sugamo awaiting transfer to Manus Island, with the agreement of SCAP. There 
were, however, other suspects still at large and on 28 January 1950 SCAP 
announced that it had ordered the Japanese government to arrest forty-three new 
suspects, making it clear that this action was a response to the request of the 
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Australian government and that the men were to be tried on Manus Island.
41 This 
public announcement distanced SCAP both from the decision to arrest the 
suspects, laid squarely at the feet of the Australian government, and from the 
process of arresting them, which was to be the responsibility of the Japanese 
police. In Australia, the press reported that a great new ‘man hunt’ for war 
criminals was taking place with the backing of General MacArthur.
42 One 
newspaper claimed, however, that the Japanese police were refusing to assist in 
the pursuit of suspects and that many wanted men had gone ‘underground’.
43 
Australian officials also seem initially to have feared that suspects would go into 
hiding, but the government came to believe that, in reality, few suspects were 
avoiding apprehension.
44 
The very public announcement that there would be new arrests and trials 
must also have contributed to the growing unease and shock amongst the seven 
million demobilised soldiers in Japan and their families. As a consequence of the 
uncertainty and anguish over the continued pursuit of war criminals, the 
Australian Embassy in Tokyo was overwhelmed with petitions and pleas for 
leniency from Japanese families, individuals and organisations. Petitions often 
attested to the character of individual prisoners, claiming that the prisoner in 
question was a good human being and an important member of his community. 
Some petitions took up the cause of family members who had only recently been 
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arrested in Japan and sent to Manus Island to await trial. The wife of Nonaka 
Masaichi wrote that her husband was the only support for her family. He had 
returned to Japan from the war with no money, then was purged by the Occupation 
and forced into ‘a miserable line of work’, though the nature of the work is left 
unexplained. Nonaka Hanako claimed that her husband was gentle and timid and 
that he had been forced to fight the war. Since the end of the war she had adjusted 
to life with her husband again.
45 This petition highlights the fact that the Manus 
trials were convened at such a late date, and that new suspects were detached from 
their communities in Japan a long time after the cessation of hostilities. The 
petition for the release of Nakaya Morie, signed by over 1,000 members of the Ni-
O Village Women’s Society, outlined the impact that removing him from his 
family would have.
46 It was said that Nakaya had a family of six, with only his 
wife able to provide a small income for them in his absence. They had no property 
and no other way of acquiring funds. This petition was typical in attesting to the 
suspect’s good character and stature in his community, while also asserting that 
his removal from the community would have severe consequences for his 
dependants.  
  Such petitions to the Australian government, usually sent through the 
Embassy in Tokyo, portray the Japanese suspects and convicted criminals in a far 
different light from the way they were depicted in the Australian press. Though 
they were seen as evil symbols of militarism in Australia, most Japanese suspects 
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were ordinary men with families. They were part of a community and, if the 
petitions from their families and villages are accurate, they exhibited normal levels 
of humanity and compassion whilst in their home country. This is not to deny that 
most of these soldiers had committed cruel crimes against POWs and local 
civilians; there is overwhelming evidence that atrocities were committed. It is 
clear, however, that the trials were viewed differently in each country. What was 
seen as a just trial of a suspected war criminal in Australia could easily be 
perceived in Japan as an exercise in revenge against a community member who 
had been forced into desperate circumstances. This clash of views was most 
marked in the context of the Manus trials. Though individual pleas for leniency for 
family members had been received since the beginning of the trials, organised 
Japanese action on behalf of BC war criminals did not occur immediately after the 
surrender.
47 By the time of the final prosecutions, however, the Japanese public 
was more active on behalf of suspects. Moreover, the Manus trials came after 
repatriates, including former soldiers and war crimes suspects, had returned to life 
in Japan, and thus the sense of injustice and dislocation from post-war peace was 
much stronger.  
  On behalf of the Nationwide Repatriates Convention, Konishi Kyosuke 
petitioned the Australian Embassy in February 1950: 
According to a newspaper report, it was, in the month of January this 
revealed [sic] that Japanese war criminal suspects concerned with your 
                                                 
47 Sandra Wilson, ‘Prisoners in Sugamo and Their Campaign for Release, 1952-
1953’, Japanese Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, September 2001, pp. 171-173. 205 
 
country would be arrested. This caused a keen interest among Japanese 
people. If such things would come to take shape, we cannot help worrying 
about the fact that, not only Japanese people but the public opinions of 
whole world would become apt to entertain a doubt on fairness and 
generosity by your country up to here. We are firmly convinced in that 
[sic] your country would take lenient steps on this matter, while today in 
all other Allied powers Japanese war criminals have been sent back to 
Japan to serve their sentences. By god we hope that newspaper reports 
were in error.
48 
It is clear from this letter that the repatriates who took part in the convention had 
been shaken by the prospect that their partially rebuilt lives could be uprooted yet 
again. The letter mentions the concepts of both justice and generosity, indicating 
that repatriated soldiers clearly felt there was something morally wrong with 
holding trials at such a late date, but also that they wished to beg the Australian 
government to leave them to get on with their lives. Konishi’s letter also shows 
that the repatriates recognised Australia’s action on war criminals as separate from 
that of the US and other Allies.  
Questions about Australia’s extension of war crimes proceedings, usually 
carefully phrased, came from diverse sources. The Australian Embassy in Tokyo 
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received a call, for example, from an Archbishop in the Vatican on behalf of 
petitions sent to him. Apparently the Vatican had been discussing war crimes trials 
in general and the archbishop felt the need to ask the Australian government to be 
more selective and lenient in choosing the cases that went to trial. The Archbishop 
made it clear that he was acting on his own initiative but that the Vatican had 
raised the issue of war criminals.
49  
Although policy on war crimes trials was decided at the highest levels of 
government, it really was an issue that concerned ordinary people. The matter of 
war criminals was still topical in both Australia and Japan in 1950, which was not 
the case in many other countries. In the main the Australian people seemed to wish 
to remain vigilant, whilst the Japanese people, or at least the families of former 
soldiers, seemed despairing and exhausted in the face of the continuation of 
Australia’s trial program. Decisions made by the Australian government on further 
trials directly concerned only a small number of people. Yet the ramifications 
would in some ways affect millions. As Konishi Kyosuke’s petition shows, 
although only a few Japanese suspects would be prosecuted on Manus Island, no-
one knew who might be arrested and the trials unsettled all of those who had 
fought overseas. On the other hand, although there must have been suspicion in 
Australia that not all war criminals had been prosecuted, the extra trials at Manus 
would prove sufficient to settle the issue, more or less, for thousands of returned 
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servicemen and their families. The effects of the Manus trials were thus far-
reaching.  
 Despite the dramatic political and diplomatic changes of the late 1940s, 
plans to continue Australian trials survived, indicating their perceived importance 
to the Australian people and resilience in the face of the wider goals for the region 
expressed by the Australian and US governments. The Australian government 
expected Japan to take part in new regional arrangements but still wanted to deal 
cautiously with Japan. The government was engaged in discussions with the US 
about South East Asian security, as Australia pushed for a regional security 
arrangement, partly to insure against any further threat from Japan.
50 The ongoing 
salience of war crimes trials in Australian foreign policy underlines the point that 
the significance of the prosecutions extends beyond the question of whether they 
were ‘fair’ or not. The continued pursuit of war criminals shows how resilient 
Australian anger towards Japan was, at both the government and popular level, 
and how unwilling the government was to abandon wartime concerns. 
 
The Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and ANZUS  
The timing of the Manus proceedings was awkward for Australian diplomats and 
for US officials in Japan. As the prosecutions progressed into 1951, new 
developments in Japan and Asia began to shape Australia’s foreign policy agenda. 
Peace with Japan was imminent: Australia’s trials ended on 9 April 1951, just five 
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months before the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 Septermber. 
Australia also signed the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty 
(ANZUS) on 1 September 1951 and the US signed a separate security treaty with 
Japan on 8 September. The time for war crimes trials had passed.  
When the Coalition entered office at the beginning of 1950, it faced the 
difficult tasks of both continuing to deal with Australia’s most recent enemy in the 
Pacific and helping to find a way to protect the Pacific from the potential threat of 
Communism. Six months after the new government took office, the onset of the 
Korean War made the Communist threat more visible than ever. The war began on 
25 June 1950 and ended on 27 July 1953, a period that coincided with Australia’s 
resumption of war crimes trials, their conclusion, and then the repatriation 
negotiations between Australia and Japan. Communist forces on the side of North 
Korea, including the Soviet Union, were ranged against a United Nations coalition 
of the US and sixteen other nations including South Korea, Australia and Japan, 
though the Japanese personnel were in non-combat roles.
51 The Korean War 
appeared to signal the start of the conflict between democracy and Communism in 
Asia for which US policy had been preparing since at least the beginning of the 
Reverse Course in Japan. The war heavily influenced US security policy for the 
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region in the 1950s, contributing strongly to the decision to sign security treaties 
with Asian and Pacific nations, including Australia.
52  
Australian policy on Japan was slow to change, and, as we will see in the 
next chapter, did not undergo a significant shift until 1954, after the war in Korea 
had ended. Nonetheless, the Korean War had an impact on the BC war crimes 
trials. The conflict strengthened the official US conviction that Japan was now an 
important ally, and concerns about a resurgent Japanese militarism faded even 
further. The contrast between US and Australian policy thus became very clear in 
this period. In June 1950, Australia committed troops to the Korean War in order 
to combat Communism and support the US. Just two months previously, however, 
the government had commenced a new set of war crimes prosecutions of 
defendants from a nation that was now an important ally in the new conflict in 
Asia.  
Australia’s political attitude to Japan in the late 1940s and in 1950 was 
more or less bipartisan, with the foreign policy agenda of the new Coalition 
government closely aligned to the core goals that the Labor Party had pursued 
during its time in power.
53 Percy Spender became the new Minister for External 
Affairs after the 1949 election and although he was aware that his predecessor had 
had some success in negotiating with the US over bolstering Pacific security to 
guard against the possible resurgence of Japan, he also acknowledged that the 
diplomatic landscape had changed. Spender in fact privately agreed with US 
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assessments that the growing Communist influence in Asia had emerged as a 
greater threat than Japanese militarism, especially later in his tenure as the Korean 
War began.
54 On the official level, however, US and Australian evaluations of 
Japan’s place in Pacific security were now at odds. 
The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on 8 September 1951, brought the 
Occupation of Japan to a close when it took effect on 28 April 1952. Japan and the 
US also signed the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan on the 
same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
55 The peace treaty turned out to be 
more lenient than Australian officials could have envisaged early in the 
Occupation. It included a key provision on war criminals that will be discussed in 
the next chapter, but the issue that most vexed the negotiations over the agreement 
was a completely separate one: the question of Japanese rearmament. According 
to the dominant Western democratic viewpoint, Japan needed to be able to 
contribute to its own defence in order to ensure the stability of the Pacific.
56 The 
treaty-writers thus chose not to outlaw rearmament, and actually allowed for a 
certain degree of rearmament through the creation of the National Police Reserve, 
a force that was in practice a military organisation, or at least a police organisation 
armed with military hardware including tanks and fighter aircraft.
57 The US 
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government envisaged that Japanese rearmament would both help to defend the 
country against the Communist threat and ease the burden on the US forces which 
were to remain in Japan after the Occupation under the terms of the security treaty. 
The 1951-1952 stance was one that conformed with US policy for all its allies, 
which emphasised that they should do their utmost to contribute to their own 
defence.
58   
For the Australian government, Japanese rearmament was the chief 
sticking-point in the peace treaty. As we have seen, long-standing caution towards 
Japan initially made it difficult for Australian officials to accept that the rise of 
Communism was significant enough to alter Japan’s status to that of a close and 
trusted ally. This stance weakened over time, however. Remnants of older 
attitudes remained important, but increasingly, the government did come to 
believe that Communism posed a significant danger in Asia, that the potential 
threat from Japan had greatly diminished, and that it was in Australia’s interest to 
cultivate better ties with Asian countries, including Japan.
59 Moreover, given the 
realities of power politics, the government ultimately had no choice but to ‘carry 
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out Australian Pacific policies as far as possible in co-operation with’ the United 
States.
60 For these reasons, the Australian government eventually agreed to a 
peace settlement with Japan that it had initially criticised, and which seemed to 
allow for the much-feared Japanese rearmament. 
  There was one major safeguard. During the period of heightened tensions 
in Korea and discussions about the peace treaty, the Australian government 
successfully negotiated a new treaty with the US government, the Australia, New 
Zealand and United States Security Treaty.
61 More than anything else, ANZUS 
was a compromise among US, New Zealand and Australian officials. It was not 
specific about military commitments, but in general terms it guaranteed 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s security in the Pacific, a matter of concern for all 
three post-war governments. ANZUS formally acknowledged that the US would 
stay involved in Pacific security.
62 The new treaty provided the Australian 
government with peace of mind about security issues and, in conjunction with the 
reluctant acceptance that policy for Japan must change, made the Japanese peace 
settlement far more palatable. Rosecrance has suggested that at the beginning of 
the Occupation, the Australian government sought ‘direct’ control of its security 
by maintaining support for a harsh and restrictive peace with Japan. In the end, he 
contends, Australia gained security ‘indirectly’ through ANZUS, and with the 
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signing of the peace treaty in 1951, Japan was included within the Western 
democratic fold.
63      
  The international context discussed above developed gradually during the 
planning for the Manus trials and the operation of the tribunals. Throughout the 
whole period, however, the diplomatic climate always appeared to be shifting 
towards better relations between Japan and the former wartime Allies. Thus it was 
necessary to complete the Manus prosecutions in a timely manner. 
 
The New Prosecutions 
In all, twenty-six trials were held on Manus, making it the second-largest 
Australian venue after Rabaul in terms of cases heard. Like the earlier Australian 
trials, the Manus prosecutions covered a diverse set of crimes and produced a wide 
range of verdicts. One hundred and thirteen defendants were tried, with sixty-nine 
found guilty of one or more charges and five executed.
64 As will be seen later in 
this chapter, the number of death sentences handed down in the courts was higher, 
but a significant number were commuted. The trial process itself did not change 
greatly between the first Australian prosecutions in November 1945 and those on 
Manus Island, and the Manus trials largely exhibit the same flaws and limitations 
as their early counterparts. The rules of evidence remained the same, Japanese 
legal personnel were still under severe time pressure and the JAG was critical of a 
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number of the trials. There were some differences from the previous trials, 
however. As mentioned earlier, the Manus Island trials mainly focused on crimes 
against Australians, whereas in previous cases a number of defendants had been 
prosecuted for crimes against local civilians in Japanese-occupied areas. Another 
change was that as the Manus trials wore on, the new Coalition government 
became increasingly involved in the process of confirming sentences, whereas in 
the past, sentences had been confirmed solely by a military ‘confirming officer’.  
The Manus prosecutions reaffirmed Australia’s image as a nation that was 
tough on Japanese militarism and active in shaping the future of Japan, an image 
that both the Labor and the Coalition governments promoted. The new tribunals 
were designed to achieve the same political outcome as their earlier counterparts: 
a relatively efficient pursuit of Japanese militarism that satisfied political and 
electoral sentiment in Australia. After Manus, as we will see in the next chapter, 
the Australian government remained wary of the Japanese but increasingly felt the 
need to soften its stance on war criminals, either due to diplomatic pressure from 
Japan or to the clearer recognition that Japan had become a political ally of 
democratic nations. The Manus trials, in fact, are one of the last issues through 
which the Australian government pursued its uncompromising stance on Japanese 
militarism. 
There was a wealth of legal expertise available to the Manus trials. Justice 
Kenneth Townley from Queensland was appointed as president of the court, while 
W. B. Simpson remained the Judge Advocate General in Australia. The quality of 215 
 
defence for the Japanese on trial was arguably higher at Manus than at any other 
Australian venue. For a start, the defence personnel were all Japanese, an 
advantage in overcoming the language barrier, at least between lawyer and 
defendant, that had been an obstacle at other trial venues, where few Japanese 
defence personnel had been used. Also, defence personnel appear to have had a 
good knowledge of the rules and customs by which the court operated, judging 
from the trial records. Correspondence between Townley and the government 
indicates that by this point the experience of Australian personnel had also led to a 
better understanding on their part of the trial process. For example, Townley, 
anticipating that the trials might take far longer to complete than was first thought, 
wrote to the government with a list of recommendations for speeding them up. His 
suggestions were mainly about procedure; he recommended, for instance, that the 
sequence of trials should be arranged so that Japanese defence personnel would 
not have to appear in consecutive trials, a situation that in the past had often led to 
requests for an adjournment to allow defence personnel to prepare for a case.
65  
Despite their expertise, the Japanese defence teams still faced significant 
challenges. Australian authorities were under pressure to complete the trials 
promptly. Twenty-six trials in twelve months seems a fairly moderate burden on 
trial personnel: it is comparable to the schedule at Singapore and Hong Kong, 
though far less efficient than the progress made at Morotai, Labuan and Rabaul. 
There was a sense of haste at Manus, however, and the Japanese defence teams 
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clearly began to feel the pressure. Time constraints are evident in the trial records, 
on both sides of the courtroom.  
The Ito Hiroshi trial provides an example of the severe pressure on 
Japanese defence lawyers. Between 18 January and 8 March 1951, Ito and Fifteen 
Others were prosecuted for executing prisoners in February 1942 near Babaoe in 
the Netherlands Indies. On 18 January, the first morning of the trial, the defence 
counsel, Sakai Yusuke, asked for an adjournment:  
[I]…wish to ask the court for an adjournment of this case after the case for 
the prosecution until 0830 hours January 31
st because I have not had 
sufficient time to prepare for this case on [sic] the following reasons: that 
since 8
th August 1950 for about 160 days I have been busy with other cases 
and had no time to see Ito and the 15 others of this case.
66 
Sakai then outlined the other cases on which he had worked, including some with 
large numbers of accused. He mentioned that he had become ill and had not had 
the opportunity to see Ito and the others until the previous day. The courts appear 
to have acknowledged the time pressures on the Japanese lawyers, and granted 
short adjournments where possible. In this instance, an adjournment was granted 
after the case for the prosecution had been heard, on 19 January, with the trial 
resuming on 31 January. For a lawyer under the strain that Sakai was 
experiencing, a short adjournment would have been welcome, but would hardly 
have been sufficient for him to operate at his best in court.  
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While using Japanese defence personnel removed the language barrier 
between defendants and lawyers, language issues still presented difficulties, as 
they had done throughout the trials. Often, the defence lawyers requested 
clarification or asked for the prosecution to speak more slowly as they had a hard 
time understanding the Australian lawyers.
67 It is obvious from the trial records 
that accused Japanese soldiers as well as the lawyers had great difficulty in 
understanding the courtroom proceedings on occasion. Time pressure also meant 
that large trials were again a feature, including for crimes of a very serious nature, 
and the Manus tribunals attracted the same criticisms from the Judge Advocate 
General on this point as had earlier proceedings. Large trials contributed to legal 
confusion, and right up until the end of the Manus hearings, the JAG reviews 
reveal dissatisfaction about this. It appears that Australian authorities either could 
not come up with a better way to try the numerous suspects in a timely manner, or 
did not agree with the JAG’s previous criticisms of large trials. After the trial of 
Ito Hiroshi and Fifteen Others the JAG wrote: 
I have previously had cause to comment unfavourably on the practice of 
trying a large number of Japanese together. This is another case where 
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Justice could be more readily have been done [sic] had the present accused 
been tried individually or in small numbers.
68 
The JAG saw fit to deal with this matter first and foremost in his report on the 
trial, even before the key factual and procedural matters, though he did not expand 
further on the consequences that the large number of accused may have had.  
In the records of this case the confusion highlighted by the JAG is 
immediately clear.
69 The evidence of the sixteen defendants appears contradictory 
at times. Some evidence was judged by the court as unlikely to be true when 
weighed against other evidence from similarly credentialled witnesses or 
defendants, but such assessments do not seem to rely on clear evaluation of each 
piece of evidence, or at least there appears to be insufficient evaluation of the 
evidence in the trial records at some points. There were also complex and 
confusing procedural issues. One particularly confusing aspect of the defence was 
the legal issue of duplicity.
70 Duplicity refers to a situation in which a defendant is 
accused of committing two different crimes under the one charge. A defendant can 
be charged with multiple offences, but normally, each offence should constitute 
only one count. If multiple offences were allowed under the one charge not only 
would it be confusing for the court, but it would also be very hard for the court to 
                                                 
68 Judge Advocate General (hereafter JAG), ‘Review of Ito Hiroshi and 15 Others 
Case – Letter for Adjutant General Army Headquarters’, 4/5/51, NAA, Canberra, 
A471, 720988. 
69 Case of Ito Hiroshi and 15 Others, ‘Trial Proceedings – Sheets 39-43’, 19/1/51, 
NAA, Canberra, A471, 720988. 
70 Ito Hiroshi Case for the Defence, ‘Trial Proceedings – Sheet 37’, 19/1/51, NAA, 
Canberra, A471, 720988. 219 
 
assess guilt for the separate crimes involved, and to sentence the defendant 
accordingly. In this case, the defence alleged that multiple offences were 
contained in just two counts.
71 The transcript in the trial records, which contains 
many pages of evidence presented to the court, covers only briefly the allegation 
that the trial was ‘bad’ because of duplicity. The Japanese lawyer appeared to 
struggle to make his point to the court at first, but eventually when it was clear that 
the lawyer was alleging duplicity, the court briefly consulted the prosecution and 
after an adjournment of two hours, decided that the case was not ‘bad’ because of 
duplicity, without elaborating further to the Japanese lawyer.
72 Overall the case 
record is lengthy and confusing, and lacks detail and clarification at points where 
they appear very necessary. 
Given the time constraints it seems that the only way to avoid large cases 
such as Ito and Fifteen Others would have been to release some of the prisoners 
and cancel trials. Such a course of action was unlikely to be palatable to Australian 
officials. Cramming as many defendants and as much evidence as possible into 
each trial, however, brought serious consequences. The results were highlighted 
best in the JAG’s review of the trial of Rear Admiral Tanaka Kikumatsu and 
Fourteen Others of the Imperial Japanese Navy, one of the last of the BC trials. 
The defendants were charged with murdering four Australian prisoners of war at 
Surabaya in Java in April 1945. In all, one defendant was sentenced to death and 
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had that sentence confirmed, one had a death sentence commuted, one received 
seven years, commuted to five, and two received five years, commuted to three.  
The other ten to face trial were found not guilty. The JAG commented that the 
volume of information presented to the court in these large trials could be 
overwhelming.  
In my opinion to try all of these accused at one time was most 
unsatisfactory. The transcript exceeds 1000 pages and the exhibits number 
193 and approximate 1000 pages. The evidence was most voluminous 
therefore and is most contradictory and confusing. I have found it very 
difficult to follow the evidence and it seems to me the court would have 
been in an equally difficult position.
73 
Even without the huge volume of evidence it would have been a difficult 
case. Tanaka and Captain Shinohara Tameo were both sentenced to death, but 
Tanaka’s sentence was commuted, though Shinohara’s was not. Shinohara, who 
was Tanaka’s staff officer, had admitted to drafting a written order for a prisoner 
to be executed, but he also claimed that he had done so because he received an 
order to do so from higher up, presumably from Tanaka. It is not clear if this 
written order was presented to the court. Tanaka admitted in evidence that he had 
given orders to a junior officer, Lt Yoshimoto Katsuki, who was also on trial in 
this case, for Australians to be executed. Tanaka maintained, however, that he 
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himself had received orders in writing to execute prisoners from a higher-ranking 
officer, Vice-Admiral Shibata Yaichiro, who was found not guilty in this same 
trial.
74 In this case, the JAG apparently accepted Tanaka’s claim that he acted 
under orders, even though the only man senior to him in the trial was found not 
guilty, and it appears that the JAG’s position may have deterred the confirming 
officer from approving a death sentence for Tanaka.
75 The court at Manus had 
clearly become overwhelmed by the volume of evidence during this large trial and 
it seems obvious that without the committed efforts of the JAG, the final 
sentencing could have been much harsher. On the other hand, the JAG also 
seemed uncertain of the events examined in the trial. The final result was that the 
senior commander, Shibata, was found not guilty but probably should not have 
been, the second highest ranking defendant, Tanaka, had his death sentence 
commuted, the lieutenant in charge of the execution party, Yoshimoto, had his 
sentence commuted to five years, but the middle-ranking defendant, Shinohara, 
received no leniency and was executed. The case against Shinohara was strong 
and he appears at times to have been proactive in organising the executions, but 
there was evidence that all four officers mentioned were implicated in the 
executions so it is not clear why Shinohara was the one officer that did not receive 
leniency. 
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In many of the larger trials, not only were there multiple defendants, but 
they were being tried for different levels of involvement in each crime. A court not 
only had to assess who was involved in a crime but also what each of the accused 
had done. Very different sentences were often necessary for different defendants. 
There were large amounts of evidence to sort through and, at times, something that 
appears close to utter confusion in the court. In the JAG’s opinion the Tanaka and 
Others case again provided an example. In this instance the JAG unambiguously 
outlined what he felt was one consequence of the confusion. It is the clearest 
example at Manus that the JAG gives of a problem resulting from trying many 
Japanese at once.  
I might quote the case of Kumero Nakayama [in the Tanaka and Others 
trial], a former Seaman who was indicted on the first charge of murder. He 
was found not guilty, yet on page 327 he admitted that he had decapitated a 
Caucasian prisoner of war. 
The JAG then quotes from the evidence showing the Japanese soldier clearly 
stating, in evidence tendered to the court, that he had indeed beheaded a white 
prisoner of war. The JAG makes no further comment on the issue, but moves on to 
deal with the other facts of the case.
76 The ‘not guilty’ verdict may have been an 
oversight by the court, but if not, there was no explanation of the court’s reasoning 
sufficient to convince the JAG. This trial included a great deal of what the JAG 
referred to as contradictory evidence, which the court did attempt to assess. Often, 
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for example, discrepancies in the evidence over the number of victims of a crime 
or the date and time of the events led to lengthy attempts at clarification.
77  
The Tanaka case provides further evidence of the arbitrary nature of the 
trials on the individual level. The JAG himself recognised the limitations to the 
justice dispensed in this case: the trial was just for some and unjust for others, 
including, presumably, the defendant who was acquitted despite confessing to the 
crime. The key accused in the case were sentenced to prison terms. Some lower-
ranking Japanese escaped punishment and some higher-ranking defendants 
received moderate sentences, while an officer of middle rank, Captain Shinohara, 
was hanged.
78  
  At Manus, sentencing and even verdicts in cases that included the defence 
of Superior Orders were thus inconsistent, as they had been in earlier hearings. 
Apart from the Tanaka and Others case, the Manus Island trial records detail one 
other case where the defence of Superior Orders appears to have persuaded 
authorities to mitigate a sentence. In the trial of Lt Col. Sumizu Junichiro and 
Others, one of the defendants, Captain Kagiyama Kaneki, admitted to receiving an 
instruction to execute prisoners of war and to carrying out the orders in July-
August 1945 on Ambon Island, part of the Maluku Islands in the Netherlands 
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Indies.
79 In this case, the defendants went to great lengths to point out that they 
had opposed the orders. Kagiyama claimed that he had repeatedly campaigned for 
the prisoners not to be executed as he realised that the orders were not legal, and 
apparently these claims could be supported, though it is not entirely clear how.
80 
The JAG recommended that death sentences not be imposed.
81 The differences 
among trials were often very slight; although trial records do not specify why one 
sentence was confirmed and another was not, it seems that in this case Kagiyama’s 
proven representations to his superior officer on behalf of the prisoners saved him, 
while others claiming Superior Orders in other trials were not deemed to have 
done enough on behalf of the victims. The accused were from all ranks of the 
Japanese military, but this consideration would seem to favour soldiers of higher 
rank, with experience in dealing with senior officers and readier access to those 
officers.  
The Manus trials were diverse, and not always as complex as in the above 
cases. Some prosecutions were fairly straightforward. In the trial of Tsuaki 
Takahiko and Two Others, there is little doubt that Tsuaki was guilty and deserved 
a harsh sentence. Tsuaki had been a sailor on a minesweeper, that is, a small naval 
vessel usually confined to coastal operations, that was sunk on 2 February 1942 by 
an Allied mine in Ambon Bay, an area of Ambon Island. Although many of his 
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colleagues died in the incident, Tsuaki survived. He later took part in the 
execution of surrendered Australian soldiers near Laha airfield on Ambon on or 
around 14 February 1942, and for this he was sentenced to death and hanged.
82 
The transcript of his trial reveals that some Japanese military personnel had 
considered executions to be an intriguing novelty. When Tsuaki asked to ‘try out’ 
executing a prisoner, he was told by a superior that ‘anyone that wants to try it can 
do so’.
83 Apart from novelty, the motivation for Tsuaki appears to have been 
revenge. The transcripts describe Japanese soldiers calling the names of their 
fallen comrades during the executions. In this case there also appears to have been 
a group of interested onlookers.
84 The incident is confronting in that it portrays the 
bold and blatant use by some soldiers of unlawful executions as a way of gaining 
revenge for the deaths of friends, and demonstrates that for some, executions were 
fascinating. The Tsuaki Takahiko case seems to be an example of a just and 
necessary war crimes trial but also a clearly functioning one, free of confusion. 
There is no doubt that the execution of surrendered Australian prisoners without 
trial deserved punishment, and that the guilty verdict in this case was justified. The 
events of the Tsuaki case appear to be clear and indeed brutal. The case is even 
more compelling given that Tsuaki remained brazen and unrepentant throughout 
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his trial. Tsuaki’s case was also short and easy to follow. Hence, the evidence 
against him was clear to the court.  
  As with the earlier trials, the Manus cases continued to catalogue not only 
Japanese military conduct but also the strained racial dynamics among the soldiers 
of the Pacific War. The tribunals show the disastrous consequences of each side’s 
contempt for the enemy. As Dower suggests, conditions in the Pacific War were 
out of the ordinary: ‘a race war’ developed and the fighting was particularly 
brutal.
85 The Manus trials, like the earlier prosecutions, showed how this ferocious 
clash of cultures and of mentally strained men had played out at times in prison 
camps around South East Asia. When Tsuaki’s case is placed next to a trial such 
as Katayama Hideo’s, described in Chapter Two, it is easy to see the diversity of 
the alleged war criminals and of the situations in which they found themselves. 
Tsuaki was vicious and remained unrepentant, while Katayama and the other 
defendants in his trial appear to have been caught in a situation beyond their 
practical control. The BC trials have been considered a catalogue of Japanese 
brutality but it should be acknowledged that Japanese misdeeds took many forms, 
from brazen and unjustified violence to unwilling participation in illegal acts.  
  One of the more unusual crimes tried at Manus was that of Surgeon-
Captain Nakamura Hirosato and Others, in Soerabaja (now Surabaya) in the 
Netherlands Indies, in which two men were sentenced to three and four years in 
prison respectively for killing fifteen natives on Lombok Island around April 
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1945.
86 The Indonesians had been condemned to death by a Japanese military 
tribunal, a verdict that the defence and the prosecution during the war crimes trial 
agreed was legitimate, although not all the details of the Japanese tribunal are 
clear in the BC court record. After the local inhabitants were condemned, 
Nakamura began inoculating them with experimental toxins.
87 Nakamura was 
found guilty at Manus of unlawful killing and sentenced to four years, 
imprisonment. He was unusually creative in his petitions against the verdict, 
alleging first that ‘unlawful killing’ was not covered by the War Crimes Act. 
According to the JAG, however, this claim was unfounded.
88 Nakamura also 
petitioned that his case was selective, in that his crimes were not committed 
against Australian soldiers and that in February 1950, Australian authorities had 
stated that only crimes against Australians would now be pursued.
89 He further 
claimed that the charge of unlawful killing was added to the prosecution at short 
notice and that the defence had not had sufficient time to prepare for it. The JAG 
rejected these points in their entirety, and gave his view that the guilty verdict for 
unlawful killing was legal, judging that although the Australian government had 
wished to pursue only crimes against Australians, the courts still had jurisdiction 
in this case.  
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  The Australian press naturally covered the Manus prosecutions, though 
not in as great detail as the initial trials. The Sydney Morning Herald commented 
on 1 June 1951 after the last of the trials: 
During the hearing of the 26 cases two facts stood out in bold relief. One 
was the inflexible discipline of the Japanese Military code. The other was 
the cool courage of the young Australian soldiers and airmen faced with 
execution.
90 
The references to fanatical behaviour amongst the Japanese soldiers and to 
magnificent character amongst Australian soldiers recall the reporting of earlier 
years. 
 
The End of the Manus Trials  
The Manus Island trials ended in April 1951, with fourteen death sentences 
(covering thirteen individuals) handed down by the courts and awaiting 
confirmation.
91 Immediately, representations to the highest levels of politics in 
Australia were made from Japan, asking for the death sentences to be commuted. 
Asai Kenkyo, a Buddhist priest and part of the Japanese defence team on Manus, 
wrote the following to Prime Minister Menzies on 9 April 1951. 
Your honour, the trials of Japanese war criminals by your country have 
finished today, and all the crimes have been brought to light to be punished 
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and a warning has been given to the world so that no war crimes can be 
committed again. The aim of the military court has been fully attained. 
Asai made further appeal to the benevolence of the prime minister and the 
Australian people. 
On this memorable day of the close of the military court on Manus Island, 
I humbly petition for the mitigation of the death sentences of these poor 
persons, which I eagerly wish, would be accorded by your Honour and the 
people of your country who have good understanding and benevolence and 
lay the love of god to the heart.
92 
From Asai’s letter, it is clear that the Japanese defence counsel acknowledged the 
trials’ grander goals, or at least recognised their importance in the Australian 
government’s justification of the prosecutions. Asai not only appealed for 
benevolence, but also on the grounds of logic: the aim of the Australian 
government to make an example of Japanese militarism had been achieved. Asai’s 
petition was forwarded to and considered by Cabinet, which then rejected the call 
for commutation of the death sentences.
93 
  Overall, the Coalition government took a more hands-on approach to the 
trials than had the Labor government when it was in power. The change had come 
about after the trial of one of the first defendants at Manus, Lt General Nishimura 
Takuma, who was found guilty of illegally ordering the execution of a number of 
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Allied soldiers in Parit Sulong, Malaya, on 22 January 1942.
94 Nishimura 
petitioned against the sentence, but his death sentence was upheld by the 
confirming officer. In his case, however, the procedure for ultimately confirming 
the death sentence was unusual. Cabinet became involved in the process, for 
reasons that are not totally clear. This was a new step entirely, as Cabinet had not 
previously interfered with the confirming officer’s role. Nishimura was a very 
senior officer and Cabinet sought the opinion of a number of legal experts, aside 
from the JAG, before approving the confirmation of the death sentence. From this 
point on, Cabinet was more heavily involved; the final death sentences at Manus 
needed Cabinet approval before they were carried out. The Coalition government 
had accused Labor of handling the trials poorly, and after taking office may have 
been attempting to ensure that proceedings ran smoothly in adding another layer 
of political interference to the process. There must also have been a recognition, 
however, that these particular trials were occurring long after other governments 
had concluded theirs, and therefore needed careful handling.  
In the end, the sentences of eight of the thirteen criminals condemned to 
death were commuted to life imprisonment or even lesser terms, and only five 
prisoners were executed at Manus. Five facing death had their sentences 
commuted in one single case, that of Ito and Fifteen Others, described above.
95 
Government interference in the confirmation of sentences invites speculation that 
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the decision to show leniency was politically motivated. Official records show, 
however, that Cabinet was initially prepared to approve the confirmation of death 
sentences, pending the full review of cases by the JAG.
96 The JAG did advise, 
eventually, that a number of death sentences should be commuted and the 
confirming authority, technically still Adjutant-General Anderson, but with 
Cabinet also heavily involved in the process, followed the JAG’s advice. It is 
unlikely that any petitions had a role in the commuting of the death sentences, 
given the initial stance of the Cabinet and the general refusal of anyone involved 
with the prosecutions to be persuaded by the petitions for clemency from Japan or 
elsewhere.
97  
  The retrospective view of the Manus Island trials is significantly altered by 
the commutation of nine death sentences to prison terms. Had twenty-six cases 
produced fourteen confirmed death sentences, so long after the war had ended and 
so near the peace treaty, the trials might have been considered heavy-handed. 
When the JAG commented on the complex nature of the Manus trials and made 
recommendations, however, Anderson and the Cabinet appear to have listened. 
The inference is that the JAG’s recommendation is the factor that saved the 
convicted criminals’ lives. The JAG’s influence in the earlier trials was only 
sporadic, though perhaps the comparatively small sample of the Manus trials 
distorts the impression. On the other hand, Cabinet’s deliberations were much 
                                                 
96 Secretary to Cabinet, ‘Note on Cabinet Submission 1’, 28/5/51, NAA, Canberra, 
A4940, 1337410. 
97 JAG, ‘Pg. 2-12 of JAG Review of Ito Hiroshi and Fifteen Others – Letter to 
Adjutant General’, 4/5/51, NAA, Canberra, A471, 81958.   232 
 
more transparent than Sturdee’s had been as confirming officer and head of the 
army for the majority of the trials; Sturdee was never, as far as can be seen from 
official records, required to explain his decisions, whereas Cabinet was prepared 
to make a press statement on at least part of its reasoning for commuting certain 
sentences.
98 Perhaps as the context of the trials had altered and the process of 
confirming death sentences had expanded to include political figures with a strong 
grasp of this changing context, it was not as easy to pursue Japanese militarism as 
unmercifully as in the past. The question of why so many death sentences needed 
to be altered, however, has no clear answer. It would seem better for the courts to 
have delivered verdicts in the first place that were more in line with the reasonable 
sentencing suggestions of the JAG. On the other hand, the amendments suggested 
by the JAG and approved by the confirming authorities again reflect the confusion 
in the courtrooms on Manus that had made sentencing difficult in the first place.  
  The Menzies government appeared more willing to associate itself closely 
with the sentencing of Japanese war criminals than the previous government had 
been. The political climate had certainly changed from the early years of the trials, 
and more explanation and government involvement in the legal process was 
perhaps required. On 1 June 1951, the national press reported that Menzies had 
confirmed the commutation of the death sentences of seven Japanese men, and 
that the government had on the other hand confirmed the death sentences of five 
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prisoners, four on the previous day and one on the day of the announcement.
99 The 
previous Labor government had never been so closely associated with the death 
sentences, remaining content for the responsibility to fall to Lt General Sturdee, as 
confirming officer in the majority of cases. Presumably, though, Labor could have 
chosen to become involved in the confirmation process if the government had 
wished to, as the legal framework for Manus was the same as it had been for the 
previous trials.  
   The five death sentences remain a grim finish to the Australian BC trial 
proceedings. Though the government did commute the sentences in some cases, 
the decision to do so appears to have been based on legal advice rather than 
goodwill or political pressure. The US executed its last seven prisoners in Japan in 
early 1950, though they had been sentenced in 1948. Thus the Australian 
government in fact executed two fewer Japanese prisoners in the 1950s than the 
US did. The key difference is that by the time the Manus trials finished, the US 
had not sentenced a Japanese war criminal to death for three years.
100 There were 
also fourteen executions in Manila on 19 January 1951, however, so Australia was 
not alone in executing prisoners at such a late date.
101 The Manus trials revealed a 
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well functioning relationship between the JAG and the confirming authorities and 
the result of the trials, in the face of a changing political landscape in Asia, seems 
to have satisfied Australian calls for justice for war criminals. No evidence 
appears of widespread public disapproval when the trials concluded. Nevertheless, 
the 1951 death sentences constitute a marker of the endurance of the Australian 
prosecution program. 
 The trials ended in April 1951 but the fate of the surviving Japanese war 
criminals was still years from being finalised. Elsewhere, dealings with war 
criminals had moved rapidly away from convictions and executions. The parole 
system at Sugamo was functioning fully in 1951. After the end of the Australian 
trials, calls from Japan for repatriation of war criminals intensified.  In amongst 
the official documents discussing the decision not to commute death sentences at 
Manus in response to petitions from Japan are records showing that the Australian 
government was simultaneously considering US policy on parole and other forms 
of early release for war criminals in the post-treaty period. The Australian 
government opposed any suggestion that the Japanese government should be able 
to participate in the decision to grant any future form of leniency to war criminals, 
preferring to retain full control over prisoners’ futures,
102 and after the trials, the 
official Australian focus quickly shifted from convicting war criminals to working 
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out how to keep them in prison. In the next chapter I discuss the repatriation and 
eventual release of Japanese war criminals and the Australian government’s 
reluctant acceptance that its approach to diplomacy with Japan needed to move on 
from the war and to recognise Japan’s status as an ally of Western democracies in 
Asia.      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE TRIALS: 
REPATRIATION AND RELEASE OF WAR 
CRIMINALS  
 
The war crimes trials on Manus Island were the final act of the Australian 
military courts in the aftermath of the Pacific War, but there was a lengthy and 
significant postscript. The government still had to decide what to do with the 
prisoners in its custody, and the process of dealing with the convicted 
criminals lasted for six more years. During the final months of the Manus 
trials, Australian officials began to discuss creating a parole process for those 
convicted.
1 After the proceedings ended in April 1951, however, 206 prisoners 
remained in Australian custody on Manus Island and fifty in Sugamo prison. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the fifty in Sugamo had been convicted in 
courts in Singapore and Hong Kong and repatriated to Japan along with those 
convicted by the UK, while the prisoners on Manus had been transferred there 
from other Australian trial venues, or taken directly to Manus from Japan for 
the court proceedings.
2 In Japan, pressure for repatriation of those war 
criminals who remained overseas had been growing since before the Australian 
trials ended, increasing around the time the San Francisco Peace Treaty came 
into effect in April 1952. Repatriation of war criminals from other Allied 
nations had begun well before this point, in some cases years earlier. By mid-
1953, only Australia and the Philippines still held convicted war criminals 
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outside Japan. The issue of whether and when to repatriate the Manus 
prisoners to serve out their sentences in Japan had to be resolved. 
  The Dutch in Indonesia, and the Nationalist Chinese, had ceased trials 
and repatriated all convicted war criminals to Sugamo Prison in Tokyo by the 
end of 1949; the Nationalist Chinese then unconditionally released all their 
prisoners in August 1952. During 1951, at the request of officials in Borneo, 
Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, the UK had transferred all prisoners under 
British jurisdiction to Sugamo.
3 The French government repatriated prisoners 
from French Indo-China to Sugamo on 3 June 1950. Nearly all of them were 
then released by commutation of sentence on 1 June 1953,
4 and the last few 
were freed in April 1954. The US already held its prisoners in Sugamo as the 
great majority had been tried in Yokohama, and those convicted overseas had 
been transferred to Tokyo. The Philippines, which came closest to matching 
the persistence of the Australian stance on war criminals, announced the 
repatriation of all surviving convicted war criminals from Manila on 27 June 
1953; the prisoners arrived in Yokohama on 22 July. Australia, with its 200 or 
so prisoners on Manus, was thereafter the only country holding Japanese war 
criminals outside Japan. By the end of 1953, all prisoners convicted by the 
Philippines had been unconditionally released from Sugamo.
5  
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The Australian government showed close interest in the actions of other 
countries on repatriation and release of war criminals, also analysing how 
relations between Australia and Japan might be affected by Australia’s action 
or lack of action on repatriation. The willingness to take notice of such broader 
perspectives indicates an acknowledgement that Japan’s position in regional 
and international diplomacy had changed after the peace treaty. To take 
account of regional and global affairs in its deliberations may seem like a small 
concession, but this was the same government that only two years earlier had 
purposefully gone its own way when it decided to continue prosecutions on 
Manus Island. Discussions on potential repatriation, then, suggest a significant 
change in thinking about war criminals, seemingly supporting Renouf’s claim 
that the treaty created the opportunity for a new Australian policy on Japan.
6 
The negotiations over repatriating war criminals also demonstrate, however, 
that the peace treaty did not eliminate entrenched official Australian attitudes 
to Japan.  
In this chapter I examine the negotiations over the repatriation and 
eventual release of Japanese war criminals convicted by Australian courts.
7 
Discussions began in earnest in 1952, and prisoners were repatriated from 
Manus in August 1953. The last of them were released from Sugamo in June 
1957. During these years, Australia’s official position on Japan changed 
dramatically. The chapter confirms that the Australian government, though 
conscious of other governments’ policies and not wanting to be out of step 
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with its allies in a general sense, still desired to direct its own policy on war 
criminals, rather than simply following the US, UK, or any other nation. The 
repatriation of convicted war criminals was a complex issue involving inter-
departmental discussions within the government, contact with foreign 
governments and considerable public pressure from Japan and within 
Australia. There were still ill-feelings towards the Japanese in Australia 
through the early years of the 1950s, and the government remained cautious 
towards Japan during the repatriation negotiations. After 1954, however, the 
government increasingly recognised that Japan had become an ally against 
Communism and that this implied a new bilateral relationship.
8 Relations 
steadily improved and by 1956 Australia’s tough stance on war criminals had 
fully given way to efforts to encourage rapprochement with Japan. In fact, the 
balance in relations had changed so much that by 1957 Japan was showing 
confidence in its dealings with the Australian government, and appears even to 
have had the upper hand at times in negotiations on war criminals. 
The chapter also discusses the grass-roots political organisations in 
Japan and Australia that were active on issues relating to war criminals in the 
early 1950s. A nationwide petition movement arose in Japan that pressured 
both the Japanese government and other governments to return war criminals 
to Japan and then to release them. This movement demanded that the Japanese 
government make representations to the Australian government for the 
repatriation of prisoners. Meanwhile, in Australia, veterans’ organisations and 
other grass-roots bodies sent letters to the government and press calling for the 
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maintenance of a firm stance on war criminals. Despite the fact that they had 
won the war, throughout the trials the Australian people saw themselves very 
much as victims. By 1952, protection of the dignity and memory of soldiers 
who had fought in the Pacific War was already a strong motivation for 
veterans’ groups. Although their primary concern was the present and future 
wellbeing of veterans, few issues seem to have ignited their reaction as much 
as possible leniency towards Japan. Issues relating to war criminals, then, were 
a lively part of grass-roots democracy in both Australia and Japan, and 
accordingly, the Australian government faced a significant task in balancing 
domestic opinion with diplomatic pressure where repatriation and release were 
concerned.  
English-language literature on the repatriation and release of war 
criminals is even more scarce than material on the trials themselves. 
Piccigallo’s key work on the BC trials does not mention repatriation at all. By 
the same token, most of the work on Australian relations with Japan in the 
early 1950s focuses on the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the negotiations 
over ANZUS, without reference to repatriation of war criminals as a 
diplomatic issue. New research on repatriation of war criminals has begun to 
appear only very recently.
9 My chapter thus makes a significant contribution to 
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the writings on Australian policy on Japanese war criminals and on foreign 
policy in the 1950s.  
 
The Legal Framework for Repatriation 
 The San Francisco Peace Treaty dealt specifically with war criminals in 
Article 11, which stipulated that decisions on the fate of convicted criminals 
remained the prerogative of the Allied governments that had prosecuted them, 
even after full sovereignty returned to Japan. Article 11 stated: 
Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East [the Class A trials] and of other Allied War Crimes Courts 
both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed 
thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to 
grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such 
prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the 
Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each 
instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons 
sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such 
power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the 
Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation 
of Japan.
10 
Article 11 did not mention repatriation. It did, however, provide a general 
framework for returning war criminals who remained overseas to Japan, 
because it guaranteed the Allied government concerned that the convicted 
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criminals would stay under their control rather than being immediately 
released by the Japanese authorities.    
On 28 April 1952, the day the peace treaty came into effect, the 
Japanese government also promulgated Law No. 103, which stated in Article 
1: 
The purpose of this law is properly to carry out the sentences rendered 
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and other Allied 
War Crimes Courts and to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to 
parole with respect to persons upon whom sentences were imposed, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 11.
11 
The law was designed to manage prisoners’ incarceration and parole, to reward 
good behaviour through managing the remission system and to protect 
prisoners’ health by allowing for temporary release if medical attention were 
needed. As the Australian Cabinet was informed in September 1952, clemency 
for the fifty war criminals convicted by Australia and already held in Sugamo 
Prison was under Australian control according to Article 11, but Japanese law 
also applied, specifically Law No. 103. This meant that the conditions of 
imprisonment and supervision of parole were governed by Japanese law, but 
the Japanese authorities could not release the prisoners convicted by Australia 
without Australian government consent.
12 Article 11 took precedence over the 
Japanese law and protected the rights of the convicting nation.  
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Both Article 11 and Law No. 103 dealt with forms of justice that were 
notionally administrative, such as parole and remission of sentence, and 
clemency, which is usually regarded as a form of discretionary justice and as a 
political exercise.
13 When it came to BC war criminals, however, there was 
little difference in practice between administrative and discretionary justice. As 
will be discussed later, for all the convicting governments the release of war 
criminals by whatever means – parole, general amnesty or remission of 
sentence - was a political issue and the policies they put in place to manage 
sentences were as much acts of discretionary justice as they were 
administrative measures. Political influence was more obvious in some cases 
than in others.  The US, UK and to a lesser extent the Australian government 
wanted to ensure that the reduction of sentences appeared to be primarily a 
legal and administrative matter rather than a political one, but most of the 
decisions they made on war criminals were actually responses to diplomatic 
and political considerations. For example, both Australian and US parole and 
remission guidelines set out formulas for the ‘automatic’ reduction of 
sentences for war criminals after they had served a certain percentage of their 
time. These guidelines were overridden, however, by the provisions of Article 
11 which prevented any prisoner from being released without the specific 
consent of the convicting authority, and on many occasions a prisoner who 
became ‘eligible’ for parole failed to gain immediate release. Thus, the 
supposedly ‘administrative’ measure of reducing sentences after a certain 
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period of incarceration had a significant discretionary component. When the 
US and Australian governments eventually decided to speed up the release of 
war criminals in the mid-1950s, they manipulated their own  remission and 
parole systems to achieve the rate of release they desired – for instance, by 
reducing a prisoner’s sentence so that he immediately became eligible for 
parole on the basis of time served. The governments of France, the Netherlands 
and Nationalist China were more open in approaching the management of 
prisoner sentences with a political outcome in mind. In light of these factors, 
there is little to be gained by distinguishing between ‘administrative’ and 
‘discretionary’ measures; in this chapter the term ‘clemency’ is used to refer to 
all reductions of prisoner sentences, granting of parole and other acts of 
leniency.                
 All prisoners incarcerated in Sugamo during the Occupation of Japan 
had come under US jurisdiction, regardless of which country had convicted 
them. When the peace treaty came into effect, the prison was transferred to 
Japanese administration. Law No. 103 produced a framework for how those 
prisoners would be managed thereafter. It would also provide the basis for 
Japanese 'recommendations' to foreign governments for parole and other forms 
of clemency, under the provisions of Article 11. The new Japanese law devised 
mechanisms to handle these recommendations, and in doing so, set down 
guidelines on eligibility for parole, even though the Japanese authorities had no 
actual power to decide on such eligibility, which was now a matter for the 
government that had originally convicted the prisoner. In recording guidelines 
for parole, the drafters of Law No. 103 closely followed the regulations that 245 
 
SCAP had put in place in Sugamo in early 1950.
14 Presumably, the intent was 
to put pressure on foreign governments to introduce parole systems that were 
similar to SCAP's, which were relatively generous and with which Japanese 
officials were by now thoroughly familiar. The Japanese law also incorporated 
SCAP's provisions for such matters as remission for good behaviour. 
The transfer from US to Japanese control of Sugamo in April 1952 
entailed minimal disruption for existing inmates in terms of day-to-day 
operations. Regulations for the management of prisoners replicated SCAP 
rules as far as possible. Moreover, Japanese guards had been working 
alongside Americans in Sugamo during the late Occupation period.
15 Prisoners 
who had been held away from SCAP jurisdiction, however, and by extension 
outside the sort of arrangements outlined in Law No. 103, faced new 
circumstances once they were repatriated to Japan. Moreover, for all prisoners, 
even those who had been in Sugamo before the transfer to Japanese 
administration, the situation was now radically different in terms of possible 
variations to sentences. SCAP's rules for parole no longer applied to any of the 
prison's inmates. Even the Americans devised a new parole system after April 
1952, which now applied only to inmates who had been convicted in their own 
courts. All the other prosecuting governments also had the right and 
responsibility to determine variations to sentences, regardless of how long the 
prisoners under their jurisdiction had been in Sugamo. As for prisoners 
convicted in Australian courts, all war criminals on Manus Island had been 
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eligible for remission of sentence, on the basis of good behaviour, but not 
parole under the Australian War Crimes Act
16 and no parole system for war 
criminals yet existed. 
Before April 1952 the circumstances of Australian-convicted prisoners 
on Manus and in Japan were thus very different, and the differences need to be 
carefully considered when assessing the Australian government’s deliberations 
over repatriation and release of war criminals. Prisoners convicted by Australia 
and transferred to Sugamo before April 1952 were subject to SCAP law, 
whereas those on Manus were not. After the peace treaty took effect, Australia 
regained control of the war criminals in Sugamo, but they were subject to 
Japanese law as well, at least to the limited extent that was compatible with 
Article 11 of the peace treaty, while those on Manus remained under 
Australian law only. The gap between SCAP laws and practices and the 
Australian system before April 1952 was perceived as a problem during the 
government’s repatriation discussions, and even after April 1952 the 
Australian government apparently feared that Law No. 103 might somehow 
take precedence over Article 11, if prisoners were returned to Japan.  
The government recognised that its own practices in relation to parole – 
that is, to allow remission of sentence only - were harsher than SCAP’s, and 
feared that if the Australian military were to repatriate war criminals to Japan 
and thus turn them over to the jurisdiction of Law No. 103, some of them 
could apply to be released immediately, because of the different approaches to 
sentencing and parole that underlay the Japanese law. Under Law No. 103, 
time credits for remission of sentences for good behaviour were slightly more 
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generous than under Australian law. Also, in cases where a war criminal had 
received more than one sentence, the US system (which was then incorporated 
into Law No. 103) applied the sentences cumulatively, whereas the Australian 
procedure was to apply the sentences concurrently. For example, if a prisoner 
had received two ten-year sentences concurrently and was eligible for a 25% 
remission of sentence, he would have two and a half years of the ten year 
sentence deducted and be out of prison in seven and a half years. If he were 
serving consecutive ten-year sentences, the total time he would spend in prison 
according to the original sentence would be twenty years, not ten. He would 
have the same amount of time deducted from each sentence, which would 
amount to five years in total, but he would be out of prison in fifteen years, not 
seven and a half. If remission and parole were granted according to 
recommendations made on the basis of Law No. 103, the prisoners convicted 
by Australian courts would receive more liberal treatment than those convicted 
by the US.
17 
 The main issue for the Australian government, however, was that 
under Law No. 103, war criminals became eligible for consideration of parole 
after serving one-third of their sentences.
18 Moreover, eligibility for parole was 
to be calculated after good time credits had been applied. Prisoners on Manus 
were not eligible for parole. The official assessment communicated to Cabinet 
in 1952, however, was that after remission of sentence was applied, of the 
roughly 200 prisoners on Manus Island, 150 could possibly apply for parole 
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immediately upon entering Japanese jurisdiction, given the terms of Law No. 
103.
19  
The government’s anxiety on this point is puzzling. No releases could 
occur without the Australian government’s permission, under Article 11 of the 
peace treaty, so the authorities were free to impose any restrictions they 
wished, and to refuse any application for parole. The Japanese government, 
however, could recommend the prisoners for parole as soon as it considered 
them to be eligible. Probably, the Australian government did not want this 
extra pressure and was unwilling at this stage to be seen to be refusing all 
requests for parole. After prisoners convicted in Australian courts were 
transferred to Sugamo from Singapore and Hong Kong in 1951, while the 
prison was still under SCAP control, it appears that some had been released, 
under the relatively lenient US systems of remission and parole which were 
later incorporated into Law No. 103. With SCAP in control of Sugamo, the 
Australian government had not needed to grant approval for a prisoner to be 
released, unlike the situation after Article 11 took effect. In the end, it appears 
the Australian government simply refused to allow parole, as distinct from 
remission of sentence for good behaviour, until it created its own parole 
system, much later, in 1954.  
Elsewhere, as mentioned previously, war criminals had already been 
repatriated and while hundreds of prisoners remained under the control of 
foreign governments because of Article 11, most had at least been transferred 
to Japan. Australia’s reluctance to begin repatriation would further complicate 
an already complex situation. The UK, for example, had avoided certain 
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problems by transferring its prisoners in 1951. All of the prisoners sentenced 
by UK courts were already in Sugamo when Law No. 103 was passed, and 
thus were already subject to the parole terms outlined previously by SCAP, 
which were then mirrored in Law No. 103.
20 Whilst Law No. 103 made the 
transfer of prisoners held by SCAP to Japanese authorities straightforward, 
however, it actually made the Australian repatriation process more 
complicated, for the reasons outlined above. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, a public campaign on behalf of war criminals was 
gaining strength. In the early 1950s, the Japanese public was increasingly well 
informed on issues relating to war crimes.
21 Information in the press about 
prisoners still held in Manila was fairly plentiful. The Australian army, 
however, kept to a tight security policy that restricted the flow of information 
to and from Manus Island
22 and officials allowed very little reporting of 
conditions there. That said, the January 1952 edition of the Red Cross 
newspaper in Japan, Ai no Hikari (Light of Love), included a report outlining 
the conditions that prisoners faced. The article first explained the geographical 
location, terrain, and climate on Manus Island. According to the paper, most 
Japanese suspected that Manus was in Siberia, where thousands of former 
Japanese soldiers were held captive in labour camps after the Second World 
War. The article then highlighted how little Japanese people knew about the 
place where hundreds of their compatriots were being held as war criminals, 
going on to explain that the prisoners were enduring a hard life, with illness 
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common.
23 One source of information was doubtless Katayama Fumihiko, a 
convicted war criminal who returned to Japan from Manus in October 1951 
after his sentence had expired.
24  
 
The Beginning of Negotiations  
Discussions and negotiations over the return of prisoners from Manus to Japan 
were complex and cautious. The Australian government began by tracking 
international interest in the situation and also the way that its allies were 
themselves responding to Japanese government requests for repatriation. 
Meanwhile, the volume of requests and petitions for repatriation sent directly 
to the Australian authorities from within Japan steadily increased. The 
government thus had considerable external pressure to balance against possible 
domestic repercussions of a lenient approach to war criminals.  
  Although discussion between the Japanese and Australian governments 
on the matter increased after April 1952, repatriation in general was already a 
key issue for the Japanese government even before the war crimes trials had 
ended. As noted above, the Dutch and the Nationalist Chinese had repatriated 
prisoners as early as the end of 1949, and SCAP had begun to parole prisoners 
in Sugamo in 1950. From that time calls for the return of prisoners serving 
their time overseas intensified. The Australian government, however, was still 
conducting trials at that stage. During the final months of the Manus tribunals 
the government was also involved in negotiations with the US and other allies 
over the terms of the forthcoming peace with Japan, which included presenting 
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Australia’s views on drafts of Article 11. Thus, while the Manus trials 
indicated that Australia’s stance on Japan remained tough, diplomatic moves 
elsewhere were laying the broad foundations for repatriation of war criminals.  
All the same, the Australian government maintained a notable level of 
vigilance where war criminals were concerned. Although the final versions of 
Article 11 of the peace treaty left control of convicted criminals solely with the 
governments that had prosecuted them, earlier drafts of the same article had 
suggested different arrangements, including a provision for decisions to be 
shared with the Japanese government. At the suggestion of Great Britain, 
Article 11 was changed, removing Japan’s role in altering the sentences of war 
criminals and substituting only the power to ‘recommend’ clemency.
25 
Remarkably, the Australian government nevertheless still objected to the 
article, as official US documents show. This objection was surprising to the US 
government. One official commented on the Australian position in May 1951: 
Japan’s rights and powers are now reduced simply to the right to 
recommend clemency to an Allied power which convicted a war 
criminal imprisoned in Japan. It is difficult to see how Australia could 
maintain strong objection to this.
26  
The strong stance taken by the Australian government on this issue 
contrasts with the moderation of the prime minister, at least, on other matters 
concerning the peace treaty. In a conversation at the Australian Embassy in 
Washington on 28 July 1951 Menzies remarked to high-level US and Japanese 
officials, including US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and John Foster 
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Dulles, Special Envoy to Japan and negotiator of the peace treaty, that Japan 
should not be punished further in the treaty, that it should progress quickly, 
and even that its capacity to rearm should not be significantly restricted, with 
the possible exception of the capacity to build an offensive navy. Acheson 
indicated that these views coincided with those of the US. Dulles then 
suggested to the prime minister that he return to Australia via Japan to assess 
the situation there in person and mentioned to Menzies that the only opposition 
to the terms of the peace treaty from the diplomatic corps in Japan at this stage 
was coming from the Head of the Australian Mission in Japan, Colonel 
William Roy Hodgson. Menzies reassured Dulles that Hodgson’s views did 
not carry much weight with the Australian government.
27 It is unclear whether 
Menzies communicated with Hodgson in person, though he certainly did not 
visit Japan as Dulles suggested, but Australian opposition to the treaty did 
eventually recede.  
From this conversation it is clear, if the personal views of the prime 
minister are anything to go on, that on rearmament and the official Australian 
attitude to a lenient peace with Japan, diplomacy between the US and Australia 
had made up considerable ground by mid-1951. Despite the prime minister’s 
accommodating stance on these matters, however, some Australian officials 
apparently persisted in opposing even the insignificant level of power granted 
to the Japanese in Article 11. Such opposition provides evidence of the 
continuing importance of war criminals in official Australian thinking on the 
peace, a consistently underplayed theme in scholarly writing both on 
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Australian war crimes trials and on Australia’s stance on the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.   
On 7 April 1952, the Japanese government formally requested that the 
Australian government begin the repatriation of convicted war criminals held 
on Manus Island.
28 It was several weeks before the enactment of the peace 
treaty, but the Occupation was coming to a close. Further requests for 
repatriation and release were made by the Japanese government after the treaty 
came into effect, prompting the Australian government to start discussing 
repatriation in detail, even though it was clear that under the terms of the peace 
treaty, the government was under no obligation to repatriate prisoners, let alone 
release them.
29 Diplomatic and political pressure built up around the issue of 
war criminals for both Australia and the Philippines, the only countries still 
holding prisoners outside Japan after the end of the Occupation. From this 
point on, the Japanese campaign to repatriate and eventually to free BC war 
criminals increased in momentum, as Sandra Wilson has shown.
30 Repatriation 
of convicted criminals in Australian (and Filipino) custody became virtually 
inevitable.  
The Australian government became ever more conscious of the actions 
of other governments. On 20 June 1952, the Department of External Affairs 
received a letter from Foreign Affairs in Manila, stating that the Philippines 
government would now consider, case by case, whether to repatriate convicted 
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criminals.
31 Repatriation had become an important matter in Japan-Philippines 
relations around the same time that the issue emerged in Australia, and lobby 
groups within Japan applied considerable pressure on the Japanese government 
to negotiate the return of prisoners from Manila. As was the case in Australia, 
the Philippines government was aware of the changing dynamics of Japan’s 
relations with the rest of Asia after the peace treaty and the need for a new era 
of diplomatic relations to begin. Nonetheless, the process of reaching this 
conclusion had been as difficult as in Australia, with the Philippines 
government very aware in the early 1950s of high levels of resentment towards 
the Japanese domestically. On 27 June 1953, the Philippines announced the 
repatriation of all of its remaining war criminals. Those sentenced to prison 
terms were to be released upon arrival in Japan and those who had originally 
been sentenced to death had their sentences commuted, but were to serve out 
their time in Sugamo. In December 1953 the latter were unexpectedly granted 
an amnesty by Philippines president Elpidio Quirino.
32  
  Several government departments in Australia were keenly interested in 
the peace treaty and its implications for war criminals, and concerned about 
aspects of it. The Department of the Army, for example, was evidently 
confused over whether the treaty would have an immediate impact on 
Australian control of convicted war criminals, and even after the treaty had 
come into effect, with the safeguard of Article 11, was seeking assurances 
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from External Affairs that prisoners would see out their sentences.
33 External 
Affairs, for its part, was confused about other complexities surrounding 
Japanese war criminals. For instance, a significant issue relating to the 
treatment of Korean and Formosan prisoners was emerging. As noted in the 
Introduction, a number of Koreans and Formosans had been convicted as 
Japanese nationals. They remained in Sugamo Prison after the enactment of the 
peace treaty in April 1952, even though they no longer had Japanese 
nationality, a situation that prompted considerable argument and a major legal 
action in the Tokyo civil court.
34 On 24 June 1952, External Affairs urgently 
contacted the Australian Embassy in Tokyo outlining the general confusion in 
relation to this point.  
A Japanese Attorney...  is at present arguing before the Tokyo district 
court that with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty these 
prisoners cease to be Japanese nationals and should therefore be 
released. 
The case in question looked likely to progress to the Supreme Court in Japan 
and the Japanese government was seeking the opinion of the Australian 
government as well as those of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on 
what status these prisoners now held. The Japanese attorney mentioned above 
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went to great lengths to point out to External Affairs that this was a delicate 
situation politically.
35 
  Arguably, the nationality of the prisoners concerned should not have 
affected their liability for prosecution or the validity of their sentences, so long 
as they had committed the crimes for which they were convicted. It did, 
however, affect the question of repatriation, as it raised the problem of where 
the prisoners would be repatriated to. The Nationalist Chinese thought the 
Formosans should go to Taiwan. On 1 July 1952, External Affairs contacted 
the Australian Embassy in Tokyo about this point.  
When approached in December 1947 by the Chinese Embassy here [in 
Australia] for repatriation to Formosa of war criminals of Formosan 
origin held on Manus, we informed the Embassy that in our view these 
persons were Japanese subjects at the time crimes were committed. 
Please advise by cable the outcome of Supreme Court case, as this 
would be a consideration in deciding if war criminals are to be 
repatriated.
36 
In mid-1952 the Australian government was maintaining its stance that 
Koreans and Formosans were still to be considered ‘Japanese’ as they had been 
during the war, but clearly had grave concerns over whether Japan had the 
legal means to receive such prisoners as repatriates. Officials from External 
Affairs had met with Chinese officials on more than one occasion to discuss 
the issue. In November 1951, External Affairs confirmed that seventy-four 
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Formosan prisoners remained on Manus Island and that the Nationalist 
Chinese government in Formosa had received petitions from the families of 
these men for their repatriation. The court case in Japan over Korean and 
Formosan prisoners made their repatriation problematic because the Australian 
government believed these prisoners should serve out their sentences in Japan 
(if repatriated) and should not be released to Formosa or Korea, largely 
because proper monitoring of their imprisonment could not be guaranteed 
there. If the Japanese Supreme Court found that the Japanese could no longer 
hold them, the Formosan prisoners on Manus would thus present a significant 
diplomatic issue. It could mean that it was illegal for the Japanese government 
to accept the repatriation of further Formosan prisoners, who were now foreign 
nationals. External Affairs also believed that any release of prisoners on the 
basis of their nationality would be undesirable as the Japanese government 
could see it as grounds to argue that other war criminals should be released 
from Sugamo Prison as well.
37 There appears to have been no basis for this 
fear, other than Australian government reluctance to take any action that might 
encourage the Japanese government to undo the results of war crimes trials.  
  The Supreme Court case in Japan was dismissed in July 1952.
38 A 
small number of Koreans were released from Sugamo Prison, however, 
because they had no family or other ties in Japan, although it is not clear why 
this constituted grounds for release. They were not prisoners convicted by 
Australian courts, but the Australian government viewed the decision as a 
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precedent that might be used to demand the release of all prisoners who no 
longer held Japanese citizenship. A widespread release by the Japanese 
government was unlikely and perhaps even impossible, but the Australian 
concern did have some basis. The Japanese government clearly did not want 
anything to do with these prisoners, who were now foreign nationals. When 
Formosan and Korean soldiers were demobilised after the war they had not 
been treated as Japanese citizens by the Japanese government and were not 
considered eligible for military pensions or financial aid.
39 It is conceivable 
that the government would do what it could to avoid taking continued 
responsibility for any of them. To the Australian government, or at least to the 
Department of External Affairs, the possibility that Korean and Formosan 
prisoners might have to be released, even against the will of the prosecuting 
country, appeared contrary to Article 11 of the peace treaty. The potential 
precedent of the release of the Koreans in 1952 further complicated Cabinet 
consideration of repatriation, but also increased the sense that the issue needed 
to be dealt with by the government soon.
40  
 
Pressure from Japan Builds 
Apart from elite members of society, some of whom were manoeuvring to 
retain influence under Occupation conditions, and on the other hand those 
actively involved in the labour movement and Japan Communist Party, it is 
often assumed that the Japanese populace was so preoccupied with survival in 
the early post-war years that it ignored other issues, or simply acquiesced to 
the Occupation. Recent work has shown that this was not always the case, and 
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that many Japanese people were active in grass-roots political organisations 
where they exhibited a new understanding of the possibilities for political 
action in a democratic society.
41 Democratic principles may have been 
imposed from above by the US Occupation, but they were embraced by many 
Japanese, not simply accepted as a necessary part of the defeat. 
  The past war was a dynamic presence in Japan in the 1950s. At the 
beginning of the decade, former soldiers, victims of the original Occupation 
purges and some convicted war criminals who had served short sentences were 
returning to public life.
42 Repatriates were coming back to Japan after the war 
and in some cases after long periods in the former colonies.
43 War memoirs 
and reports of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were entering 
the public domain. Franziska Seraphim describes the state of affairs at the end 
of the Occupation: 
The return of convicted war criminals to public life (and even national 
politics), the belated disclosure of the real horrors of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki atomic bombings, the stories of repatriates from Japan’s 
former empire, and the bestselling collections of war testaments 
brought a flood of memories to public prominence and provided fertile 
ground for liberal democrats, pacifists, and nationalists of different 
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vintages to formulate their respective political agendas with great 
urgency.
44  
One important example of an issue that stirred community action was the 
campaign to press the Japanese government and other governments to return 
war criminals to Japan, then to release them from custody.  
Individual Japanese had long petitioned Australian government and 
army officials on behalf of war criminals. There was no formal appeals 
mechanism in the Australian trials, so the only way to ‘appeal’ was to add a 
petition to a prisoner’s file for review by the JAG. In the great majority of 
Australian BC trials, a guilty verdict was followed by a petition from the 
convicted Japanese himself. These petitions, along with the JAG review, 
provide the only real retrospective assessment in the trial records of an 
individual’s circumstances (though similar comments appear later, in parole 
applications), and are also valuable in assessing the attitudes of Japanese war 
criminals to their conviction. As we have seen, family members and a variety 
of Japanese organisations also sent petitions and letters on behalf of convicted 
or alleged war criminals.   
After the peace treaty, civilians at home in Japan continued and 
intensified their active role in petitioning the Australian government. It is 
difficult to assess how many petitions the government received overall. One 
indication comes from a Tokyo Embassy official who noted to External Affairs 
in September 1952 that a ‘heavy volume’ of petitions was coming to the 
Embassy; the latest one made a total of seventeen that week. From this count it 
is likely that the total petitions sent to the Embassy numbered in the 
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hundreds.
45 A nationwide petition movement, ‘ai no undo’ (campaign of love),
 
arose in 1952,
46 in effect institutionalising the campaign by ordinary Japanese 
to pressure their own politicians and, directly and indirectly, foreign nations 
such as Australia. The peace treaty and the repatriation of prisoners held by 
some governments had galvanised sections of the Japanese public.  
The petitions help us to modify the common view that ordinary 
Japanese people turned their backs on the war as soon as peace came. 
Moreover, even those not involved in grass-roots organisations likely were 
among the large number of Japanese who became interested in the plight of 
BC war criminals. Fifteen million people, for example, were said to have 
signed petitions demanding the release of war criminals by the end of 1952.
47 
Odagiri Akira, chairman of the Yamanashi Prefectural Assembly, that is, a 
regional government west of Tokyo, claimed to represent the views of his 
prefecture in sending the following to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo in 
May 1952. 
When we think of those Japanese war criminals still detained and of 
their families, we cannot help feeling anxiety and worry. By those 
Japanese war criminals we mean our prefectural people who are war 
criminals detained abroad or under servitude at Sugamo prison in 
Tokyo. Our hearts flow out in sympathy to those war criminals who are 
heavily burdened with the responsibilities of the war living lonesome 
lives in strange countries and also to their families who are leading 
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unhappy, helpless lives at home separated many thousand miles away 
from their chiefs [sic], their supporters. All of us [it appears that he 
means the families and officials of the prefecture], to say nothing of the 
war criminals themselves, keenly feel the responsibilities for the last 
war, and we are now determined, with the help of god, not to repeat the 
same mistake we made before.
48 
Odagiri asks for the release of the prisoners, appealing to the Australian 
authorities for mercy and prefacing his request with thanks to the Australian 
government for granting Japan the opportunity to rebuild its relations with 
other countries. Presumably this refers to the Occupation of Japan and to the 
forthcoming peace treaty. The acknowledgement that Japan had made mistakes 
and the commitment to learn from those mistakes was common to a number of 
petitions. It is impossible to say whether the sentiments were designed only to 
appeal to the targets of the petitions, or were part of a genuine attempt to 
embrace the democratic idealism that was associated with other aspects of the 
Occupation.  
  The Yamanashi Prefecture petition links the guilt of the war criminals 
to the responsibility for the war of the ordinary Japanese civilian. Often war 
criminals were portrayed in petitions as ‘ordinary’ Japanese family men, but 
some petitions claimed that all Japanese felt responsible for the war. In saying 
that the entire prefecture felt responsible, the petition suggests that reflection 
on wartime conduct was widespread, or at least, this is what the petitioner 
wanted to convey. In the petition there is very little distinction between those 
facing military justice and those at home struggling with Japan’s 
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reconstruction. This was not a particularly common sentiment in petitions sent 
to the Australian government. The consciousness of responsibility for the war 
here also seems to contradict the standard Occupation line, which was that the 
population had been led astray by militarism which was now being removed, 
leaving behind the great majority, who had had no responsibility for the war.
49 
The Yamanashi Prefecture petition suggests a deep sense of community: the 
citizens of Yamanashi Prefecture are portrayed as sharing the trauma of the 
end of the war and embracing Japan’s future together. The issue of war 
criminals seems, if anything, to have united them. They appear unlikely to try 
to pin all blame for the war on a small group of war criminals in order to free 
themselves from responsibility, and they also seem prepared to be very active 
in trying to bring the convicted criminals home. By this stage, many Japanese 
people must have been frustrated that petitions of this kind appeared to have no 
impact on the Australian government. Nevertheless, they persisted in their 
efforts.  
Indeed, a suggestion of strong community sentiment was always 
present in the petitions. The close association with the guilt of the war 
criminals and responsibility for the war that was in the Yamanashi petition was 
often missing, but most petitions expressed some level of regret for the war, or 
a form of apology. For example, one petition from Saitama Prefecture, sent on 
behalf of the prefecture’s assembly directly to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 
called for a return to Japan of all prisoners held overseas. The wording of the 
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petition is simple. The petitioners apologise for the pain caused in the war and 
pledge never to wage war again.  
Upon reflection we Japanese inflicted a damage [sic]on the lives of 
your people and materials of your country and we feel very regretful 
that we made your people have an indelible spiritual grudge against 
us.... However, when we think of  those family-members leading their 
lives in tears, worrying themselves about the welfare of beloved ones 
who are in a foreign prison as war criminals and eagerly longing for a 
day when they may return to their native land, we cannot help feeling a 
heart breaking sympathy for them.
50 
Though there is no close association here with the guilt of the war criminals 
and the petitioners do not actually claim responsibility for the war, they 
express a strong community sentiment and acknowledge that Japanese actions 
during the war caused damage to Australia and Australian lives. 
  The Yamanashi and Saitama petitions are just two of many forwarded 
to the Australian government or the Japanese government. The Netherlands 
and British governments also received many petitions, in their case, at this 
stage, for the release of war criminals, while prisoners convicted by the 
Nationalist Chinese and most of those convicted by the French had already 
been released by mid-1952. On 10 July 1952, the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Okazaki Katsuo, indicated to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo that many 
petitions on behalf of prisoners held by Australia had been forwarded to the 
Japanese government. The Foreign Minister said he might be forced to make 
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continued representations to the Australian government for the release of war 
criminals, as pressure was building in the Diet.
51 Cabinet noted: 
Increased pressure both in the Diet and in the public is being applied in 
Japan in an attempt to effect the transfer of Japanese war criminals 
detained abroad. Organisations at present carrying out nationwide 
campaigns include the ‘League for the release of Japanese overseas’, 
which is composed of members of the Diet of all main parties, and a 
recently formed association under the sponsorship of  influential ex-
war criminals and suspects who served in Sugamo prison.
52 
Clearly, high-powered political action was occurring, and Japanese people 
were applying continued and widespread pressure on their own government as 
well as appealing to the goodwill of the Australian and other governments. 
Large numbers of people in Japan were mobilised in some way to act on behalf 
of war criminals: by signing petitions, attending mass rallies or contacting 
politicians. Cabinet documents like the one quoted above indicate that the 
Australian government was becoming aware of the pressure being exerted in 
Japan during 1952 and recognised that the campaign to have war criminals 
returned to Japan included powerful figures such as members of the Diet. 
External Affairs noted that this high-level political involvement could mean 
the unresolved issue of repatriation would have a negative impact on relations 
between Japan and Australia.
53  
  The Australian government continued to receive a large number of 
petitions from Japan, in what was described by the Australian Embassy in 
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Tokyo as a ‘concerted campaign’.
54 The movement to bring Japanese war 
criminals home and to release them was gathering so much momentum that the 
terms of the discussion changed for some Japanese people. An Embassy memo 
on 6 September 1952 reported on petitions received from Yamaguchi 
Prefecture, in the south-west of Honshu, the main island of Japan. 
Among those [petitions] received this week are several from 
organisations in the Yamaguchi Prefecture, Southern Honshu. At a 
meeting of the welfare committee of the Yamaguchi Prefectural 
Assembly on 7
th of August a resolution was passed deploring the fact 
that 41 sons of the Prefecture are still serving sentences for war crimes. 
The resolution states, inter alia, that ‘it is not too much to say that [the 
imprisonment of these 41 citizens of the prefecture] was the result of 
partial and unfair justice and many of the imprisoned were not guilty.’ 
In support of this opinion the resolution quotes the remark of the Indian 
Judge on the International Tribunal for the Far East Judge Pearl [Pal] to 
the effect that the war criminals sentenced by the Tribunal were the 
objects of official revenge of the winners for the defeat of Japan.
55 
Legally speaking, it was not possible to link the dissenting opinion of one 
judge in the Class A trials, Justice Radhabinod Pal of India, to the repatriation 
of BC war criminals tried by the Australian military courts. The tone of this 
petition, however, shows that for some Japanese, the situation was changing. 
This petition does not appeal as much as previous petitions did to the goodwill 
of the Australian authorities, but appears more steadfast and aggressive. In the 
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eyes of the Yamaguchi Prefecture petitioners, the moral balance of the 
situation had been reversed; they had passed a resolution that did not portray 
them as at fault for the war, but suggested the whole trial process was the result 
of ‘victor’s justice’. The Embassy memo goes on to indicate that many 
Japanese petitions were now going much further, even to the point of 
requesting compensation from Australian authorities for the imprisonment of 
war criminals. 
  Each petition appeared to be trying its own tactics to persuade or 
pressure the Australian government. Petitioners in Chiba Prefecture enlisted 
the aid of a member of the Japanese parliament and met with Australian 
Embassy officials in person in September 1952. Women from rural areas in 
Chiba cried in front of Australian officials while the men outlined the 
hardships being faced by prisoners before leaving with the Australian officials 
a petition signed by 5,000 Japanese. The Australian official who 
communicated this event to External Affairs described the scene as ‘novel’.
56  
  As well as family members, interested citizens and those with political 
agendas, there was another key group working for the release of BC war 
criminals. By the early 1950s, the BC criminals themselves were active in 
publicising their plight from within Sugamo Prison. Sugamo, which held all 
three classes of war criminal, had become a centre of considerable political 
activity. War criminals were able to publish their thoughts in periodicals and 
other publications that were well received by the Japanese public, many of 
whom did not see the BC criminals as responsible for the war, or as a group 
that should be cast aside by society. Sugamo Prison was relatively easy to 
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access by the early 1950s, with frequent visitors taking information in and out 
of the prison. This was not the case, of course, with Manus Island. As Wilson 
points out, by 1952, high-profile visits to Sugamo had become openly political, 
as prisoners sought to insert the repatriation and release issue firmly in 
Japanese government discussions with the former Allies. The campaign for 
release by the war criminals themselves seems to have been quite 
sophisticated, with rallies and panel discussions within the prison and even a 
meeting in December 1952 with the outgoing Japanese Ambassador to 
Australia, Nishi Haruhiko, regarding the prisoners on Manus.
57 Sugamo 
inmates appear far from silenced, far from ignored and far from shunned by the 
Japanese public. They constituted an active, effective and passionate element 
of the campaign to release war criminals. 
From an Australian government perspective, the key aspect of the 
public campaign was that it had gained widespread support in Japan, including 
high-level political support. The movement on behalf of war criminals had 
grown to a point that it had electoral worth to Japanese politicians.
58 Grass-
roots petitions were met with cynicism at times by Australian officials and had 
little direct effect. Embassy officials often derided the petitions, as in the case 
cited previously of the petition delivered in person from Chiba. Lobbying 
through the Japanese government, however, appears to have been successful 
up to a point. For example, as mentioned earlier, repatriation became a key 
consideration for the Australian Cabinet due to repeated requests from the 
Japanese government, which came about partly because of domestic pressure 
to take action on war criminals.   
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Australian organisations too were vocal in commenting on war 
criminals in the early 1950s, as we will see below. The complex repatriation 
negotiations were thus set against a backdrop of two societies that included 
organisations and individuals who were active on post-war issues and 
particularly interested in the treatment of BC war criminals. Given the 
combination of such domestic lobbying and the changing international context, 
most importantly the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Australian 
and Japanese governments faced difficult negotiations domestically, and with 
each other. For Australia, the issue was further complicated by the fact that the 
trials had long overshot their expected deadline. As a result, the last of the 
actual trials and sentencing, not just the prospect of repatriation and release, 
were occurring in a new context. 
 
Government Activity and Public Pressure in Australia 
As noted above, the government was clearly anxious about repatriation and 
desired to assess the actions taken by the other prosecuting countries. At the 
same time, Canberra indicated to US officials in August 1952 that if it could 
secure a guarantee from the Japanese government that an ‘undue’ number of 
remissions of sentences would not occur and that they would be calculated 
according to the Australian system, repatriation from Manus would go ahead.
59 
This is not an accurate representation of how discussions were proceeding in 
Australia, however. Government documents indicate that the issue was far 
from settled at this point. In any case, the government evidently either did not 
receive a sufficient guarantee from the Japanese government or was internally 
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divided on whether repatriation should go ahead. The latter appears more 
likely, since Article 11 ensured that the Australian government controlled 
releases, making a Japanese guarantee redundant. 
The government contacted the Netherlands authorities in late August 
1952 to assess their position on clemency for war criminals.
60 The Dutch had 
repatriated convicted war criminals from the Netherlands Indies in late 1949, 
but were still faced with the issue of release and other forms of clemency, and 
thus still had to negotiate with the Japanese, as did the Australians over 
repatriation. The Dutch reply to the Australian enquiry made it clear that 
releasing war criminals was linked with Cold War concerns. 
As far as the matter of granting clemency is concerned the Netherlands 
government feel in principle - and notwithstanding the absolute 
necessity of judging any and every specific case on its merits – an early 
release of war criminals might be instrumental in facilitating Japan’s 
re-entry into the international community. They are convinced such an 
attitude would contribute to Japan staying within the Western orbit. 
Nevertheless, there were also other considerations, chiefly that the Netherlands 
government was still seeking compensation from the Japanese government for 
wartime losses to its citizens in the Indies. The Japanese government had 
agreed in principle to compensate the Netherlands financially for wartime 
losses, but no action had yet been taken. The Dutch government accordingly 
indicated it would not be able to grant clemency just yet. 
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Neither the Netherlands Parliament nor the public in general are likely 
to approve of any major concessions to the Japanese government with 
regard to the release of a considerable number of Japanese war 
criminals, unless the Japanese show their good intentions in respect of 
compensation. 
In short, the Dutch memo informed the Australian government that the time 
was not right for a mass release of war criminals from the Dutch government’s 
point of view.
61 In fact, the Dutch government held out until 1956, releasing 
the last of its war criminals shortly after the Japanese government finally 
arranged to pay compensation.
62 
  The communication between the Australian and Netherlands 
governments is revealing. The Netherlands government did not appear to have 
any desire to hold Japanese war criminals for much longer, aside from using 
them to force Japan into providing financial compensation for lost assets in the 
Netherlands Indies; nor did it have serious concerns over how they would be 
paroled or serve out their sentences. Indeed, the Netherlands government could 
see the wider benefits, in terms of the Cold War, of acting generously. Thus, in 
matters of leniency towards Japan, there was a significant difference between 
the motivation of the Netherlands and Australian governments. The Australian 
government was not using the war criminals as a way of getting money out of 
the Japanese government, or for any other utilitarian purpose. Ill-feeling over 
the war seems to have been translated into a desire for financial compensation 
in the Netherlands, probably because of the loss of a significant colony to the 
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Japanese during the war years and the subsequent disruption caused by the war 
for independence in the Netherlands Indies, followed by permanent loss of the 
former colony in 1949.  
The Philippines, Burma and Indonesia also demanded compensation 
from the Japanese government, in their case as reparations rather than as 
compensation for losses sustained by private citizens.
63 The Australian 
government, however, was not really able to measure its treatment by the 
Japanese in money, or at least the government did not consider it desirable to 
take this approach. The Japanese military had not invaded Australian territory. 
The lack of a reason for financial claim perhaps meant that the official 
Australian attitude to war criminals had to be based on other grounds. Meting 
out tough but fair sentences, displaying justice and holding on to convicted 
criminals appear at face value to be the equivalent of demanding compensation 
in monetary form, as the Netherlands, the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia 
did. In fact, for the Australian government, gaining satisfaction appears to have 
taken the form of steadfast adherence to its own agenda on war criminals most 
of the time, and a determination to pursue justice in the way it saw fit. In my 
view, honouring the sacrifices made by Australians in the Pacific War was the 
most important motivation for such commitment to the war crimes trials. Not 
being premature in repatriating, releasing or otherwise showing leniency to 
Japanese war criminals was in itself a great satisfaction to the Australian 
government. Neither was the government tied as closely to the Cold War, at 
this stage, as were the US, the UK, and the Philippines, which again allowed 
the Australian government more freedom in negotiations over war criminals. 
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The US and to a lesser extent the UK were prime movers on the side of the 
‘free world’, while the Philippines was one of the countries in South East Asia 
most directly confronted by a left-wing threat, in the form of the Hukbalahap 
rebellion of the early 1950s.
64 Concerned though it was about the spread of 
Communism, the Australian government was not nearly so involved in the 
Cold War and hence did not feel such a pressing need to cement new alliances 
with anti-Communist countries. 
  By September 1952, the Australian press was reporting on the issue of 
repatriating war criminals, though the transfer of prisoners to Japan would 
prove to be further way than the media expected. An article on 10 September 
stated that repatriation from Manus Island would be discussed soon, 
presumably referring to the Cabinet agenda documents being produced around 
this time for a meeting originally planned for September 1952.
65 A report on 
14 September stated that the government was almost certain to grant the 
repatriation of all war criminals still on Manus Island, predicting that several 
conditions would be placed on the transfer, and stating that Australia was now 
the only country holding prisoners outside of Japan, which was in fact not the 
case as the Philippines still held its prisoners in Manila. The report also 
detailed the hardships that prisoners were facing on Manus, commenting that 
several prisoners were ‘willing themselves to death’. The writer believed that 
most Cabinet ministers and also the returned servicemen’s organisations 
accepted that Japan was now Australia’s ally against Communism in Asia, and 
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so it was appropriate to repatriate war criminals.
66 Parliament confirmed that 
the government was planning to discuss the issue in a Cabinet meeting but that 
no decision had yet been made.
67  
The Department of External Affairs had been in contact with the 
Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (later 
the RSL), in the weeks prior to these press reports. On 10 September 1952 the 
Department received a letter stating that the members of the organisation 
‘almost unanimously’ believed that Japanese prisoners should continue to be 
held at Manus Island and should not be released unless the Australian 
government declared that they could be.
68 This of course was actually the case, 
due to the provisions of Article 11 of the peace treaty, but public knowledge 
about the conditions surrounding repatriation was evidently not great. The 
Minister for External Affairs responded to the letter by assuring the 
organisation that no-one was being released at present although the request to 
repatriate war criminals from Manus to Japan was under consideration.
69 The 
Council for the 8
th Division (of the Second AIF), another veterans’ association, 
with many members who were former POWs, was also active, writing to the 
government to insist that a move towards clemency would be premature and 
that ‘the Asiatic mind will see it as weakness’.
70 The letter does not 
acknowledge any change in Australia’s relationship with Japan. A section of 
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the community evidently continued to believe that the Japanese should be 
treated as former combatants, not as present and future allies. In addition to 
these official representations from powerful veterans’ lobby groups, press 
articles also opposed the release, on parole or otherwise, of those Japanese 
already held in Sugamo Prison.
 71 Thus, public debate on war criminals 
continued, at least when they were in the news.  
   The government had in fact already repatriated several war criminals 
from Manus Island, before discussions on the overall policy on repatriation 
were complete. In most cases these prisoners had served their sentences and 
were free men. Such cases presented logistical difficulties, however, Katayama 
Fumihiko’s sentence expired on 30 May 1951 and he was repatriated, but not 
until 25 October, because of a lack of transport.
72 In this case, a man who 
should have been free was held for five extra months in undesirable conditions, 
due to the practical difficulties of getting him home to Japan. On the other 
hand some prisoners were allowed to leave Manus a few weeks prior to the end 
of their sentences if transport was available then, but would be unavailable on 
the actual date of their release.
73 The example of Katayama illustrates the fact 
that throughout the Australian trials and their aftermath, the resources available 
and the communication strategies in place were simply inadequate to allow the 
achievement of the lofty goals officially proclaimed as the purpose of the trials. 
No doubt the Katayama case confirmed in many Japanese minds the unfairness 
of Allied treatment of BC war criminals. As negotiations continued, more 
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Japanese prisoners neared the end of their sentences. Some twenty-two 
prisoners were repatriated from Manus in February 1952 on board the S. S. 
Nellore.
74 Large-scale repatriations of this kind, especially in a context where 
other governments were releasing prisoners, likely suggested to some Japanese 
that a general repatriation of war criminals was about to take place. 
Several other prisoners needed a transfer off the island for health 
reasons, and in some cases required a general release from their sentences. It 
seems that the medical facilities on Manus were not capable of providing 
adequate and long-lasting care for sick prisoners in the harsh climate. 
Bureaucrats were confused about the process of repatriation due to illness. 
Three Japanese returned home on board the Osaka Maru in September 1952,
75 
but the process of repatriating them proved convoluted and complex. Officials 
at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo originally believed they would resume 
their sentences in Sugamo when they had sufficiently recovered their health, 
but the situation was unclear. The prisoners were in the custody of the 
Australian navy while they were being transported to Japan. The navy then 
advised the embassy that the prisoners would not return to Manus or serve out 
their sentences in Sugamo, and the embassy was prepared to treat the sentences 
as cancelled altogether.
76 It is unclear why officials in the navy and the 
embassy concluded that prisoners would not resume their sentences. Next, and 
in complete contrast with its previous advice, the navy passed on orders to the 
embassy for the men to serve out their sentences at Sugamo Prison once they 
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had recovered their health, presumably on advice from the Australian 
government.
77 The Japanese Foreign Office reported to the Australian 
Embassy that Japanese lawyers were preparing to argue that there existed no 
legal means, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to re-imprison a Japanese 
national in Japan who had originally been tried and incarcerated overseas and 
had once been released, presumably because no official agreement on 
repatriation had yet been reached between Japan and Australia.
78 The entire 
issue appears to have been a complicated mix-up between governments and 
government departments, but the men in question did in fact return to captivity 
in Sugamo after receiving medical attention in hospital. 
 
Deciding on the Future of the War Criminals   
On 9 August 1952, the Japanese government made a verbal request to the 
Australian government to turn all remaining prisoners over to the Japanese 
authorities unconditionally. At this time, roughly 200 war criminals were still 
held on Manus Island and fifty prisoners tried by Australia were incarcerated 
in Sugamo Prison. In September 1952, the Minister for External Affairs and 
Minister for Army and Navy prepared a submission to Cabinet outlining the 
repatriation issue. The Soviet Union and the Republic of the Philippines were 
the only other countries yet to return to Japan war criminals convicted under 
their jurisdictions; the People’s Republic of China still had not prosecuted the 
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suspected war criminals it held.
79 On the other hand, none of these nations had 
ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty, whereas Australia had. 
With the Japanese petition movement and diplomatic action in full 
swing, the Australian government, chiefly External Affairs and the Department 
of the Army and Navy, was revising its approach to war criminals and 
assessing how to respond to Japanese requests for repatriation. The Australian 
government should not be seen simply as under siege diplomatically during 
this period, however, as it was actively attempting to plan appropriate action 
on repatriation, despite the complexities of the process. The key issues at the 
Cabinet meeting that was originally planned for September, but was delayed 
until later in the year, would be how the government should respond to the 
formal Japanese request to return war criminals from Manus to Japan; whether 
to accept Law No. 103 as it related to paroling war criminals; and how to deal 
with the Japanese requests, contained in petitions, to release all war 
criminals.
80  
No record of the actual Cabinet discussion exists, as Cabinet meetings 
are confidential, but papers attached to the agendum are revealing. In these 
papers, officials from External Affairs recommended that prisoners on Manus 
should be repatriated and that Law No. 103 should be accepted, providing 
acceptance were not taken to mean that the Australian government would 
automatically accept all requests for parole thereafter. It was recommended 
that the request for all prisoners to be released should be rejected. Those 
preparing the Cabinet agendum believed that this stance would conform with 
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the policies of almost all of the other governments that still held prisoners, in 
Manila in the case of the Philippines, or in Sugamo in the case of other 
countries. The Cabinet agendum predicted that the Australian public would be 
‘justifiably wrathful’ if too much leniency were shown to war criminals, but 
that public outcry over returning prisoners to Japan would be fairly moderate 
provided they served out their sentences.
81 This comment shows that officials 
from External Affairs were sensitive to public reaction, and also suggests they 
shared the sentiment that it would be improper for war criminals simply to be 
released.  
  In reality, Australian public opinion on repatriation and release of war 
criminals appears to have been far from simple. Early views were often very 
hostile, as we have seen. Macmahon Ball observed in 1948:  ‘I was often told 
in Tokyo [in 1946-1947], not only by Japanese, but by Americans and others, 
that Australians seemed more bitter and revengeful towards the Japanese 
people than any other of the Allied peoples’.
82 When the Manus Island trials 
were being set up in 1950 and prior to that, in 1949 when the hearings had 
stopped, press reaction reflected and stimulated a public feeling that as many 
Japanese suspects should be brought to justice as possible. There was genuine 
disappointment that the operations of the Australian military courts had been 
so long delayed, and that justice for the alleged war criminals had stalled.
83 
While bringing war criminals to justice was a priority, however, press reports 
also indicate a concern that Australia should not inflict injustice on the 
Japanese through untoward delay. Justice must continue to be upheld, but from 
                                                           
81 Ibid.  
82 Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally?, p. 12. 
83 For example, ‘Australia to Try Japs on Manus Island: Delay in War Trials’, 
The Sunday Herald (Sydney), 4/12/49, p. 5. 280 
 
everyone’s point of view. Moreover, attitudes towards Japan had softened to a 
degree in the years after the war. General public opinion in the early 1950s 
does not appear to have been preoccupied with revenge and indeed sometimes 
appears to have been moderate, even among former Australian prisoners of 
war.
84 Nevertheless, some sections of the community were vocal in their 
continued support of a harsh stance.
85 
In 1952 the Australian government clearly believed that public opinion 
still required a tough attitude to war criminals. Some officials also wanted 
sentences to be specifically guaranteed by the Japanese government. Even 
though Article 11 of the peace treaty seemed to secure the rights of the nation 
that had convicted the criminal, certain officials and politicians still appear to 
have feared the Japanese would release war criminals once they were out of 
direct Australian custody. There is no suggestion in the peace treaty that 
repatriating a group or approving clemency for an individual prisoner could 
constitute a precedent applicable to all prisoners subject to Article 11. 
Nonetheless, the Australian government was clearly suspicious of how matters 
would develop in Japan. The concern over the future of war criminals after 
repatriation appears to have been two-fold. First, there was a reasonably 
plausible notion that some technicality relating to parole or the nationality of 
the prisoner might result in early release. Second, and less plausible, there was 
a notion that the Japanese government would take one special repatriation case, 
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such as that of a prisoner who was ill, or one act of leniency, as a precedent for 
comprehensive leniency or even as an excuse to find a way of releasing 
unconditionally a number of prisoners convicted by Australian courts.
86 It is 
unclear how serious these possibilities appeared to the Australian government 
to be, except that they were serious enough to be discussed formally by 
External Affairs and the Department of the Army and Navy in the preparation 
of the Cabinet agendum documents and were tabled for discussion by Cabinet. 
   No decisions were reached at this point, however. The Sydney Morning 
Herald reported on 28 September 1952 that several controversial Cabinet 
decisions were being postponed because of a looming by-election in the seat of 
Flinders in South Australia and that one of them concerned the request from 
the Japanese government to repatriate war criminals.
87 The Mercury reported in 
December that no decision on repatriation would be made until at least the 
following year.
88 Yet again, the war crimes trials had become entangled with 
domestic politics.  
Despite the position of the Philippines, the People’s Republic of China 
and the Soviet Union, other governments that had conducted  war crimes trials, 
or at least those of the US, the UK, France and Nationalist China, intended by 
the early 1950s to conclude matters and move towards better relations with 
Japan. The Netherlands, as we have seen, did not immediately share this goal, 
with compensation still to be resolved. As for Australia, it appears from the 
range of opinions in the official sources that attitudes to repatriation varied 
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between reluctance and cautious acceptance. Reluctance seems to have been 
tempered by both the acknowledgment that the current diplomatic climate 
surrounding Japan was moving rapidly on from the period of war crimes trials 
and the recognition that Australia was again behind the other wartime Allies in 
softening its attitudes to the past war. In contrast to its 1949-1950 decision to 
resume trials on Manus, official sources in this period indicate that the 
Australian government was more aware that it must now make a greater effort 
to conform to its allies’ policies on war criminals.  
There were many factors to consider, for and against repatriation. For 
one thing, the prisoners on Manus Island were not idle. At this point Manus 
was run by the Australian navy, and there were plans to make it a significant 
base for Australian units in the future defence of the Pacific.
89 Japanese 
prisoners amounted to a cheap source of labour as part of various navy 
working parties on the island. The navy initially opposed repatriation on the 
grounds that war criminals were needed at Manus as labour. In April 1952, the 
Minister for Navy (and future prime minister), William McMahon, apparently 
believed that the prisoners were carrying out valuable work.
90 The navy 
recognised, however, that the situation would change later: it had been 
calculated that by 1957 the number of prisoners on Manus would have fallen 
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significantly as they completed their sentences, diminishing the source of 
cheap labour.
91  
Pappas acknowledges that several issues contributed to the Australian 
government’s reluctance to begin repatriation in the early 1950s, but suggests 
that this financial incentive was significant.
92 In the Cabinet agendum 
document, however, the labour issue is only one item out of many. There was 
certainly a financial incentive for holding prisoners on Manus Island, but it 
was evident that it would not last long, as the number of war criminals would 
soon dwindle.  Moreover, official sources suggest that other and more complex 
issues held greater weight in discussions of repatriation. The Cabinet agendum 
document framed the discussion broadly, focusing on the significant 
diplomatic questions surrounding repatriation. The desire not to harm relations 
with Japan, and to have repatriation policies similar to those of other 
governments, seem to have been more important considerations for Cabinet as 
a whole than the financial benefit of retaining prisoners on Manus. The view of 
External Affairs was that a refusal to agree to repatriation would be taken by 
the Japanese government as an indication of continued bitterness towards 
Japan, and it was now considered undesirable to suggest any such bitterness.
93 
Even the navy eventually decided to support repatriation. External Affairs was 
informed in January 1953 that after a visit to Japan, Navy Minister McMahon 
had reconsidered his stance and now believed that ‘any gesture that could be 
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made to the Yoshida Government is desirable’.
94 It is unclear exactly why the 
minister changed his mind after this trip, but his comment suggests that even 
the navy, the branch of government  most opposed to repatriation, had come to 
appreciate the importance of improved relations with Japan and the broad 
political significance of repatriating war criminals.  
The opportunities for trade with Japan probably also played a part in 
the government’s realisation that holding war criminals on Manus could be 
counter-productive to Australia’s image and interests in the region.
95 Private 
trade between Australian and Japanese businesses had resumed in 1947, and by 
the time the peace treaty came into effect, a trade imbalance between the two 
countries existed in Australia’s favour.
96 Trade was still small, but the 
opportunities for growth were evident. After all, Japan had already been 
Australia’s third-largest destination for exports in the 1930s, before the Trade 
Diversion dispute of 1936 and then war and occupation interrupted the 
pattern.
97 The peace treaty enabled the resumption of more normal trading 
relations and brought trade between Australia and Japan into a new era. Trade 
expanded from the early 1950s, mainly through export of Australian wool but 
also in the acquisition of some products from Japan.
98 Major steps to move on 
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from the war needed to be taken, if the trade potential between the two 
countries was to be further exploited. In the economic arena, it was not 
advantageous to treat Japan as a former enemy. 
After McMahon’s change of heart in early January 1953, all of Cabinet 
now supported repatriation in principle. The final decision, however, was 
deferred on 23 January after Cabinet received advice that the Japanese 
government had amended Law No. 103 to enable it to grant provisional parole 
to war criminals for periods of fifteen days for compassionate reasons, 
extendable for a further fifteen days, without limit to the number of provisional 
paroles that could be granted. A number of other amendments also made Law 
No. 103 more lenient.
99 Australian officials were concerned about these 
changes, and also expressed uncertainty about whether Article 11 would apply 
to war criminals who were repatriated after the peace treaty was enacted. They 
remained anxious, too, about the question of parole under Law No. 103, and 
how it would be applied to prisoners repatriated from Manus.
100 Hence any 
commitment to repatriation was considered premature.  
The Japanese did in fact amend Law No. 103; it appears that by the 
time the US and other foreign governments could register their protest, 
Japanese officials had already decided on the amendments.
101 The Japanese 
foreign office was, however, concerned that foreign governments might 
toughen their policies on war criminals as a result of the Japanese action and 
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Japanese officials moved to assure their US counterparts that the amendments 
to Law No. 103 were not intended to subvert Article 11 and that if any 
impression to the contrary had been conveyed, it amounted to a 
misunderstanding. In the end, US officials continued to view the Japanese 
actions as ill-advised but were satisfied with Japanese assurances that the spirit 
of Article 11 would be upheld and that US officials would still retain practical 
control over all forms of clemency.
102 In essence, Australian officials appear to 
have followed the US lead on this matter. 
The concerns of early 1953 were never truly resolved. Instead the 
Australian government simply agreed to repatriate prisoners conditionally, 
seeking extra assurances from the Japanese authorities on Law No. 103 and 
Article 11, just as the US had. On 7 July 1953, the government cabled the 
Australian Embassy in Tokyo requesting that the Japanese Foreign Minister be 
informed that Australia would now turn all prisoners over to the Japanese 
authorities at Sugamo Prison. 
Cabinet has agreed to the transfer of War Criminals from Manus Island 
to Japan, providing that the Japanese Government gives an undertaking 
that the sentences will be faithfully carried out. 
The cable also outlined further conditions. The Japanese government was 
requested to continue to comply with Australian law, presumably the 
Australian War Crimes Act and any future legislation on clemency for war 
criminals, and to consult with Australia before applying Japanese law in place 
of Australian law to a prisoner, presumably when questions of parole or other 
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forms of leniency arose, with reference to Law No. 103. The Japanese 
government provided these assurances, satisfying the Australian government 
that it would retain control of the sentences of the repatriated war criminals. A 
further condition from the Australian side was that prisoners would only be 
transferred if the Japanese government paid the costs of their transfer. The 
cable of 7 July 1953 also requested that the Japanese government take swift 
action to facilitate repatriation, as details of the Australian government’s 
decision had already been leaked to the press.
103 In fact, however, this cable 
was sent roughly twelve months after the initial press leaks about repatriation. 
The prisoners were repatriated almost immediately, disembarking in Japan 
from the Japanese ship Hakuryu Maru on 8 August 1953.
104 
  After the decision to transfer war criminals was made in July 1953, 
official Australian views of Japan progressed positively and quickly from the 
suspicion and caution that had been notable during the repatriation 
negotiations. In August 1954, Cabinet met to discuss relations between 
Australia and Japan and it was decided that more needed to be done to foster 
amity between the two countries, in order to keep Japan from forming close 
relations with Communist countries.
105 After the new policy was decided, US 
officials in Australia advised Washington of the following: 
External Affairs official has informally suggested to Embassy 
representatives Australian Government “would now not be adverse” to 
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follow any US initiative toward more liberal treatment Japanese war 
criminals. While for political reasons Australians still consider they 
cannot assume such initiative themselves, this approach believed to 
represent calculated effort bring Australian position more in line with 
US and to adopt more moderate and realistic attitude toward Japan if 
this can be done without arousing further public antipathy here.
106 
Presumably, this meant the Australian government was prepared to release 
Japanese war criminals if it could do so inconspicuously. In official Australian 
thinking, Japan was now accepted as an ally in safeguarding the security of the 
Pacific. The government reached this position roughly six years after the US 
did and after spending most of that period in opposition to the more lenient US 
policies for Japan.  
 
Parole, Reduction of Sentences and Release 
After repatriation, the next pressing issue was parole. Australia was, in fact, 
one of the last nations to start paroling prisoners in any significant numbers.
107 
An Australian system for reducing a prisoner’s sentence for good behaviour 
was in place; very small numbers of prisoners had had their sentences remitted 
under this system but there was not yet any provision for parole, even though 
the Japanese authorities were sending parole requests to the Australian 
government under the terms of Article 11. In December 1953, External Affairs 
circulated a draft Cabinet submission to several government departments 
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requesting their participation in setting up a Parole Committee for War 
Criminals. The Attorney-General, Department of External Affairs and the army 
all provided officials to sit on the committee, which recommended that an 
official Australian system of parole should be set up.
108  
It is unclear why it took so long to establish a system, but in April 1955 
the government decided that prisoners would be eligible for parole after 
serving two-thirds of a sentence of less than fifteen years and in the case of a 
sentence greater than fifteen years, after serving ten years. The guidelines were 
designed to match US policy, but Cabinet decided that parole should only be 
granted on this basis if the rules matched the UK practice as well. This 
produced considerable confusion, and the caveat quickly proved to be 
unworkable as Australian eligibility for parole would necessarily be more 
lenient than the UK practice because the UK did not parole Japanese prisoners: 
it allowed only remission of sentences.
109 In the end, prisoners held by 
Australia were granted remission on a basis comparable to the UK practice. 
The UK altered its policy in August 1955, however, by reducing war 
criminals’ sentences. Thereafter, Australian officials felt that parole could go 
ahead because it would not appear more lenient than the UK practice.
110 
Releases from this point remained slow, without any significant progress until 
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1956. As will be discussed later, the Australian government became 
dissatisfied with the rate of release and reviewed its parole system at that point.  
  Although there were still significant obstacles to overcome before 
widespread release of Japanese prisoners occurred, the April 1955 Cabinet 
discussions were the starting point for an effort by the government to bring its 
policy on war criminals into line with Australia’s new general policy for Japan, 
created in 1954: that is, the decision to foster good political and diplomatic 
relations with Japan. In April 1955, External Affairs and the Department of the 
Army submitted to Cabinet that Australia needed to adopt a more lenient 
stance on war criminals for seven reasons: Pacific security relied on Japan 
being aligned with the West; the Japanese government had indicated that the 
continued incarceration of war criminals was a major obstacle in improving 
relations with the West; Australian officials believed that a moderation in 
Australia’s stance would create goodwill in Japan towards Australia; some 
Class A war criminals had already been released and the Australian public had 
not reacted badly; although Japanese foreign policy was firmly based on co-
operation with the US the possibility that Communist propaganda might 
influence Japan could not be ruled out; Communist China had a far more 
lenient approach to war criminals than Australia (though it is unclear on what 
basis the government believed this to be the case), which could generate 
goodwill towards China in Japan; and, finally, the number of BC war criminals 
held by Australia was small and they would not present a security risk if they 291 
 
were released, whereas they were currently treated as martyrs while in 
prison.
111 
 These assessments indicate that matters relating to BC war criminals, a 
dimension of Australia post-war foreign policy that has attracted almost no 
attention among historians, were intimately related to a number of the biggest 
issues that the Australian government was facing in the 1950s. In particular, 
issues associated with war criminals directly affected and were affected by 
discussions of regional security and Australia’s position in the Cold War. It 
was on the basis of these seven points, none of which mention economic 
benefits, that the government approved a system of parole.
112 It is true that 
policy on war criminals was generally the domain of External Affairs and the 
army, so a tendency to focus heavily on Pacific security and geopolitics, rather 
than on the economic benefits of ties between the two countries, was likely. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis that the government placed on the war criminals’ 
role in relations with Japan, and to a lesser extent on Cold War considerations, 
is striking.  
Under the provisions of Article 11, Australia retained control of all 
forms of clemency for war criminals, including parole, right up until the last 
prisoners it had convicted were released in June 1957. Recommendations for 
parole, however, came regularly from the Japanese authorities according to the 
provisions of the peace treaty. The National Offenders’ Prevention and 
Rehabilitation Commission (NOPAR), a Japanese government body that 
implemented Law No. 103, and hence dealt with Article 11, investigated a 
                                                           
111 ‘Cabinet Submission – Granting of Parole’, 1/4/55, NAA, Melbourne, 
MP729/8, 452819. 
112 Ibid.  292 
 
prisoner as he became eligible because of time served for recommendation for 
parole or a reduction in sentence. The investigation process was thorough and 
usually included details of the prisoner’s crime and sentence, and a review of 
his case and of his conduct and work during imprisonment. The investigation 
also noted what a prisoner intended to do upon release, and his family 
situation, including whether his family depended on him financially. The 
report usually claimed that a prisoner had completely reformed from 
militarism. Details of the investigation were summarized by the Japanese 
officials looking at the case, but documents from the prisoner himself, such as 
completed questionnaires, were also included in the materials sent to the 
Australian government, as were the original reports from Sugamo Prison and 
the Australian War Crimes Compound on Manus describing the character and 
behaviour of the prisoner and in the case of Manus, his work record. A lengthy 
explanation of the reasons for the recommendation for parole was also 
appended.
 These explanations usually included any reasons for clemency that 
could be found by NOPAR in the original trial. Mostly, the prisoners stood by 
their original defence, which makes them in some ways appear unrepentant. 
Often, however, the recommendation also claimed that the prisoner deeply 
regretted the incident in question. In this way the review of a prisoner’s case 
usually suggested he regarded himself as not guilty of a crime, but was deeply 
reflective on his wartime conduct all the same.
113 
  In its recommendations for parole, NOPAR explored some of the 
controversial aspects of the BC trials. For example, the claim of Superior 
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Orders was often used to justify the proposed parole of a prisoner. In some 
cases the recommendation implies that the original verdict was unfair. One 
example is provided by the recommendation for the parole of low-ranking 
Japanese soldier Kondo Norio, sentenced for executing prisoners at Gasmata in 
New Britain in March 1942. Kondo claimed he had followed orders to execute 
ten Allied soldiers. NOPAR noted: 
It seems, however, that in view of the fact that Commander Miyata 
committed suicide during his confinement as a suspected war criminal 
and, further, that Lieutenant Kawai and a surgeon attached to the 
garrison at Gasmata who were in a position to testify to the then 
circumstances were both dead at the time of his trial, he [Kondo] was 
held responsible for the execution as the highest responsible officer and 
then sentenced to a heavy penalty.
114 
NOPAR thus suggested that Kondo received his heavy sentence of life 
imprisonment solely because he was the only one left to be held accountable 
for the crime. The implication is that the original sentence is explained either 
by the reluctance of the Australian authorities to allow a serious crime to be 
punished by only a light sentence, or by the failure of trial authorities to 
acknowledge that Kondo was in a difficult position, being one of few Japanese 
soldiers connected to the incident left alive.  
It is striking that NOPAR criticised the trial process on behalf of the 
prisoner in its recommendation for reduction of sentence and for parole, at a 
time when it would seem that the prisoner would have benefitted from 
claiming to be totally repentant. In general, the goal of the recommendations 
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appears to have been to cover all of the angles for clemency that might 
convince Australian authorities. The recommendations thus often amount to a 
contradictory collection of reasons for a reduction in sentence. For example, 
along with the veiled criticisms of the trial process in Kondo’s case, the 
recommendation also includes a statement that he had converted to Christianity 
and was no longer a militarist.
115 The latter claim suggests that at one point he 
had been a militarist, which contradicts the other argument that he had been 
unhappily following orders when executing the Australian prisoners.  
  By the mid-1950s, issues concerning war criminals had exceeded 
consideration of individual cases and had become an openly political matter 
between Japan and Australia. By 1956, Australian policy on the release of war 
criminals was almost totally focused on promoting good relations with Japan, 
while still maintaining the integrity of Australia’s system of dealing with the 
convicted criminals. The Japanese Embassy in Canberra approached the 
Australian government in March 1956 to request early release of war criminals 
convicted by Australian courts, noting that the Netherlands was expected to 
release its remaining prisoners soon, and the US and UK were also working 
towards early release.
116 The Japanese authorities provided a detailed analysis 
showing that Australian releases were behind those of the other countries.
117 
The initial Australian parole system had indeed been slower to take effect than 
the parole systems of other countries for reasons that will be explained below; 
the Minister for External Affairs and the Minister for Army and Navy 
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submitted to Cabinet in April 1956 that Australia needed to alter its system for 
parole and other forms of clemency to expedite the release of Japanese war 
criminals.
118 The issue appears to have been of genuine concern to the 
Australian government, regardless of Japanese pressure. External Affairs noted 
that by the end of the year, only prisoners convicted by Australian and US 
courts would remain in custody in Sugamo Prison.  
 The Australian government quickly sought to confirm with the 
governments mentioned by the Japanese Embassy in March 1956 whether the 
information provided was correct, and found that it more or less was. The 
Netherlands government had been releasing small groups of war criminals 
since 1952 and although Dutch officials assured the Australian government 
that a blanket release would not occur, they also stated in March 1956 that 
these releases would continue.
119 In fact, the last prisoners held under Dutch 
jurisdiction were released in July 1956, less than six months after agreement 
had been reached with the Japanese government on compensation. External 
Affairs was concerned that if it did not make changes, Australia would appear 
overly harsh, which could harm attempts to improve relations with Japan.
120 
This attitude shows how dramatically Australian policy on war criminals had 
changed since 1945 and even since 1950. In those years there had been little 
concern for how Australian policy appeared externally and more concern to 
ensure policy did not appear too lenient internally. Moreover, the way the 
Japanese government applied diplomatic pressure on Australia, by showing 
that it realised how ‘out of step’ with the other wartime Allies Australia would 
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be if it did not change policy, suggests that the Japanese had a sound 
understanding of official Australian thinking in this period. 
  The slight differences between each government’s sentencing and 
clemency regulations meant that the release of war criminals was not uniform 
among the Allies. Conformity with other nations in policy on war criminals 
was thus difficult to achieve. The External Affairs submission to Cabinet in 
April 1956 noted two issues. One was that Australia was slightly reducing the 
sentences of those imprisoned for more than fifteen years upon Japanese 
request, but was not showing leniency to those with shorter sentences. The 
submission recommended reducing all sentences above ten years, which would 
get prisoners released faster, though war criminals convicted by Australia 
would still remain in prison until 1961. One of the reasons that Australia’s 
prisoners were remaining incarcerated for longer than those given the same 
initial sentences by the UK was that the UK applied sentences from the date of 
arrest whereas Australian courts imposed sentences from the date of the court 
proceedings. The difference between the two dates could be a significant one. 
Also, the UK appeared to be making a concerted effort to release war criminals 
as the government had recently reduced life sentences, and sentences of twenty 
years in prison, to fifteen years. In addition, the UK government was also 
applying further remissions, meaning that the few prisoners convicted by UK 
courts who remained in prison were to be released by the end of 1956.
121 The 
second issue noted by External Affairs in April 1956 was that the status of 
Korean and Formosan prisoners had not been fully resolved. Granting parole to 
these prisoners would be difficult because they would not be able to serve their 
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parole in Japan, as they were no longer Japanese citizens, and the conditions of 
their parole would therefore be less easily regulated and monitored. The 
Japanese government wanted Korean and Formosan prisoners to receive a 
general amnesty. In an indication that Australian officials were not yet 
prepared to forgo all of their rights over war criminals in order to secure better 
relations with Japan, however, External Affairs recommended that an amnesty 
not be granted and that instead the prisoners be allowed to serve out parole in 
their country of origin.
122 
  In May 1956 the Australian government decided that it would not alter 
the existing parole system in order to expedite releases, but instead would 
cease paroles altogether, in favour of exercising clemency for war criminals 
through a revised and more lenient system of remitting sentences. Moreover, 
throughout the rest of 1956 the government began to remit the sentences not 
only of prisoners who became newly eligible for parole but also 
retrospectively, for those who had been paroled already.
123 This practice solved 
the problem associated with the Korean and Formosan prisoners – specifically, 
that their parole could not necessarily be supervised and monitored by the 
Japanese authorities under Law No. 103 because they might reside outside 
Japan - and also greatly sped up the outright release of war criminals.   
   The last war criminals convicted by Australian courts were released on 
28 June 1957. The Australian government had informed the Japanese 
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government in March that this final release would occur.
124 Australia released 
prisoners at that point due to consistent pressure from the Japanese government 
as well as a general realisation that new regional circumstances required such a 
move. It appears that the impending negotiation of a trade deal between Japan 
and Australia in July 1957 and the planned visit of Japanese prime minister 
Kishi Nobusuke later that year were factors in the decision. Australian progress 
on matters relating to war criminals had been rapid since the mid-1950s. 
Meanwhile, the US government had been experiencing difficulties in 
concluding its release program, specifically in finding a way to release the 
worst war criminals, who had extremely long sentences, without totally 
undermining the principle of justice under which they had been tried in the 
first place.
125 As a result, Australia ended up releasing its last war criminals 
earlier than the US did, despite having been so far behind for so many years. In 
fact, US officials recognised that the final Australian releases put them under 
pressure to free the last war criminals under their control.
126  
In the final negotiations with Australia, Japan appears to have been 
very confident in its diplomacy. As one indication of this, in May 1957 the 
Japanese ambassador in Australia met a high-ranking member of External 
Affairs and requested that the release of prisoners be completed by 14 June as 
the Japanese prime minister was travelling to Washington and this would allow 
him to press strongly for the release of all US-sentenced prisoners. External 
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Affairs found this request unacceptable. It is revealing, however, that the 
Japanese ambassador felt he was in such an advantageous position that he 
could request Australia’s participation in a scheme that might potentially 
embarrass the United States, Australia’s close ally.
127 
By the time the final releases of war criminals occurred, Japan had 
entered a new phase of political and economic ties with a number of former 
enemies, including a historic trade agreement signed in July 1957 with 
Australia.
128 The Australian government and military had proven itself 
throughout the war crimes trials and beyond to be as determined to bring Japan 
to account for the war as any other nation. Eventually, however, the 
government took a pragmatic and political approach and after years of being 
behind the US, managed to conclude its dealings with Japanese war criminals 
ahead of the US. From the first trials to the last release, the entire process had 
taken roughly twelve years.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Commerce began to dominate relations between Japan and Australia in 1957. The 
Japanese prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987), and representatives of the 
Australian government, signed the Japan-Australia Agreement on Commerce in 
Hakone, Japan, on 6 July 1957, in what was considered in both Japan and 
Australia to be a landmark trade deal.
1 The agreement was ratified by the 
Australian parliament later that year. Kishi visited Australia in December 1957, 
addressing several functions and speaking at length on a number of occasions. 
Kishi was a controversial figure with close ties to Japan’s war-time regime. He 
had been a senior bureaucrat in Japan’s puppet government in Manchukuo in the 
late 1930s and served as Minister for Commerce and Industry from 1941 to 1943 
and as Deputy Munitions Minister in 1943-1944. He was purged during the 
Occupation and arrested as a suspected Class A war criminal, though he was 
released without charge in December 1948. In 1952, he was depurged and won 
election to the Diet as a conservative.
2 Kishi's visit to Australia may have been 
about the future, but he also represented the past.  
There were two main themes in Kishi’s speeches to Australian officials in 
December 1957. He expressed gratitude at the welcome he had received in 
Australia, and focused heavily on the economic futures of the two countries, 
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which he believed were on a parallel course and had great potential to be mutually 
beneficial.
3 Kishi gave his most significant address at Parliament House in 
Canberra on 4 December. In this speech he deviated from his strong focus on 
economic issues, highlighting Japan’s transformation into a democracy and also 
alluding to the history of the relationship between the two countries. Kishi noted 
‘a long tradition of friendship between Australia and Japan, including, in the First 
World War, our cherished association with your immortal ANZACS’, but also 
referred to ‘four years of tragic interruption to that friendship’, offering ‘our 
heartfelt sorrow for what occurred in the war’.
4 During his visit he laid a wreath at 
the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. In the early 1950s it would have been 
unthinkable to the Australian public that someone who so clearly represented the 
Japanese war-time elite might play a key role in rebuilding friendship between the 
two countries, but Kishi’s 1957 visit was met with only muted protest.
 5  
The landmark events of 1957 - the release of the last Japanese war 
criminals in Australian custody, the trade deal and the Kishi visit -  mark a new era 
in relations between Japan and Australia and the end of post-surrender diplomacy 
between the two countries. Kishi’s professed regret over the war, the welcome that 
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he claimed he received from Australian officials and the strong focus on the future 
of the two countries suggest that both governments were making a concerted effort 
to move on from the war. The emphasis was firmly on the opportunity associated 
with the future, not the record of the past, and in Australia, government policy on 
Japan was dominated for the next fifteen years by commerce officials. External 
Affairs was no longer central to Australia's relations with Japan, in marked 
contrast to the crucial role played by that department during the 1950s.
6  
The apparently bright outlook for rapprochement between the two 
countries in 1957 followed a twelve-year post-war period in which relations 
between Japan and Australia had been far less amicable. During the Second World 
War Japan had posed a direct threat to Australia and in 1945 Australia’s future 
security remained highly uncertain in the eyes of many officials. Internally, 
Australian society was still in shock after the acute sense of danger produced by 
Japan's early victories in the war, the human and financial cost of the conflict, and 
especially the condition of returning prisoners of war. The sense of shock was 
fuelled by government manipulation of the press, which contributed to anger 
against Japan and overwhelming public support for war crimes trials. Japan’s 
unconditional surrender had not been enough to satisfy either the government or 
the public that the problem of Japan had been dealt with. The government and the 
Australian people felt that they had sacrificed a great deal during the war and that 
this sacrifice ought to be recognised. Pursuing Japan quickly became a key part of 
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the government’s foreign policy agenda, driven by the imperative to act on the 
widespread outrage over Japanese war-time conduct, the need to preserve 
Australia’s security against a possibly resurgent Japan and a desire to emerge from 
the war as a significant diplomatic player in regional political affairs.  
The government secured a degree of representation in regional affairs 
when Australian officials were selected for several important roles in the 
Occupation of Japan. The government soon found, however, that its ability to act 
independently and to express its vision for Japan’s future was hampered by US 
domination of the Occupation. Moreover, the key Australian policy of the early 
Occupation, to ensure that the Emperor was placed on trial, ended in 
disappointment. Australians thought their war-time experience had been unique, 
and wanted to bring Japan to account for the war and have a strong say in its 
future. The prosecution of Class B and C war criminals was one matter over which 
the government had almost complete and independent control. Through the trials, 
suspected war criminals could be brought to justice and, at least potentially, 
Australia could thereby exert an influence over the future course of Japanese 
society, politics and foreign policy.  Thus, from the beginning, the tribunals 
reflected Australian national sentiment.  
Senior Australian officials publicly described this national sentiment as a 
pursuit of justice, while at least one prosecutor later admitted it had also 
incorporated a desire for vengeance.
7 In fact the trials included both dimensions: 
they constituted a political issue that afforded Australian officials the opportunity 
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to respond independently to Japanese war-time conduct and at the same time they 
provided the Australian military and the public with an opportunity for revenge, 
by bringing actual perpetrators of crimes to account in military courts. The 
enthusiasm to do both of these things was such that it is difficult to see how 
Australia could have developed a policy on Japan in the initial years after the war 
without the opportunities presented by the war crimes trials.  
  The US-led Occupation of Japan generally embraced retribution against 
Japan’s wartime regime during the early years, but support for measures such as 
war crimes trials later receded. The Occupation began with the goals of 
democratising and demilitarising Japan. By 1948, however, US aims for Japan 
were heavily influenced by the escalating Cold War. This shift in US policy 
contributed to the decision of most of the war-time Allies to conclude their 
prosecutions of suspected Japanese war criminals. Retributive policies focusing on 
the old regime in Japan were becoming less important in the new direction of the 
Occupation, and in any case the separate governments conducting war crimes 
trials had other pressing concerns. The effect of the Reverse Course on the 
Australian trials, however, was different. The Australian government disagreed 
with the new US policies in Japan, and was reluctant to accept the role the US 
defined for Japan in the future security of Asia. Australian officials continued until 
1952 to view Japan as a potential danger to the region, which limited their 
appreciation of Japan as an ally against the apparent Communist threat. While 
Australian officials did not necessarily want Japan  permanently to remain an 
international pariah, the government did believe that policies created to punish the 305 
 
war-time regime and remove Japan's capacity to wage war should not at this stage 
make way for measures to reintegrate Japan into the community of nations  and to 
rehabilitate its economy. 
   In late 1945 the Australian authorities had taken up the task of prosecuting 
suspected war criminals with alacrity, and with the intention of trying all those 
who deserved to be brought to account.  In 1948 and 1949, however, they faced 
serious logistical difficulties. Despite these obstacles, which came on top of the 
now unfavourable international context, the government did not cancel its legal 
proceedings. Instead it began planning for new prosecutions on Manus Island. In 
1949, as a formal peace seemed to draw nearer, US officials, concerned primarily 
with rehabilitating Japan to become a successful member of the democratic camp, 
tried to ensure that all prosecutions would finish well before the peace treaty was 
signed. It would have been easier for the Australian government to end its trials at 
this point, avoiding the danger of falling out of line with US policy for Japan and 
also saving time and resources, but it does not appear that this was ever considered 
a suitable option. In Australia the desire for trials was evidently still strong. 
The Manus prosecutions began in 1950, reaffirming Australia’s image as a 
nation that was tough on Japan. The proceedings represented much more than just 
unfinished military business. In fact, many suspects were released in an effort to 
conclude the trials as quickly as possible, so the effectiveness of Manus in 
‘finishing the job’ was, at best, token. The real reason the trials continued into 
1950 and 1951 was that the two imperatives driving them from the start remained 306 
 
very potent. The government wanted to take a stand on Japan for political and 
diplomatic reasons, and both the government and the people wanted revenge.  
The Australian government’s hard line on war criminals in 1950 reflected 
an emerging tension between  policies to deal with the former enemy and policies 
aimed at building friendships with its allies in the region. One of the strategic and 
diplomatic realities  the  government faced after the war was that it could no 
longer rely on British strength in the Pacific. In the post-war world, Australia had 
to rely heavily on the US for security. Yet despite this dependence on good 
relations with the US, Australian policy on Japan was at odds with that of the US 
on several points. Australian officials objected to the proposed role for Japan as a 
US ally in the region, and were anxious about US willingness to encourage 
Japanese rearmament. Most of their concerns were allayed during the negotiations 
over the peace treaty, and especially with the agreement on the ANZUS security 
pact with the US and New Zealand. Nevertheless, Australia and the US remained 
at odds over war criminals. 
The Australian government managed to conclude its prosecutions prior to 
the signing of the peace treaty in September 1951 but  it remained tough on war 
criminals and negotiations over the repatriation and release of Japanese prisoners 
after the end of the Occupation in April 1952 were protracted and difficult. There 
would seem to have been little external political value in maintaining a strong 
stance on war criminals, especially when Australia’s allies were moving on 
rapidly from retribution against Japan. A combination of mistrust of the Japanese 
government and wariness of domestic public opinion, however, compelled the 307 
 
government to continue to deal with Japan resolutely. Australian officials opposed 
the idea that Japan might be granted any share in decisions on the future fate of 
convicted war criminals and they appear to have maintained an objection to 
Article 11 of the peace treaty even though it allowed Japan almost no power over 
the release of prisoners. Such a harsh approach to Japan and willingness to go 
against US preferences now contradicted the general trend of Australian foreign 
policy. The government supported the US in the Korean War and had lobbied US 
officials hard for a security pact between the two countries, but policies on war 
criminals indicated that a significant area of disagreement persisted over the status 
of Japan. As I have shown, the US remained outwardly supportive of Australia’s 
right to conduct war crimes trials in 1950 and appeared patient with the continuing 
tough stance by the government thereafter, but US internal documents also show a 
clear sense of frustration at Australia’s policies. 
By August 1953 the Australian government had accepted that it could not 
indefinitely remain out of line with the policies of its allies on Japan and it agreed 
to repatriate war criminals. The matter was not yet resolved, however, as the 
government then had to consider how to apply clemency to those incarcerated in 
Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. Over the next six months Australian policy on clemency 
was slow to develop. In 1954, things began to change significantly. The 
government created a new general policy for Japan on the basis that Australia 
should do whatever it could to create better relations between the two countries 
and to prevent Japan from falling under the influence of Communism. Policy on 
clemency accordingly altered to allow more Japanese prisoners to be released 308 
 
early. This change came almost two years after disagreement over Japanese 
rearmament had been resolved and two years after BCOF soldiers had returned 
home with the end of the Occupation. The delay indicates that policy on war 
criminals remained both important and lively, long after other issues affecting 
relations among Japan, Australia and the US had been resolved. At the grassroots 
level, reactions to the Australian government’s policies on war criminals indicate 
the authorities were probably correct in concluding that the majority of the public 
preferred a tough stance on Japan. A 1952 Gallup poll showed that 60% of 
respondents believed Japan would become a threat again in the future.
8 Press 
coverage of the BC trials, on the other hand, suggests that public opinion was 
more complex than is commonly thought. At various points in the twelve-year 
process of convicting and then releasing war criminals, public reaction was muted. 
Though a hard core of anti-Japanese sentiment persisted well into the 1950s, some 
people also appear to have wanted Australia to move on from the war or at least to 
treat war criminals as justly as possible.  
Australian scholars have commonly regarded the 1952 San Francisco 
peace treaty as the watershed in Australia-Japan relations that propelled the two 
countries into a new era. In light of negotiations over war criminals, however, 
1952 is too early a date to consider as the beginning of a new relationship. The 
peace treaty was without doubt a very significant event in the post-war era but it 
did not resolve all of the lingering war-time issues between the two countries, and 
post-surrender politics continued for years after the treaty. The two countries 
                                                           
8 Rix, The Australia-Japan Political Alignment, p. 97. 309 
 
progressed slowly from being survivors of the war, to uneasy bit-players in US 
security policy and finally to trade partners and friends. The evolution of 
Australian policy on BC war criminals charts this progression of relations more 
accurately than does any division of the post-war era in Japanese-Australian 
relations into a pre-peace treaty and a post-peace treaty period. Australia’s BC war 
crimes trials constitute the one major foreign policy issue that spanned the entire 
era between the end of the war in 1945 to the landmark trade agreement of 1957. 
Writing on the early post-war period in Australian history generally 
acknowledges that Japan was a significant focus of an increasingly independent 
and energetic Australian foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, the BC trials have 
received very little scholarly attention. The topics commonly discussed in relation 
to Japan are the formation and operation of BCOF, the forthright Australian 
opposition to leniency on rearmament in the peace treaty and to any Occupation 
moves that could potentially allow Japan to threaten Australia in the future, and 
the burgeoning economic relationship between the two countries in the 1950s. 
Omitting the trials, however, omits a major part of the story of Australia's 
relationship with Japan, of the evolution of post-war foreign policy, and of the 
connections between foreign policy and domestic concerns. The omission is all the 
more glaring given the consensus among scholars that the POW experience was, 
and remains, particularly important to the Australian people. While the centrality 
of POWs in post-war Australian politics and culture is acknowledged, one of the 
issues most closely associated at the time with the returned prisoners - namely the 
trials of those Japanese soldiers suspected of mistreating them - is ignored.  310 
 
Study of the BC war crimes trials makes two major contributions to the 
understanding of Australian foreign policy. First, the trials show how Australian 
policy on Japan developed when it operated free of direct US control, illuminating 
the distinctive aspects of the Australian government’s approach to Japan. An 
assessment of the government's dealings with Japan that does not pay attention to 
the determined attempt to bring war criminals to justice might well conclude that 
the authorities were cautious and even timid in their approach. A focus on the 
trials, however, shows Australian policy to have been much tougher. Second and 
more fundamental, the pursuit of war criminals establishes that throughout the 
period between Japan's surrender and the 1957 trade deal, Australian foreign 
policy attempted to strike delicate balances between domestic concerns and 
external political goals, between developing a distinctively Australian response to 
Japanese war-time conduct and promoting closer relations with the US, between 
maintaining a hard line on Japan and creating other policies that recognised  Japan 
as an important partner in combating the new threat of Communism. No other 
policy matter so strongly combined such pressing social, diplomatic and security 
concerns and no other foreign policy issue in relation to Japan spanned the entire 
period from 1943, when investigations of war crimes began, to the new era of 
trade and friendship signalled by the 1957 commercial agreement.     
  Despite being an important feature of Australian foreign policy after the 
war and crucial to the development of Australia-Japan relations in the 1950s, the 
BC trials are most commonly studied to assess their fairness. The matter is far 
from settled, and the legal and moral fairness of the trials themselves is likely to 311 
 
remain contested for some time. Perhaps another way of assessing the trials is to 
examine the release of prisoners. From 1950 onwards for most of the Allies, and 
from 1952 onwards for Australia, issues relating to war criminals were 
increasingly dominated by politics and diplomacy, rather than considerations of 
individual guilt or justice. In fact, political pressure and opportunity had driven 
Australia to pursue war criminals in the first place, and the same factors 
contributed to the moves to end the trials and show clemency to the Japanese 
prisoners. The prosecutions were always far more than a legal undertaking and this 
is why purely legal understandings of them are insufficient. The pursuit and 
release of BC war criminals is overwhelmingly a political story and political 
considerations, including idealistic ones like the need to punish militarism and 
create precedents for the conduct of war, produced trials and management of 
prisoner sentences that ultimately were focussed on imperatives other than the 
need to punish individual perpetrators of terrible offences. Thus, concerns about 
the guilt of  individual Japanese soldiers made way for pragmatism, idealism and 
political gain, as did concerns for victims of Japanese crimes when the sentences 
of war criminals became a political bargaining chip after the proceedings had 
ended.  
  This thesis shows that the Class B and C war crimes tribunals and their 
aftermath constitute a twelve-year foreign policy project that illuminates 
Australia’s relations with Japan and the US during an era when Australia sought 
energetically to establish itself as an enthusiastic and independent participant in 
Asia-Pacific politics. The increasingly political dimension of the BC trials, their 312 
 
propensity to inflame domestic opinion and to become entwined with high-level 
policies, and the persistence of issues associated with war criminals means they 
offer a unique perspective on post-war Australian politics, society and, especially, 
foreign policy.     
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